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Limitations in the shipbuilding industry’s understanding of the precise workings of its 
market have led to difficulties in the prosecution of a subsidy and countervailing 
measures case in WTO and to obstacles in the furtherance of an international 
shipbuilding agreement in OECD.  Weaknesses stem in particular from lack of 
precision in the definition of the market, from incomplete understanding of the 
concept of ‘like product’ as it relates to commercial shipbuilding, and from limited 
research into cross price elasticity.   
In this dissertation the nature and boundaries of the market are investigated, leading 
to a simple definition of the ‘international commercial shipbuilding market’.   This 
differs from existing definitions, for example in OECD and EU, in that it is based on 
the attributes of the shipbuilder, rather than attributes of the product.  A meaning of 
‘like product’ that is consistent with WTO case law is defined for commercial 
shipbuilding, with the conclusion that likeness between products should be 
determined by competition for the same units of capacity.  Technical substitutability 
of a unit of shipbuilding capacity is analysed in relation to factors that determine 
competitiveness, concluding that substitutability is wide with few exceptions and that 
technical aspects of the products are therefore of limited significance in determination 
of ‘likeness’.  Correlation and linear regression are used to demonstrate empirically 
that cross price elasticity exists in the commercial shipbuilding market, thereby 
establishing that apparently dissimilar products, such as an LNG tanker and a 
capesize bulk carrier, may compete for capacity in the same market and can 
therefore be considered as ‘like products’.   
The nature of market leaders, pursuing competitiveness through high investment and 
economies of scale, and the persistence of cycles in demand mean that subsidy and 
conflict are likely to remain a feature of competition in international commercial 
shipbuilding.  Conclusions presented in this dissertation will assist in the future 
analysis and definition of such conflicts and hopefully also in resolution.  It is hoped 
that conclusions will also assist in the pursuit of improved governance of the industry 
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1. Introduction and statement of the problem 
Shipbuilding is the manufacturing and assembly industry that creates new ships and 
this dissertation concentrates on the ‘commercial’ sector of that industry.  What 
precisely is meant by the term ‘commercial’ in this context is an important part of this 
research but at the most basic level this separates the sector of interest from warship 
building, which is economically a very different business.  The research also deals 
with shipbuilding yards, which means facilities for the construction, launching and 
delivery of new ships, as opposed to shiprepair yards that are part of the service 
sector of industry. 
Commercial shipbuilding is periodically plagued by overcapacity, being slow to 
respond to changes in demand, and this is the status of the industry prevailing at the 
time that this research is being undertaken.  Zannetos remarked on the general trend 
in his influential work on the tanker markets in the 1960s, rationalising what persons 
operating in the industry know to be a general truth: “As soon as prices per Dwt start 
their upward trend, the shipbuilders rush to accept orders and, in general, become 
very accommodating.  They promise early delivery, omit escalation clauses (that is, 
quote fixed prices), grant liberal credit terms, and so on.  This situation, however, 
does not last long; soon the shipbuilders play “hard to get” and assume the upper 
hand with demands for the total payment even before delivery, escalation clauses, 
and five to six year delivery schedules.  At the same time, instead of devoting all 
their capacity to shipbuilding, they start employing part of their organization efforts to 
expansion, thus cutting their capacity somewhat for the purposes of building future 
capacity” (Zannetos, 1966, p. 79).  The capacity developed tends to be persistent in 
the face of periodic downturns in demand, leading to the cyclical periods of 
overcapacity.  Shin and Lim, for example, comment in considering shipbuilding 
competitive strategy in the post-2008 era that: “Widespread overcapacity has pushed 
ship prices to below economic levels for quite some time” (Shin and Lim, 2013).  The 
Editorial Comment section of the Naval Architect Magazine in February 2014 was 
titled: “Overcapacity policy key to balanced shipbuilding industry” and in a 2013 
publication funded by the State of Finland, aiming to identify best practise in 
surviving the prevailing downturn in commercial shipbuilding, the authors stated:  
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“During the last century, the European shipbuilding industry ran into two similar 
crises caused by the overcapacity of shipyards”.  (Keltiniemi et al., 2013).  
The prevailing problem is only the latest incarnation of an issue that the OECD has 
been trying to resolve since the 1960s and which, in reality, is probably as old as the 
industry itself.  In discussing investment in British shipyards between 1860 and 1880 
for example, leading up to the apogee of British dominance of the industry, Pollard 
and Robinson note of investors: “The highly cyclical nature of the industry, however, 
weakened them financially and tempered their enthusiasm for expansion” (Pollard 
and Robertson, 1979, p. 26).  At this early stage, however, downturns tended to be 
relatively short lived: “The amount of tonnage produced fluctuated tremendously over 
short periods and facilities built during a boom were often under-employed for five or 
more years” (ibid.).  Even earlier than this Slaven notes: “Between 1815 and 
1883…the industry experienced seven great cycles of expansion and contraction, 
each roughly of nine to ten years duration”  (Slaven, 2013, p. 16) and, referring to 
earlier times again, notes that: “New shipbuilding had few equals as an industry 
beset with cyclical fluctuations.  This was hardly less true in the days of wooden 
ships than it was after the arrival of metal hulls, although from that time onwards the 
larger yards frequently meant that the consequences of these fluctuations were more 
disastrous for both workers and their employers”   (Clarke, 1997, p. 1).  The echoes 
of the pitfalls of larger yards have a very strong resonance with the current era, as 
will be discussed later.  Clarke further notes that: “Variations in demand for 
shipbuilding were already evident in the 17th Century as reflected in the fluctuations 
of new apprentices enrolled in the Newcastle Shipwrights” (ibid., p. 5). 
Significant peaks in output in global shipbuilding have, in fact, recurred every 25 to 
30 years for the past century.  The nature of this cyclicality is analysed in the next 
section of this dissertation.  It is useful to summarise the views of others on this 
subject, however, here.   A succinct statement made by Parkinson in 1960 sums up 
the effects of a key underlying driver: “Improvements in freights lead to a tendency to 
over-order and depressions to a tendency to postpone even replacements” 
(Parkinson, 1960, p. 79).  Because replacements are postponed the supply of 
shipping capacity becomes tighter over time, as seaborne trade grows, leading to 
increased freight rates, which starts the up-cycle once more.  The knock-on effect of 
the cycle of peaks of over-ordering of new ships followed by a period of correction 
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whilst the over-capacity built is absorbed have always been a feature of commercial 
shipbuilding.  Slaven, for example, notes in relation to the growth of shipbuilding in 
the period between 1815 and the 1850s: “Consequently, although the industry was 
expanding, its overall experience to the 1850s was of three short booms separated 
by two long periods of slack trade, as the market slowly absorbed the capacity 
produced at the peaks of production”  (Slaven, 2013, p. 17).   The average period 
between peaks was 35 years, suggesting that the cycle pre-dates the problems 
faced in the 20th and 21st centuries.  For example, Slaven notes the output from 
British shipyards in 1776 as 528,128 tons, falling to 182,143 tons in 1801 (Slaven, 
2013, p. 9).   It is not only the existence of the cycle that has been a constant feature 
of the industry, therefore, but also the order of magnitude of the swings between 
boom and bust. 
These recurring larger peaks are different to the general volatility of the industry that 
was noted in the period between 1860 and 1880, discussed above.  The business 
opportunity presented by such peaks is substantial and shipbuilders have historically 
taken the opportunity to build new capacity to try to maximise the profit potential from 
expanding demand.  This is also not a new phenomenon as noted in the quotation 
above from Zannetos in 1966 and as pointed out by Daniel Todd when discussing 
the most recent phase of expansion in South Korea: “This exuberance displayed by 
some South Korean new entries, while liable to costly failure in adverse 
circumstances, is not without its historical precedents.  In fact, it is reminiscent of the 
great fanfare attending UK shipbuilding in 1918-19 when expectations of unlimited 
shipping demand caused existing shipbuilders and newcomers alike to lay down 
excessive capacity.  These British entrepreneurs were to rue the day they gave way 
to such schemes long before the 1920s were out” (Todd, 2011). 
The cyclical nature of demand causes economic problems for shipbuilders, 
summarised succinctly by Pollard and Robertson (1979, pp. 26 - 30).   As demand 
rises so raw material costs and wages rise with it.  In a rising market the cost 
increases are covered by corresponding price increases.  As the market approaches 
the peak, however, price will start to turn down but, due to the lag between ordering 
and output, input costs will continue to rise.  “This created a paradoxical situation in 
which the best years in terms of tonnage constructed were amongst the worst for 
shipbuilders profits”  (Pollard and Robertson, 1979, p. 28).  There are also economic 
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advantages to be gained.  For example, in the late 1990s as prices began to rise, 
Korean shipyards were able to take down-payments on significant order volumes for 
future delivery, the cash generated being used to significantly reduce debt (First 
Marine International Limited, 1999 to 2005).     
The longer term underlying economic cause of the problems that result from the 
cyclical nature of output is that capacity developed to cope with the peak is 
persistent long after the peak has gone.  When output turns down dramatically, as it 
has done four times over the past 120 years, capacity is slow to react.  The outcome 
of this repeating pattern and the economic difficulties it causes is likely to include 
conflict between suppliers and a reliable mechanism to address such conflicts would 
therefore be desirable.   
The problem of subsidies in shipbuilding and the resulting difficulties are far from 
recent, therefore.  What has changed, however, is the regulation of international 
trade and commerce, and such subsidies in the modern era can be countered if they 
cause distortions in trade to the detriment of another competing nation. 
One possible mechanism for resolution of international disputes that may result from 
subsidisation, whereby one nation believes it is being damaged by injurious pricing 
of another, would be by recourse to the World Trade Organization.  Just such an 
action was brought before the WTO in 2003, to settle a dispute between the 
shipbuilding industries of the European Union and the Republic of Korea, resulting 
from the rapid expansion of South Korean shipyards in the 1990s.   In considering 
the case, however, the dispute panel reached certain conclusions that effectively 
mean that commercial shipbuilding may be outside the ambit of the dispute 
resolution procedures of that Organization unless the problems identified by the 
panel can be resolved.  It is the possible resolution of these problems, to bring 
commercial shipbuilding within the sphere of influence of the WTO, which this 
dissertation sets out to examine. 
Whilst the primary objective of this dissertation relates to the specifics of the 
regulation of shipbuilding in WTO, a further aim is that it should address the relatively 
low level of published research on the shipbuilding market, and the work therefore 
has a conceptual element in defining the market and determinants of price and 
competitiveness.  “Conceptual research helps us to see the world – and decision 
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making phenomena – through new lenses, enabling us to find new trailheads and 
emerging problem-solving quests” (Fawcett et al., 2014).  This conceptual element is 
in line with the work of the shipbuilding working party of OECD, OECD WP6, which 
concluded in 2012 that: : “The termination of the Shipbuilding Agreement 
negotiations at the end of 2010 ended an important phase in the WP6's 
consideration of market distortions in the shipbuilding industry. Negotiations ceased 
because it was felt a deeper understanding was needed of factors that could cause 
distortions in the market, so that they could be more effectively identified.” (OECD 
Working Party 6, 2012a).  This dissertation aims to address the “deeper 




2. Background and literature 
2.1 The evolution of commercial shipbuilding 
2.1.1 The evolution of technical and engineering aspects 
Prior to the 16th Century shipbuilding was a very small craft industry serving limited 
local needs.  Global or even national issues in this early era were to all intents and 
purposes non-existent.  In Britain, Henry VIII and Elizabeth I realised the need to 
expand the navy and the merchant fleet to serve colonies and trading routes that had 
started to develop following voyages of discovery: to the ‘New World’ and Eastwards 
to India and eventually China (Stopford, 2009; Slaven, 2013).  It was this expansion 
that formed the early beginnings of a coherent industry although early shipbuilding, 
up to about 1815, remained localised and built predominantly small wooden vessels.  
For example, in Newcastle the industry built colliers (coal carriers) for the trades 
between the Tyne and London.  Military shipbuilding and larger vessels for protected 
government trades, for example the East India Company, tended to be built in the 
South East.  Similar local industries would be found in other shipbuilding nations. 
Wooden shipbuilding saw its peak in terms of tonnage built in 1855 (Slaven, 2013, p. 
18) but the switch to iron (then steel), rather than wood, and to steam, rather than 
sail, was rapid.  By 1880, 90% of all ships built were iron or steel and British 
shipbuilding had a share of over 80% of all vessels built anywhere in the world.  
Britain’s dominance resulted essentially from the coincidence of three factors: 
technological leadership in iron and steam, the need for a substantially expanded 
Navy to protect the country’s rapidly expanding global interests and the availability of 
a rapidly growing market for merchant ships to serve the vast British Empire.  The 
technological element was essential: Britain could not compete with US shipbuilders 
for wooden vessels because the country lacked the reserves of wood to use for 
shipbuilding.  The industrial revolution therefore came to the rescue of a pressing 
problem that would otherwise have limited the growth of Britain’s economy as a 
whole (Slaven, 2013). 
It could be stated that the modern commercial shipbuilding industry commenced with 
the first ‘modern ship’, which is generally accepted to have been Brunel’s ‘SS Great 
Britain’, built between 1839 and 1843: “which can claim to be the fore-runner of all 
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ships of significance afloat today” (Corlett, 1971).  ‘SS Great Britain’ was made of 
iron, a shipbuilding material that had been made possible by improvements in the 
Iron manufacturing process, patented in 1784 by Henry Cort (Fairburn, 1865; Corlett, 
1975), which led to the economic availability of the material in the form of plates.  
Without the availability of plates or sheets of iron the material did not come in a form 
that could be riveted together to form the shell of a ship’s hull and the use of iron was 
limited to ships’ frames or parts of frames for composite wood and iron ships.  Iron 
shipbuilding proper commenced in 1812 with the construction of canal boats in the 
United Kingdom, with the first iron sea-going ship, the ‘Aaron Manby’, constructed in 
1822 (Fairburn, 1865).  The industry in the USA was a little later in adopting iron 
because the cost was so much higher than in UK whilst timber was in more plentiful 
supply: “The first iron steamboats were probably the river paddlers ‘John Randolph’, 
122 tons, ‘Chatham’, 198 tons and ‘Lamar’ 196 tons, which were put together at 
Savannah between 1828 and 1834 of materials imported from England” (Fassett, 
1948, p. 43).   
Iron and wood continued to be used for shipbuilding through much of the nineteenth 
century until steel, the material used in the modern industry, was introduced in the 
latter decades of the century.  The first steel ship was a small river vessel built “for 
Niger expedition” by J. Laird of Birkenhead in 1858.  A number of other smaller 
vessels followed but the first sea-going cargo vessel built of steel was the 452 ton 
‘Jason’ built in 1859 by Samuda Brothers of London (Newcastle University Marine 
Technology Special Collection, 2014).     The use of steel became more common in 
the 1880s, with Lloyd’s Register’s first set of rules for steel ships being published in 
1888 (Blake, 1960).  Steel became more widely available after the invention of the 
Bessemer process in 1855 but early Bessemer steel was of variable quality.   The 
trigger for the viability of steel as a shipbuilding material was the development of the 
Siemens-Martin process for steel manufacture:  “Siemens-Martin open hearth steel 
of consistent quality became available from about 1878, with production rapidly 
expanding.  The transition from iron to steel hulls took only ten years. Small 
quantities of cast steel had been available from the late 1850s but its high price of 
around £20 per ton compared with £9 for wrought iron limited its use to lightweight 
vessels like river steamers and blockade runners for the American Civil War, 
although it had been used to build masts and spars of lighter topweight.  But bulk 
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manufacture in Scotland and north-east England soon reduced the price of steel to 
about £6 per ton, even below that of iron. Its greater strength reduced steelweights 
by around 15% and its greater ductility improved survivability in the event of 
grounding or collision, while the larger size of plates possible (up to 8ft wide in place 
of 4ft) reduced riveted joint length and construction cost” (Buxton, 2010).  Thus the 
modern industry, in terms of its construction material, was established by the late 
19th century but the industry of the 21st century has little else in common with the 
industry of that time.  The material remains the same but the building technologies 
and methods, the producers, the products and the scale of the industry would have 
been unrecognisable to shipbuilders from a century ago.  Technically and 
economically, therefore, the modern industry started at some point in the 20th 
Century. 
Technically the great change in the 20th century came with the advent of welding as 
a viable joining method for steel.  Riveting was the prior method, which had many 
downsides.  From the shipyard’s viewpoint It was labour-intensive, heavy and skilled 
work, which would be very difficult to automate.  Film of work in the UK shipyards 
collected by the National Film Archive shows the only development in riveting 
between 1900 and WWII to have been the introduction of pneumatic hammers in 
place of heavy manual hammers.  Little other development in the technique was 
possible (Rotha et al., 2011).  Lloyd’s Register introduced experimental rules for 
welded shipbuilding in 1918 and the first experimental all welded ship, ‘MV Fullagar’, 





Figure 2.1 - MV Fullagar, the world’s first all welded ship (Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty, 1943, p. 283)  
The use of welding to repair stern frames prior to this time had been only partially 
successful and LR indicated that “until experience had been gained with welded 
vessels at sea, the classification would remain experimental.  The principal deterrent, 
at that time, to the fuller use of electric welding was the distrust of the ductility of the 
welds.” (Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 1943, p. 172).  This was despite 
‘Fullagar’ sailing successfully for 17 years before being sunk in a collision.   After this 
time welding was used for certain parts of the ship only: “Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 
issued revised rules for the application of electric welding in 1932.  In these rules it 
was contemplated that the improved electrodes could be used for welding parts of 
the vessel of primary importance” (ibid. p. 172).   The improved electrodes referred 
to in this quotation were the flux coated welding rods that would be recognisable 
today, prior to which welding had been achieved with bare wire and was less 
reliable.  Buxton points out that at this time welding “tended to be used where there 
were clear advantages such as oil tight bulkheads in tankers or oil fuel bunkers, 
where really oil tight riveting was difficult to achieve” (Buxton, 2010).  As well as 
technical reservations on the part of the classification society part of the problem 
limiting early adoption of the technique was that welding was significantly expensive.  
Labour unions sought additional pay for the skills needed and manufacturers of 
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welding equipment tried to develop welding as a specialist subcontract, rather than 
promoting its use by shipyard workers. 
Swan Hunter & Wigham Richardson of Newcastle built an all welded Great Lakes 
tanker in 1933, preceding the first all welded ship in the United States, also a great 
lakes tanker, ‘Poughkeepsie Socony’, built in 1934.  It was not until WWII, however, 
that welding became more common as a process for joining the structure of the ship.  
In 1940 a British shipbuilding delegation visited the United States to order “about 60 
vessels of the tramp type of about 10,000 tons deadweight” (Thompson and Hunter, 
1942).  The delegation was ambivalent about welding but concluded: “To suit USA 
practice, to ensure a good supply of labour, to facilitate production and to get the 
best value for money, it was decided that ships must be mainly welded” with the 
extent of riveting varying by shipyard.  The extensive ‘Liberty Ship’ construction 
programme that followed US entry into the war saw fully welded ships become the 
norm in that country.  The ‘Liberty Ship’ was a standard 7,210 ton general cargo ship 
that was built as quickly and cheaply as possible to replace allied tonnage that was 
being lost at an alarming rate to enemy action: “the..demands of WWII, when a 
capacity output of approximately four times that of normal peace time operations was 
mandatory” (Fassett, 1948, p. 202).  2,468 ‘Liberty Ships’ were built in total in United 
States shipyards between 1941 and 1945 and welding in place of riveting was one 
way of achieving the speed of construction needed.  “Since riveting had previously 
been the limiting factor in construction time, it was possible to decrease substantially 
the time necessary for all hull work” (Fassett, 1948, p. 59).  As Buxton puts it: 
“Without welding, the US would not have been able to build the 5,000 ships the 
Maritime Commission produced between 1941 and 1945” (Buxton, 2010).    
The introduction of women into the workforce of the United States in WWII, when the 
men went off to war, also benefited from a less manually demanding joining process 
than the heavy work of riveting: “One of the principal reasons for welding the 
vessels..was, of course, the shortage of skilled labour…It was recognised that much 
less time would be necessary to produce efficient welders than to train reliable 
riveters and caulkers.  The present war time policy of the British Admiralty is to 
increase production by developing merchant ship construction along similar 
lines..That policy has to a very large extent been dictated by the same 
considerations which operated in America – namely, the insufficiency of proficient 
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labour, and the necessity for the rapid training of dilutees, including women” (Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty, 1943, p. 173).  Thompson and Hunter noted in 
1942, following their visit to the United States, that: “It is much easier to train good 
welders than good riveters.  Females can and do weld, but they cannot rivet.  The 
average man would prefer to weld rather than rivet” (Thompson and Hunter, 1942).   
A further advantage of welding over riveting is that it permits pre-fabrication of 
sections of the vessel, something that could only be achieved for small parts using 
rivets.  ‘Traditional’ shipbuilding involved the joining of individual pieces to form the 
structure of the ship at the final assembly site.  Pre-fabrication of blocks of steel in 
covered workshops, prior to assembly on slipway or in dock, is an essential key to 
productivity in the modern industry.  The origins of pre-fabrication were also seen in 
the United States in WWII: “Mass production: In adopting these methods, wartime 
shipbuilders were following American industrial experience.  Whenever it desired to 
turn out more identical units in a given time at reduced cost, the American mind 
inevitably devises mass production processes – whether it be for pins, automobiles 
or ships” (Fassett, 1948, p. 226).  “The United States Emergency Shipyards have 
been specifically planned for mass production of standard welded merchant ships.  
As these yards are laid on vacant sites it has been practicable to provide extensive 
areas and depth of space above the head of the berths – essential for rapid 
production by pre-fabrication.  Typical of these yards is the Todd California 
Shipbuilding Corporation in Richmond, near San Francisco.  This yard laid down in 
1941..the assembly and welding of large pre-constructed units, including double 
bottom structure, panels of the bottom shell..” (Lords Commissioners of the 
Admiralty, 1943, pp. 142,143,146).  Such pre-assembled units were actually very 
small by modern standards with assembly cranes of only 25 to 30 tons, compared to 
1,000 tonnes plus for a modern final assembly crane.  Photographs comparing 
‘traditional’ piece by piece shipbuilding, WWII assemblies and modern block 




Table 2.1Construction of ‘SS Olympic’ 1910 (Rotha et al., 2011), a liberty ship 
1941 (Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 1943, p. 144) and modern block 
construction 2014 (Hyundai Heavy Industries, 2014) 
Pre-fabrication of standard products enabled substantial productivity of shipbuilding 
berths in the United States: “the target of at least one ship per berth per month” 
(Thompson and Hunter, 1942).  It would be wrong, however, to suppose that the 
United States was alone in developing welding and pre-fabrication at this time.  The 
same technology was undoubtedly also being developed in Germany, for example, 
in particular for submarine construction where dispersion of production, building ‘U-
boats’ at disparate locations to avoid allied bombing, required that block construction 





Figure 2.2 - U-Boat construction in WWII, showing advanced blocks being 
used (source: forum.axisindustry.com) 
This photograph suggests that block building technology may have been more 
advanced in Germany than in the United States.  The significance of US 
developments in this context, however, was that it was US technology that went on 
to be developed following WWII and which was therefore seminal in the development 
of the modern industry, even if more advanced technology had been developed 
elsewhere during the war years. 
Modern joining methods, therefore, were established in WWII.  The methodology of 
block or unit construction in commercial shipbuilding was then developed further in 
Japan in the 1950s.  Shipbuilding, along with marine transportation, had been 
selected as a “priority sector” in what came to be known as Japan’s ‘economic 
miracle’, that being the recovery of the economy that was decimated during WWII.  
Hardy and Tyrell note that the post-war recovery of the Japanese industry was 
“aided largely by American capital, engineers, and production planning” (Hardy and 
Tyrrell, 1964, p. 105).  Under the influence of the United States (after 1948 under the 
“great reverse” following General McArthur’s initial reform policies that were aimed at 
curtailing militarism (US Department of State Office of the Historian, 2014)) 
shipbuilding was selected as a priority industry, along with steel, coal mining, 
electricity generation, railways, chemical and others, for the rebuilding of the 
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economy (Otsubo, 2007).  The effectiveness of this policy was spectacular and by 
the mid-1960s Japan had established itself as a major industrial exporter.  The 
industry developed in Japan at this time would be recognisable today as the modern 
commercial shipbuilding industry, establishing the build methods that would be used 
to develop industries in both South Korea and China, as well as most other modern 
shipbuilders.  In this way, the development of the shipbuilding industry in Japan post 
WWII could be regarded as the birth of the modern commercial shipbuilding industry.  
Without doubt, Japanese shipbuilding would have learned about the production 
methods, mass production and pre-fabrication, developed in the United States in 
WWII but Japanese shipbuilders then developed the techniques further and 
eventually the situation reversed and the United States sought to learn from Japan.  
In a citation accompanying the award of the ‘Solberg Award’ by the American 
Society of Naval Engineers to Mr Louis D. Chirillo in 1985 it is stated: “Under the 
auspices of the National Shipbuilding Research Program, he studied Japanese 
shipbuilding methods and through management of research projects with Japanese 
shipbuilders he gained a complete understanding of the logic and principles of their 
methods” (American Society of Naval Engineers, 1985).  Contributing to the strategic 
development of the industry in Japan was the appointment the head of the Japanese 
aircraft industry, which was industrially significantly more advanced than 
shipbuilding, to lead the development of the shipbuilding industry.  “Interestingly, the 
development of the modular construction system for shipbuilding which the 
Japanese developed came as a result of the now popular benchmarking concept of 
studying parallel industries.  In this case, following World War II, the head of 
Japanese aircraft construction was appointed head of shipbuilding.  In those days, 
the traditional method of building ships was to lay the keel and then build the ship 
from the bottom up.  Aircraft construction was different; in this case, a modular 
construction method was used…This method required greater accuracy in the 
manufacture of units but overall it reduced construction times by a factor of ten.  The 
same improvement resulted when the method was applied to ship construction” 
(Hutchins, 2008, p. 46). 
A final technical change in the industry in the second half of the twentieth century 
was the development of shipbuilding strategy and facilities to suit.  Layout drawings 
of United States shipyards in WWII show that volume was achieved by building 
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multiple slipways.  The more slipways the more ships built, with the ‘Liberty Ship’ 
possibly achieving the maximum possible of about 12 ships per slipway per year but 
more commonly a slipway would produce less than 2 ships per year (Fassett, 1948).  
The shipbuilding strategy involved completing the structure of the vessel and then 
installing outfit by trade; pipework, electrics, joinery, etc.  Pre-fabrication enabled 
steelwork and outfit to start to be integrated, shortening the cycle time for the 
production of a ship and increasing the capacity of a slipway as a result.  Figure 2.4 
shows a typical layout of a high volume US shipyard of WWII vintage, showing the 
array of slipways (or ‘shipways’ as referred to in this drawing) needed for high 
capacity. 
 
Figure 2.3 - Arrangement of a WWII US shipyard showing slipway 
arrangements needed for capacity (Fassett, 1948, p. 243) 
As the slipway was the bottleneck, increasing the capacity of the slipway increased 
the capacity of the entire shipyard.  The effect of advanced outfitting is shown in 
Figure 2.5.  In the traditional sequential method the total cycle time (Tt) is equal to 
the sum of the steel work time (ts) plus the outfitting time (to).  If the start of outfitting 
is advanced by time ta to overlap the steelworking process, rather than the 
traditional sequential approach that waited for steel to be complete before outfitting, 




Figure 2.4 – The effect of advanced outfitting on cycle time 
As blocks became bigger, further strategies emerged to enable slipway capacity to 
be increased.  The most important strategy was called ‘semi-tandem’, which enabled 
the stern of a following ship, the stern normally containing a disproportionate amount 
of the total work due to machinery spaces, to be built alongside the previous ship 
and slid into place on the slipway following the launch of the first ship.  The effect of 
semi-tandem construction on the capacity of a slipway is shown in Figure 2.6, 
considering the total cycle time for two ships.  In this case the steel and outfit work of 

















Figure 2.5 – The effect of semi-tandem construction on cycle time 
Slipways are still commonly used in shipbuilding but the greatest capacity comes 
from the use of a flexible large building dock served by very large ‘goliath’ cranes, 
that is to say self-supporting gantry cranes.  Hyundai Heavy’s largest drydock, the 
no. 3 dock at Ulsan, has dimensions 672m x 92m and is served by three goliath 
cranes: one at 1,290 tonnes swl and two at 450 tonnes (Hyundai Heavy Industries, 
2014).  Cranes of this size would be largely impractical on an inclined slipway and 
are a key to higher productivity of a shipyard.  This dock is shown in Figure 2.7, 



















Figure 2.6 – Flexible building docks at Hyundai Heavy Industries, Ulsan 
(Hyundai Heavy Industries, 2014) 
The large cranes means that large (heavy) blocks can be fabricated in workshops for 
erection into the dock, maximising the integration of steel and outfit work on the 
block and undertaking this work in ideal conditions, not outside on an exposed 
slipway, which means that work can be undertaken at the ideal and therefore 
cheapest time.  Integrated supporting workshops were designed specifically to 
support this strategy, defining the shape of a modern shipyard (Bruce and Eyres, 
2012, p. 119 to 123).  Commercial shipbuilding in drydocks, as opposed to on 
slipways, commenced in Germany in the late 1950s.  In 1960 Kieler Howaldtswerke 
was using ship construction facilities that included 5 slipways and 4 drydocks, two of 
which were sometimes used for repair (information kindly provided by Verband Fur 
Schiffbau und Meerestechnik E.V. (German Shipbuilding and Ocean Industries 
Association)1).  This is certainly an early commercial use of building docks, although 
                                            
1 Information provided for this work in email correspondence with the Association.  
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it has not been possible to confirm that this is the earliest adopter of this technology: 
Japanese shipyards were similarly building occasionally in repair docks (The 
Shipbuilders' Association of Japan, 1961).  Dedicated newbuilding docks for 
commercial shipbuilding were first seen in the early 1960s in Europe.  The ‘Patton 
Report’ into productivity in shipbuilding in 1962 noted 4 shipyards using drydocks for 
building in continental Europe.  This included the purpose-built dock in Burmeister 
and Wain of Copenhagen, but output records for 1960 suggest that this particular 
dock was not in production in that year and a 1959 brochure for the company notes 
that the dock was due for completion in 1960.  The report also notes the 
development of the large building dock at Gotaverken Arendal in Sweden, not yet 
open in 1962, which, along with the goliath cranes supporting the dock became a 
model for the modern generation of building docks (Patton J, 1962).  This pattern of 
large shipyard was made ubiquitous, however, by British consulting company ‘A&P 
Appledore’, which designed and built Hyundai Heavy Industries in Ulsan in 1971 
(Bruno and Tenold, 2011).  The form and technology of that shipyard was exported 
to many shipyards globally, including the latest generation built in China. 
The other great change in commercial shipbuilding in the 20th century was economic, 
that being the move away from empire towards globalisation, which was triggered by 
the Bretton Woods conference of 1944.  Stopford argues that this was a key driving 
forces for the modern shipping industry.  “At the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 
the US Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, outlined the objective of 
creating ‘a dynamic world economy in which the peoples of every nation will be able 
to realise their potentialities in peace and enjoy increasingly the fruits of material 
progress of an earth infinitely blessed with natural riches’.  By the end of the meeting 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund had been founded and the 
groundwork had also been laid for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades 
(GATT).  This policy had a profound effect on the maritime industry.  By the end of 
the 1960s almost all of the European colonies had been given independence and 
they were encouraged to open their borders and transform their economies from 
self-sufficiency to export production ” (Stopford, 2009, p. 37).   
The ‘profound effect’ on shipping had a knock-on profound effect on shipbuilding and 
it could be argued that the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 and the consequent 
globalisation that followed, was the trigger for the development of modern 
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shipbuilding as much as it was the trigger for the development of modern shipping.  
The following changes in particular should be noted: 
 Increased shipping demand required more ships and the volume of production 
increased.  In 1950 the world’s shipbuilding industry produced 3.2 million 
gross registered tons.  In 1976 the industry reached a peak of 34 million tons 
and in 2010 reached a peak of 103 million GT, thirty two times the size of the 
industry post WWII. 
 The types of vessels changed from the earlier ubiquitous general cargo ships, 
commonly termed ‘freighters’ that carried everything except oil, to dedicated 
carriers for different cargo types.  The dry bulk carrier, for example, whilst it 
existed prior to WWII, particularly in the form of Great Lakes vessels, started 
to become more common in the late 1950s.   
 The size of vessels increased in pursuit of economy of scale in shipping.  
Records (sourced from Sea-Web) for general cargo ship production in 1950, 
for example, show that the average size of ship built in that year was 2,868 
deadweight tonnes and the largest was 13,632 tonnes.  In the same year the 
largest tanker produced was 42,295 tonnes and the average was 13,984 
tonnes.  Shortly after this the first commercial2 panamax vessel, the 70,000 
dwt crude oil tanker ‘W Alton Jones’, was built by Newport News, Virginia, in 
1954.  This was a large vessel in its day but commercial ship size peaked with 
the development of Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCCs) in the 1970s, the 
largest having a deadweight of 555,000 tonnes (Stott, 2014).  The first 
panamax tanker was followed by a panamax obo built by Mitsubishi in 1955 
and the first panamax dry bulk carrier followed in 1959, the 58,000 dwt ‘Pacific 
Maru’ built by Kawasaki.   Shipyards clearly needed to be bigger to handle 
this step change in ship size. 
 Another key development was the standardisation (or more correctly quasi-
standardisation) of the products built, to suit the standardisation of shipping by 
class of vessel.  Classes such as ‘panamax’ and ‘VLCC’ are recognisable in 
the modern industry.  Prior to 1960, with the notable exception of the ‘liberty 
                                            
2 The first actual panamax ships were the USS ‘Iowa’ class battleships, of which four were completed 
in 1943 and 1944. 
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ship’ and the ‘T2’ tanker, built for the war effort, standards by and large did not 
exist. 
The industry addressed in this dissertation, therefore, in terms of products, volume, 
producers, technology, materials and investment, emerged after WWII, was 
developed following a pattern originated in Japan and is the product of the process 
of globalization.  How this may relate to the industry of the future is clearly uncertain 
and depends on how globalization now proceeds. 
2.1.2 The evolution of cycles and volatility 
This section looks at shipbuilding output since the late 19th Century, identifying how 
cycles and volatility have changed with the development of the modern industry.  
Figure 2.8 shows the output from global shipbuilding since 1892, clearly identifying 
periodic peaks.  The peaks are shown on separate graphs because each 
subsequent peak masks the existence of the previous peaks by virtue of its size.   
 
Figure 2.7 – Output from global shipbuilding at selected periods between 1892 




































































































































































































































































































It should be noted that the parameter evaluated here is output, not ordering, and the 
fall in output therefore lags the economic change that may have precipitated it.  For 
example, the tail of very high WWII ordering can be seen as output in 1946, even 
though the post-war slump in ordering had already preceded this.  (The significance 
of wars to shipbuilding output has long been recognised: “Wars almost invariably 
inflated the industry and, usually temporarily, shipbuilding profits.  Certainly, from the 
17th Century, in the immediate aftermath of a war a substantial depression of trade 
followed”  (Clarke, 1997, p. 1)).  Similarly the peak of output in the most recent cycle 
was seen in 2011, three years after the 2008 crash that precipitated a sharp decline 
in ordering.   
Cyclical behaviour in the shipbuilding market, and all shipping markets, is expected 
by economic theory and anticipated by economists.  It is not the intention of this 
dissertation to examine the causes of these cycles but the effect of one important 
progenitor is worth noting here: reinvestment cycles.  This was a subject studied in 
the context of shipbuilding by Norwegian economist Johan Einarsen in the 1930s 
(Einarsen, 1938), who in turn refers to the work of Tinbergen (Tinbergen, 1931). The 
principal of reinvestment remains important in the forecasting of newbuilding demand 
in the modern era.  Reinvestment suggests that capital expenditure has to be 
renewed periodically due to obsolescence of the prior investment, either because it 
is worn out or because newer and more productive technology is available.  Einarsen 
referred to the cycles caused in this way as an “echo phenomenon”, describing the 
‘waves’ of demand that result from the phenomenon.  Einarsen described 
reinvestment as follows: “The production for capital goods – production instruments 
and long-lasting consumption goods – is also a cyclical one.  A person who buys a 
machine today for his business will regularly some time in the future, when the 
machine is worn out or outmoded, be in need of a new machine to replace the old 
one” (Einarsen, 1938, p. 35).  He also notes that “These cycles arise when the 
reinvestment takes place at the time when the capital instruments have reached their 
typical normal age for replacement” (ibid., p. 38).   
Einarsen was seeking to examine Norwegian shipping as a case study to look at the 
general economic issue of reinvestment.  Karl Marx in the 19th Century had 
postulated that reinvestment cycles are an important factor in the generation of the 
general business cycle, and had made an educated guess that the reinvestment 
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cycle was typically 10 years in length.  Einarsen was using Norwegian shipping to 
test the cycle length and did indeed concur with Marx’s ten year hypothesis.  This is 
clearly out of step with the life expectancy of a ship which, then as now, was typically 
around twenty to twenty five years.  Einarsen therefore had to distinguish between 
“reinvestment” when a ship is scrapped and replaced and “replacement”, when the 
original purchaser sells the ship on and buys a new one, to take account of technical 
improvements and increasing maintenance costs and reduced efficiency of the 
original investment.  He also noted that elasticity in the ultimate age of a ship leads 
to complexities in the working of the phenomenon and that the peak of expected 
reinvestment demand tends to lead ahead of a higher peak of shipbuilding demand 
in total, a feature that remains in current shipbuilding cycles. 
Importantly, Einarsen noted that there has to be an original concentration of 
newbuilding to generate the future “echoes” or waves of demand.  Factors that kick 
off the clustering of investment were proposed to include shocks such as wars: “A 
war, for instance, will often result in a disproportionately strong expansion of those 
industries which produce goods previously imported from foreign countries.  Further, 
wars often bring with them the destruction of capital goods to a great extent”.  Other 
generators include “a new revolutionary invention, a sudden change in the trade 
policy, the opening up of new trade routes, etc., will influence the course of capital 
production” (ibid., pp 42,43).  At Einarsen’s time the Great War was seen as a 
progenitor of the shipbuilding cycle, at least in the context of Norwegian shipping: 
“during the Great War, Norway (in spite of its being neutral) lost through the 
submarine campaign nearly half of its merchant fleet….This was re-established to a 
broad extent by the extraordinarily great number of new constructions in the years of 
1920 and 1921.  The Great War thus caused a pregnant concentration in the age 
distribution of ships” – which lead to a specific example to study the existence of the 
re-investment cycle” (ibid., p. 102).  Based on this theory it would be expected that 
WWII would similarly have produced a concentration of demand leading to future 
“echoes”, along with the economic changes following Bretton Woods, as previously 
described. 
Visual inspection of the graphs shown above suggests that there have been major 
cyclical peaks in 1919, 1946, 1975 and 2011, recurring at periods of 25 years, 29 
years and 36 years respectively, an average of 30 years between major peaks.  As 
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well as these major cycles, however, there are many smaller cycles that can be seen 
in the period examined and the analysis of volatility has to take these into account. 
To examine volatility the year-on-year change in output from this data has been 
analysed over the full period, with results presented in Figure 2.9.  Certain key 
events of economic significance have been superimposed on this graph (with 
acknowledgement to Einarsen and Stopford for the techniques (Stopford, 2009, pp. 
93-134)). 
 
Figure 2.8 – Year-on year change in output from global shipbuilding 
Based on this analysis and the evidence of literature on this subject presented 
earlier, cycles have been a constant feature of the shipbuilding industry since it 
began.  This means that the economic difficulties caused by high fixed investment 
supported by volatile revenue, that is to say revenue that fluctuates and which is one 
of the major causes of subsidy, has also been a constant feature – even though 
industry personnel may still greet the problem with surprise every time it occurs. 
It is clear from the figure, however, that whilst volatility is persistent its nature has 
changed over time.  Volatility prior to WWII appears to have been significantly 
















































































































































































































than following the war.  Three significant events in the 20th century had a particularly 
strong effect on the shipbuilding industry, however, causing very large swings in 
output.  These were the two world wars and the great depression.  If these are 
ignored the level of volatility of the two periods still appears different but the order of 
magnitude of growth and decline is more comparable.   
The parameter used to investigate volatility is the coefficient of variance, that is to 
say the ratio of the variance to the mean.  The larger the value the greater the 
relative variance and thereby the greater the volatility.  Statistics comparing the 






Mean annual growth 7.6% 5.2% 
Variance 12.2% 2.8% 
Coefficient of variance 1.62 0.53 
Proportion of years in recession 43.5% 32.4% 
Average recession yoy change -23.8% -12.1% 
Average growth yoy change 31.7% 13.5% 
Lowest recession yoy change -57.9% -70.6% 
Highest growth yoy change 97.8% 43.4% 
Table 2.2 – Comparison of statistics to compare volatility of output from global 
shipbuilding between 1893 and 2014 
The reduced coefficient of variance confirms what can be seen in Figure 2.9, that 
volatility in the modern industry, post-WWII, is reduced compared to the UK-
dominated colonial industry that preceded it.  Whilst the average annual growth in 
the modern industry is lower than that preceding WWII the proportion of time spent in 
recession, that is in the down-swing of a cycle, is also less, suggesting more periods 
of sustained growth and longer cycles.  The other statistics show that, with the 
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exception of the very deep recession that immediately followed WWII, the cycles are 
less ‘sharp’, with longer periods and shallower growth or recession rates.  These 
cycles are easier to see if a three-year moving average trend line is applied to the 
above chart, as depicted in Figure 2.10, although it should be kept in mind that the 
effect of such a trend line is generally to shift data to the right and the cycles 
revealed are therefore not precisely in the correct time alignment.   
 
Figure 2.9 – Three year moving average trend line for year –on-year change in 
output, for greater clarity of the underlying cycles 
The length of cycles, peak to peak, is analysed in Figure 2.11, showing the number 







































































































































































































Figure 2.10 – Length of shipbuilding cycles 1893 to 2014 
It can be seen that, unlike the average length of shipping cycles that appears to be 
reducing (Stopford, 2009, p. 107), the length of cycles in the modern shipbuilding 
industry has increased, with longer periods of sustained growth in the post-WWII 
period.  The average length of cycle observed prior to WWII was 4.7 years, 
compared to 15.25 years post-WWII.  The number of years of recession associated 
with each cycle has also increased as illustrated in Figure 2.12.  This graph shows 










































Figure 2.11 – Number of years of negative growth associated with the 
recession phase of each cycle 
The average number of years of negative growth prior to WWII was 2.43 years per 
cycle whilst in the modern industry this has increased to 5.33 years per cycle on 
average, although the modern industry can clearly be seen to be on a rising trend. 
In summary the volatility of the modern industry is lower than was experienced prior 
to WWII, with longer periods of sustained growth but accompanied also by longer 
periods of sustained recession.  To some degree this change may be attributed to a 
combination of increasing capital intensity and changes in social attitudes.  Prior to 
WWII shipbuilding was a skill-based industry, relying on skilled workers rather than 
capital investment.  Without the capital burden it was easier to close shipyards and 
wait until the market picked up again, resuming work with new orders.  It was also 
much easier in that period to lay off personnel to be re-hired when work was 
available, a practice common in many industries.  Following WWII the capital 
intensive nature of the industry increased along with improved employee rights and 
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2.1.3 The evolution of global competition 
The progress of market dominance in shipbuilding by successive nations might be 
termed a ‘hegemony’, that being the predominance or ascendency of one group to 
the exclusion of others (Oxford English Dictionary).  For the long view, Hardy and 
Tyrell note: “Before 1850 the Americans were supreme in shipbuilding, but in the 
second half of the nineteenth century Britain adopted the new techniques of the 
industrial revolution and overtook all other countries until she produced over 80 per 
cent of the world’s ships.  This triumph has been short lived; the same methods were 
adopted and improved upon elsewhere, so that by 1955 Japan had become the most 
prolific shipbuilding nation in the world, and by 1958 Britain produced less than 20 
per cent of the tonnage launched outside the Communist bloc” (Hardy and Tyrrell, 
1964, p. 98).  Whilst shipbuilding appears to be a shifting hegemony (Bruno and 
Tenold, 2011), and is sometimes referred to as such, the presence of a true 
hegemony is open to question.  The only clear hegemony occurred in the late 19th 
Century when economic and technical dominance in steel shipbuilding meant that 
the United Kingdom took a market share of over 80%.  Subsequent dominating 
shares have been very considerably lower than this value. 
Figure 2.13 shows the progression of market share over time for market leaders, 





Figure 2.12 – Shipbuilding market share in global leading countries since 1892 
(compiled from various sources) 
The UK maintained its lead up to the early 1950s, but as can be seen failed to 
maintain its extreme dominance as the technical capability of other nations caught 
up and then over-ran the UK industry, and as markets moved from colonial trades 
prior to WWII to globalisation following WWII.  It should be noted that the industry 
experienced loss of market share and not a reduction in output, which averaged 
around 1 million GT completed per year between the end of the great depression 
and the mid-1970s, only starting to decline after 1978.  Numbers started to decline 
earlier, however, as ships became larger, the decline in numbers of ships completed 
being steady from about 1960  (Buxton et al., 2015). 
The gradual loss of market share caused much angst in the UK shipbuilding industry, 
the Government and trade unions from about 1925 until the industry effectively 
closed in the 1990s.  A typical example of the angst is seen in the introduction to a 
‘Report of joint enquiry into foreign competition & conditions in the shipbuilding 
industry’, published by a ‘Joint Committee of shipbuilding Employers’ Federation and 
Shipyard Trade Unions’ in 1926: “After the announcement early in March, 1925, that 
a British Shipowning firm – Messrs. Furness, Withy & Co. – had placed an order in 
Germany for five large Motor ships, …it is proposed that a Joint Conference should 
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affecting the industry might be discussed..” (Joint Committee of the Shipbuilding 
Employers' Federation and Shipyard Trade Unions, 1926, p. 5).  The committee’s 
terms of reference sought an exchange of views that would arrive at “definite 
conclusions as to the best means which could be taken to re-establish the industry 
and enable it to retain its pre-eminent position in world shipbuilding”   (ibid., p. 6).  
This was one of many such reports by industry and government, a number of which 
are referenced in this dissertation, none of which found the means to swim against 
the tide of change that eventually engulfed the industry.  Much has been made of the 
roles of poor management and restrictive practices in this process but the 
overwhelming causes stemmed from attempts to ‘shoe-horn’ the craft-based pre-war 
UK industry into the increasingly de-skilled and mechanised post-war global industry, 
the pursuit of volume that was beyond the scope of the investment inherent in ageing 
British shipyards and the market shift to much larger ships that were also beyond the 
scope of the UK industry in economic terms.   
Japan took over the lead in the mid-1950s, for reasons relating to the economic 
miracle described earlier, and sustained a share between 40% and 50% for the next 
three decades.  Korea took the lead in the early 2000s and then China around 2010.  
It can be seen that the period for which market dominance has been maintained has 
declined with each successive leader, as has the peak value achieved.   
In the era of wooden sailing vessels up to the mid-1850s, and in particular for clipper 
ships, the leading producer was the United States.  US builders benefited from a 
plentiful supply of North American softwood: “before the Civil War the Americans, as 
well as the North American colonists, could build cheaper ships than the British, 
although it was widely held that Britain could build the better class of ship as cheaply 
as any other country in the world” (Pollard and Robertson, 1979, p. 10).  British 
shipbuilders lacked the supply of timber to compete with the USA and persisted in 
building better quality ships from hardwood.  As Pollard and Robertson point out, 
however, Britain was: “Favoured by an island position, sheltered ports, a large share 
of the world’s trade, a relative abundance of capital, and technical skills second to 
none.  Britain needed only an economical supply of the necessary raw materials to 
become the world’s great shipbuilding centre” (ibid, P. 9).   Centres of shipbuilding 
clustered around the areas where the raw materials were plentiful (NE England and 
the River Clyde in Scotland) and where clusters of manufacturing were developed to 
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supply the industries.  This clustering mirrors the development of the modern 
industry, although clusters now tend to be national rather than regional – for example 
in South Korea, Japan and China. 
Japan’s ascent was founded in economic need and political motivation. South 
Korea’s ascent in the 1980s benefited from a similar mix of motivations, the 
Government promoting heavy industry for economic growth whilst at the same time 
having an eye to domestic security and the need to build ships for defence (Bruno 
and Tenold, 2011).  Bruno and Tenold suggest that the establishment of a significant 
shipbuilding industry in the modern era is virtually impossible without government 
support because of the level of capital needed, both fixed and working capital, and 
the economic nature of the industry, with volatile demand.  Benefits accrue from the 
generation of economic wealth that the industry provides and history will almost 
undoubtedly show a similar mix of motivations and supporting factors in the 
development of the modern Chinese shipbuilding industry: “Seeing Korean 
advantage as consisting in the melding of big shipyard practise with series 
production of large ships, they undertook to do likewise, inaugurating big yards in 
short order” (Todd, 2011).  Having said this, it is interesting to note that Bruno and 
Tenold’s work shows the level of government support in the development of the UK 
industry in the 19th Century was much less significant than it has become in the 
modern era. 
A number of themes emerge from this analysis, in particular: 
 motivation for the development of the commercial shipbuilding industry 
stemming from shipbuilding’s potential to confer economic benefits on a 
country; 
 the strategic nature of the industry that stems from politics; 
 the influence of military interests on the development of commercial 
shipbuilding. 
It is apparent that development of a significant presence in the industry, at least, 
debatably, in the period post the British industry of the late 19th Century, requires 
more than pure commercial capital to be successful.  Other attempts to gain a 
significant presence in the industry in the late 20th Century, notably in India, Vietnam 
and Brazil, have not yet succeeded. 
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It is common in market analysis of the shipbuilding industry for suppliers to be 
aggregated at the national level and this is justified by Strandenes as follows: “We 
conclude that the newbuilding market has been characterised by competition 
between shipbuilding nations and not only by competition among shipbuilding firms” 
(Strandenes, 2002).  More significant than the national hegemony, however, is the 
level of ‘concentration’ in the market, which has increased in recent years.  
Concentration is described by Durlauf et al as: “the degree to which the industry was 
[sic] dominated by a few large firms”  (Durlauf et al., 2008).  Shin and Lim go as far 
as to state that: “A shipbuilding industry can be characterized as a typical oligopoly 
with quantity competition” (Shin and Lim, 2013), although the analysis presented in 
their paper on shipbuilding competitiveness is aggregated at national and regional 
level, rather than between companies as one would expect when referring to an 
oligopoly, defined as: “A state of limited competition, in which a market is dominated 
by a small number of producers or sellers” (Oxford English Dictionary).  The extent to 
which an oligopoly exists in shipbuilding is worthy of further study but the existence 
of concentration to a significant degree appears to be in little doubt, particularly when 
consolidation of shipyards into group companies in South Korea and China is taken 
into account.  Data provider Clarkson Research Services monitors the concentration 
of the orderbook by group and reported the following concentrations in May 2011 











Top 25% 4 4 0 
Top 50% 17 14 -18% 
Top 75% 48 35 -27% 
Bottom 10% 364 279 -23% 
Table 2.3 - Concentration of commercial shipbuilding orders by shipyard 
group (source: Clarkson World Shipyard Monitor) 
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The number of groups reporting orders has fallen by almost 25% in the three years 
shown, but it can be clearly seen that the likelihood of ceasing trading increases as 
group size reduces, with no reduction in market share for the four largest (Korean) 
shipbuilding groups, which together account for 25% of the global orderbook. 
2.1.4 The persistence of subsidy 
Cyclical downturns are one of the most significant causes of shipbuilding subsidies.  
They are not the only cause, however.  For example, in the strongly growing market 
of the 1960s the British Government noted in a publication setting out the findings of 
the “Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee”, in rebutting calls for financial aid for the UK 
industry: “the Government should first see whether it is possible to persuade foreign 
governments to get rid of some of their artificial aids to their own shipbuilding 
industries”  (Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee, 1966).  Subsidy has been a general 
feature of the shipbuilding industry for as long as the industry has existed and has a 
wide range of causes and forms, many of which have been indirect, that is to say the 
subsidy may be given to the shipping industry to indirectly support home 
shipbuilders.  For example:  
 Clarke refers to a British act of parliament passed in 1685 “for the 
encouragement of shipbuilding greatly decayed in Newcastle, Hull, Yarmouth, 
Ipswich and other ports of England on the eastern coast, occasioned chiefly 
by so much employing of foreign-built ships in the coal trade…A duty of 5 
shillings per tun was imposed upon the foreign vessels over and above 
existing duties” (Clarke, 1997, p. 5) .  Such a tax in the modern era would be 
construed as an indirect subsidy to the shipbuilding industry that it seeks to 
support. 
 Humphrey Jordan notes in the book ‘Mauretania’ that in the race for speed 
supremacy of passenger liners across the Atlantic: “None of the companies 
were to escape the danger; sooner or later, in the struggle to own the fastest 
and the best ship upon the run, they all sought and obtained assistance from 
their governments” (Jordan, 1936, p. 16).  Such subsidies were often 
euphemistically termed ‘subventions’ or other vague terms to try to mask their 
existence.  To receive the assistance these vessels had to be built in home 
shipyards and government assistance to shipowners thereby constitutes a 
shipbuilding subsidy and would, in the more open trading conditions of the 
51 
 
21st Century, be viewed as potentially distorting trade and damaging to foreign 
suppliers.   The earliest subsidy mentioned in this context is four ships built for 
Collins Line in 1847, which received government assistance in their building 
(ibid., p. 15). 
 Jones, in the book ‘Shipbuilding in Britain’ notes that: “Shipbuilding is very 
sensitive to changing world conditions and is subject, more than any other 
industry, to political influences.  At one time or another practically every 
maritime country in the world has either directly or indirectly assisted its 
shipbuilding industries”  (Jones, 1957, p. 6).  The earliest state aid for 
shipping/shipbuilding cited in this work is in 1837, where subsidized ships 
were built to enable faster communication around the British Empire (ibid., p. 
141).   This type of subsidy was formalised in an act of Parliament in 1921, 
enabling the use of subsidy to promote national interests, known as ‘mail 
subsidies’, for vessels designed to carry mail around the British empire, where 
the government assisted the construction of ships against what was perceived 
to be unfair subsidized foreign competition.  Jones goes on to note that by 
1932 the need for subsidy had moved to a different and more general footing: 
“the problem facing shipping was precisely that which confronted the 
shipbuilding industry – the need to rid the industry of redundant and obsolete 
capacity” (ibid., p. 146).  This comment was made in response to the 
Chamber of Shipping’s proposal to government to introduce a “scrap and 
build” scheme that would, at the same time, reduce fleet capacity whilst 
providing work for under-utilised shipyards. 
 In the modern era, the EU rules on state aid to shipbuilding, set out in the 
‘Framework on State Aid to Shipbuilding’ permit “specific provisions in relation 
to innovation aid and regional aid for shipbuilding, as well as provisions on 
export credits” (European Commission, 2011).  The concept of “innovation 
aid” recognises that prototyping in the development of innovative commercial 
ships is rarely an option: the prototype will be sold and as such the economic 
risk of technical innovation is high.  The EU therefore permits limited subsidies 
for “innovative products and processes, that is to say, technologically new or 
substantially improved products and processes when compared to the state of 
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the art that exists in the shipbuilding industry within the Union, which carry a 
risk of technological or industrial failure” (ibid.).  
Subsidy has historically, therefore, been to some degree a permanent feature of the 
industry and is not solely a consequence of overcapacity.  In studying the decline of 
shipbuilding in Western Europe following the peak of 1975,  Strath refers to “The 
Obscure Jungle of Subsidies” in a chapter heading of the book ‘The politics of de-
industrialisation: the contraction of the West European shipbuilding industry’  (Strath, 
1987, p. 13).  Strath notes in relation to support for the industry: “The wealth of 
subsidies that has supported shipbuilding is almost impossible to survey, at least if 
one is to try to calculate their size in real terms rather than simply detail the forms 
they take.  The inventive power and ingenuity of politicians has been great when 
introducing new kinds of support for the failing industry, but the fact that it has been 
in the interest of every government to minimise the figure published has not made 
the survey easier”  (ibid.).  Strath then goes on to list seven groups of types of 
shipbuilding subsidy recognised by the OECD, with 17 mechanisms listed only one 
of which is ‘direct subsidy’.   Zannetos also notes the ubiquity of subsidy: “The 
number of tankers under construction may also be influenced by the domestic 
policies of various countries.  Some governments take national pride in having 
vessels flying their flag, while others may attempt through legislation to encourage 
shipbuilding activities in their countries.  Presumably such efforts by governments 
are intensified during periods of depressed market conditions and excess 
shipbuilding capacity” (Zannetos, 1966, p. 75).  Strandenes refers to the use of 
subsidies to preserve capacity in European shipbuilding as the industry has moved 
East in recent decades (Strandenes, 2002, p. 188).  Strandenes also refers to the 
use of subsidy in the establishment of new shipbuilding industries: “The result is a 
world-wide subsidy competition that presses prices and increases demand for new 
vessels” (ibid., p. 195).  In the same chapter Strandenes discusses the effects of 
subsidy on the shipbuilding industry and later in the same book Joon discusses the 
important place played by government policies in the development of the 
shipbuilding industry (Joon Soo Jon, 2002).  Joon notes that “Government policies in 
promoting shipbuilding industry are largely implemented through various types of 
financial assistance such as direct financial aid and or by guaranteeing loans”. 
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The situation that first comes to mind for many, particularly in Europe, is where state 
aid is used as a support for mature industries that are struggling in the face of 
volatile demand and prices set against competition from lower cost producers.  A 
variation on this is the provision of aid to ailing regions as has been used also in 
Europe (Joon Soo Jon, 2002, p. 535).  Such aid is expensive.  The declared average 
annual aid to shipbuilding in EU countries in the period 2001 to 2003, for example, 
was €840 million per annum (Commission of the European Communities, 2006).  At 
the root of this problem is the persistence of shipbuilding capacity: capacity is not 
removed from the industry when on the basis of pure economics, because price has 
fallen below the cost of the producer, the capacity should close.  The reasons for the 
persistence of capacity would form a valuable study in their own right.  There is not 
space in this dissertation to review these in rigorous detail but the following are 
postulated as the root causes for persistent capacity: 
1. Optimism: shipping is well known to be cyclical and there is a major cyclical 
element to shipbuilding also.  Because of this governments may be 
persuaded that the under-utilisation of capacity is temporary and that an 
upswing will occur sooner rather than later and part of the cause of persistent 
capacity could be laid at the door of market research.   
2. Politics: as a major industrial employer it is politically difficult to close a 
shipyard.  There are knock-on consequences for votes for whichever political 
party is in power at the time.  Politicians may therefore expediently listen to 
the optimism of market forecasts that predict that the downturn will be short 
lived and the industry will return to normal sooner rather than later. 
3. High fixed capital investment means that shareholders are likely to be 
reluctant write capacity off.  Mothballing appears to be a potential solution but 
is technically not straightforward and is likely to be expensive.  
4. Loss of capability: the capacity of a shipyard is inherent not only in the 
physical assets but also in the skill and experience of the workforce.  This 
takes a long time to develop and even if physical facilities could be mothballed 
the loss of the workforce would be difficult to recover for a future upturn. 
5. Economic consequences: shipyards are major employers, not only in the 
shipyard itself but also for supplier industries.  The utility of commercial 
shipbuilding in generating economic activity was demonstrated in the 
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Japanese ‘economic miracle’ of the 1950s and more recently in South Korea 
and China.  Many jobs outside the shipyards are dependent on those 
shipyards remaining in trading.  Closing a major shipyard, therefore, has a 
significant cost in terms of employment and economics outside the shipyard 
itself.   
6. Being too large to fail: the closure of one of the very large shipyards of South 
Korea, for example, would have an economic impact at the national level that 
is best avoided where possible: “The expeditious intervention of the Seoul 
government to buttress them [the Korean shipyards] through loans and 
guarantees speaks to their vital importance in the domestic economy” (Todd, 
2011).  This is part of the advantage afforded by being part of a large 
industrial conglomerate.  As Joon Soo Jon puts it: “Conglomerates have 
political clout.  These diversified, large companies command respect and 
influence in industrial, financial and political circles.  This can mean easier 
access to capital markets and more sympathetic treatment by politicians, than 
could be expected by a dedicated shipbuilding company” (Joon Soo Jon, 
2002, p. 558). 
As well as at the time of economic difficulties for mature industries, the role of state 
support in the start-up of shipbuilding companies can also be important and can also 
be very expensive.  “A supportive government is a major component in successfully 
establishing and maintaining a viable shipbuilding industry” (Bruno and Tenold, 
2011).  Bruno and Tenold list the State Aid received by the fledgling South Korean 
industry as: “In brief, the state supported HHI by giving access to domestic and 
foreign funds with preferential interest rates; helping in obtaining and providing 
financial guarantees; making complementary investments in facilities and 
complementary industries, such as steel; and providing support for technology 
acquisition” (Bruno and Tenold, 2011).  It is highly likely that a proportion of this help 
was effectively straightforward operating subsidies.   
The need for assistance in the start-up phase is generated by two effects. 
1. Firstly, the shipyard has to gain orders in competition with established 
shipbuilders that are likely to be more productive and have lower cost due to 
the established nature of the business.  Even the best planned new shipyards 
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are likely to have a build-up period where supply chains and productivity are 
developed. 
2. Throughput in early years is likely to be slow and the high cost of establishing 
the shipyard has to be supported by this low level of business.  “..high fixed 
costs make the establishment of shipbuilding capacity virtually impossible 
without government support” (Bruno and Tenold, 2011). 
The development of China’s largest commercial shipyard provides a good example 
of the issues faced by large shipyards at an early stage of development.  Shanghai 
Waigaoqiao Shipbuilding ltd3, a division of China State Shipbuilding Corporation 
(CSSC) is conceived as a shipyard on the “Korean model” (Ludwig and Tholen, 
2006), that is to say aimed at series production of standard large commercial ships.  
Exact information on Chinese shipyard development, operations and economics is 
hard to come by.  Construction of the yard began in 1999 and operations started in 
2001. The first ship was delivered in 2003.  The total planned investment in the yard 
is not known precisely but was reported to be 3.2 billion Renminbi, around $390 
million at the exchange rate of the time (Drewry Shipping Consultants, 2003) and 
tangible fixed assets reported in company accounts in 2010 was $545.7 million.  
Estimates of the intended capacity of the yard were initially put at between 1.8 and 
2.8 million dwt per annum but this has already been well exceeded with deliveries of 
over 5.5 million dwt in 2012 and CSSC states the capacity of the yard as being over 
7 million dwt per annum.  The development of throughput at the yard is shown in 
figure 2.14. 
                                            




Figure 2.13 – Deliveries from Shanghai Waigaoqiao Shipyard (data sourced 
from Sea-Web) 
It can be seen that the build-up of work took around seven to eight years from start-
up and ten to eleven years from the start of construction of the shipyard.  Note that 
because of the buoyant state of the market over this period this build-up could be 
regarded as an ‘ideal’: no better market conditions are likely to occur that could have 
reduced this build-up period.  During this period the economic coverage of these 
assets will clearly be lower than is the case with the yard working at full capacity and 
it is tentatively estimated that the shortfall in value added at the shipyard, compared 
to output achieved in 2012, could have been between about $3.5 billion and $4 
billion, greater than the cost of construction of the yard itself.  This supports Bruno 
and Tenold’s conclusion stated above that financial assistance is likely to be needed 
to fund a start-up period for a large shipyard and that this assistance may be beyond 
the means of private capital, particularly for a very large shipyard.   
Such a lengthy start-up is not unique to Waigaoqiao but is likely to be faced by any 
new major shipyard.  Figure 2.15 shows the build-up of output from HHI Ulsan as 


























Figure 2.14 – Build-up of output at HHI Ulsan (data sourced from Sea-Web) 
In addition to a build-up period for volume there will also be a build-up period for 
efficiency.  Statistics presented for South Korean productivity development in Section 
6.1.4.2 suggest a long term average performance improvement of 6% to 7% per 
annum, referring to what Craggs et al call ‘shipyard learning’ (Craggs et al., 2004) to 
differentiate this from productivity gains made on series’ of ships, although 
significantly greater gains can be made in the early stages of development.  In 2004 
Waigaoqiao reportedly had a permanent workforce of 3,900 persons (Ludwig and 
Tholen, 2006) but this did not include temporary labour, used extensively, so an 
estimate of the yard’s productivity for comparison in precise terms is not possible.  
Benchmarking of shipbuilders main assets has been recommended as a possible 
measure of efficiency of a shipbuilder (Colin and Pinto, 2009), and is relevant in this 
situation.  In particular one of the most significant investments made in a new 
shipyard is that in the building docks and the efficiency of this asset can be 
compared to competitors.  The development of performance in terms of CGT 






















Figure 2.15 – CGT produced per annum per square metre of building dock at 
Shanghai Waigaoqiao 
Clearly the development of performance shown in this chart follows the output 
development shown in Figure 2.15.  For benchmarking the performance of the South 
Korean industry in 2005 was estimated by Colin and Pinto to be around 13 CGT/m2 
and rising sharply.  This suggests that whilst there has been significant improvement 
in performance at the shipyard over the past ten years it has not yet approached the 
level of performance achieved in South Korea in the mid-2000s and proceeded 
through a significant build-up period during which productivity was relatively low.  
The cost penalty resulting from this performance build-up will have to be funded by 
the yard’s shareholder: in this case ultimately the Chinese Government. 
2.2 The economic and regulatory context 
2.2.1 Shipbuilding in the context of WTO 
A summary of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its legislative instruments is 
given in Appendix 3 to this dissertation. 
Following a period of consultation between the shipbuilding industries of South 
Korea and the European Union, during which no resolution could be found, on 11th 
June 2003 the EU requested the establishment of a panel at the World Trade 
Organization to examine a complaint relating to unfair subsidies to the shipbuilding 
industry on the part of the Government of the Republic of Korea.  The panel met over 
the subsequent year to hear the dispute and finally reported findings on 7th March 
















procedures of the WTO’s “Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures” 
(hereinafter the “SCM agreement”).  The author of this dissertation was a participant 
in this process, as technical expert advising the European Communities and 
appeared at the tribunal in this capacity.  The case is referred to as “Korea – 
Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels” (hereinafter referred to as Korea 
– commercial vessels4) and has the WTO case number DS273.   
There is not sufficient space in this work to delve into the specific aspects of the 
complaint brought by the EC but succinct summaries can be found in Glen (2006) 
and on the WTO website (World Trade Organization, 2016).  The outcome is 
summarised by Glen as follows: “..the EU, despite winning its case in a number of 
specific issues, has lost the fight to establish that there was significant price 
suppression of ships as a consequence” (Glen, 2006).  The failure to demonstrate 
price suppression and thereby harm to the industries of other nations raises a 
fundamental question about the WTO’s ability to rule on disputes relating to 
shipbuilding.  This is a serious issue given that the WTO’s “main function is to ensure 
that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible”(World Trade 
Organization), that shipbuilding is a global industry and that the WTO is the only 
recourse for complaint in the case of unfair practices of other nations.  It raises the 
potential that WTO may not be able to accommodate complaints relating to 
commercial shipbuilding and thereby shipbuilding is potentially outside the 
international regulation mechanisms established for trade disputes.  This is the 
conclusion reached by the European Commission following the failure of the case 
against South Korea.  Scepticism on the part of the EC was shown in a 
communication to the European Parliament in 2003 relating to the establishment of a 
policy framework to support the industry in Europe at the time that the WTO panel 
was initiated.  The EC stated: “Commercial shipbuilding and ship repair operate in a 
truly global market. This comprehensive exposure to world-wide competition and the 
fact that WTO trade disciplines are not in all cases suitable for application to this 
sector, make shipbuilding substantially different from most other manufacturing 
industries”(Commission of the European Communities, 2003).  Following the failure 
of the WTO dispute the EC, in a working document from 2007 that evaluates the 
                                            




progress made in supporting competitiveness in European shipbuilding, stated: “The 
shipbuilding industry is truly global and ship owners can buy vessels anywhere in the 
world without significant technical, commercial or legal restrictions. However, the 
global trade rules governing the sector are often unequal, incomplete or inapplicable. 
Regrettably, no tangible results can yet be seen in this domain despite the best 
efforts of all concerned in the OECD and other arenas and the determination shown 
in prosecuting the WTO case against Korea. This case underscored the limitation of 
current trade rules with regard to shipbuilding where the concept of import and 
export effectively does not exist and where subsidisation is often related to the 
producer rather than the product. Thus, the ruling on this case offered little help to 
European shipbuilding” (Commission of the European Communities, 2007). 
One of the requirements of the SCM agreement is that the complainant is required to 
demonstrate “serious prejudice”, or in other words the complainant must show that 
significant harm is done to their own industry by the action of the other.  There are 
several definitions within the agreement of what may constitute serious prejudice, 
with the definition claimed by the EC in relation to shipbuilding defined as “the effect 
of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product as 
compared with the price of a like product of another Member in the same market or 
significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same 
market”(World Trade Organization).  The panel accepted on an uncertain basis that 
such a market exists in commercial shipbuilding but ruled that the EC had not 
adequately established a link between pricing behaviour of specific shipyards in 
South Korea and the behaviour of market prices in general.  The arguments centred 
around two specific issues that were discussed at length in the panel hearings: 
1. What are the bounds of ‘like product’ in the commercial shipbuilding industry?  
For example, what is the relevance of pricing of LNG tankers in South Korea 
when the majority of shipyards in Europe were building either cruise ships or 
container ships at the time of the complaint? These products are not inter-
changeable from the point of view of their use and it is difficult to see what 
their relationship is to each other – how are they ‘like’? 
2. EC did not show “cross price elasticity” between different product types in the 
shipbuilding market, thereby failing to establish that the products are 
economically part of the ‘same market’.  The South Korean shipbuilding 
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industry was engaged at the time in construction of large tankers and 
container ships.  Can it be shown that pricing behaviour in these specific 
sectors affect the market, for example, for shipbuilders building smaller 
container vessels?  
South Korea additionally argued that there was no such thing as a “shipbuilding 
market” and that all contracts were decided on an individual and un-connected basis.  
Certainly at one time this opinion could have been argued strongly.  In 1966, for 
example, Zannetos, in examining the market for tankers, concluded: “In 
shipbuilding..agreements are reached through private negotiations and often the 
terms of contracts are not readily available, thus causing market imperfections” 
(Zannetos, 1966, p. 95).  Zannetos noted lack of transparency of information on 
market prices and lack of consistency between products as, inter alia, particular 
problems with the notion of a shipbuilding market in the economic sense.  Since that 
time, however, standardisation of products and widely available price information 
have changed the nature of the market, not to mention the widespread adoption of 
standard shipbuilding contracts as the basis for contractual relationships between 
buyer and builder.  The Panel were prepared to accept the EC argument that the 
shipbuilding market does exist as a coherent entity in order to progress the hearing, 
although without defining in any specific way how the market is constituted, but 
found that the pricing mechanism between countries and between products was not 
sufficiently established. 
2.2.2 Shipbuilding in the context of maritime economics research 
The research presented in this dissertation is fundamentally about one of the four 
shipping markets as identified by Stopford, namely the “newbuilding market” 
(Stopford, 2009, p. 175), these four (including additionally the “freight market”, the 
“sale and purchase market” and the “demolition market”) forming the core of 
maritime economics.  A summary of the development of research in maritime 
economics is presented in Appendix 2. 
The field of maritime economics, as described by Heaver, “remains diverse”  
(Heaver, 2012, p. 28), but research specifically in the field of the newbuilding market 
constitutes a minority in the discipline.  The summary of research subjects given by 
Heaver shows that by far the most active sector of the field remains port studies, 
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measured by the proportion of papers on the subject published in the two principal 
journals (Maritime Policy and Management and Maritime Economics and Logistics), 
accounting for 27.3% of papers published between 2000 and 2009, although this had 
reduced from around one third of all papers published between 1982 and 1991 (ibid, 
p. 26).  The economics of shipping markets, taking liner and bulk together, 
accounted for 17.2% of all papers between 2000 and 2009, only slightly up from 
16.9% in the period 1982 to 1991.  Woo et al reach a slightly different conclusion to 
Heaver, based on the analysis of content of Maritime Policy and Management alone, 
in a retrospective covering the first forty years of publication.  In this review shipping 
market studies feature ahead of the ports sector in terms of number of publications 
(Woo et al., 2013).   
The proportion of papers on shipbuilding identified by Woo et al decreased from 
7.5% in the period 1989 to 1991 to only 1.7% (8 papers in total) in the period 2000 to 
2009 and it is possible that this decline reflects the European-centric nature of 
maritime economics.  Woo et al provide information that reveals that 68% of papers 
published since the 1970s have been from European institutions and the decline in 
interest in the economics of shipbuilding could be correlated with the decline in 
European shipbuilding over that period. 
No specific shipbuilding themes are identified either in Heaver’s analysis, the sector 
being referred to as generating “a variety of subjects”  (Heaver, 2012, p. 28), or in 
Woo et al, where the comment is made: “Although this area presented a consistent 
appearance, the number of papers remains relatively small” (Woo et al., 2013).  A 
review of 11 papers published in Maritime Policy & Management between 1999 and 
2013 that contain ‘shipbuilding’ in the key words, undertaken as part of the research 







Subject Number of 
papers 
Overview 
Price 1 Price formation of Chinese-built bulk 
carriers 
Management 1 China’s shipbuilding management 
challenges in the 1980s 
Competition 3 The WTO dispute, modelling of global 
competition and Taiwanese 
competitive strategy 
Policy 6 Various policy studies and 
recommendations for the shipbuilding 
sector 
Table 2.4 – Review of shipbuilding papers published in Maritime Policy & 
Management, 1999 to 2013 
This dissertation is related to the two most numerous sectors, competition and 
policy, but 11 papers in over a decade would still be counted as a low level of output.  
It is interesting to speculate why this low level of research in the economics of 
shipbuilding might be.  It certainly cannot be because the sector is without economic 
interest, nor that all economic issues have been solved.  The evidence for this is that 
both Talley and Woo et al include shipbuilding as an element of the subject in their 
reviews, although one that is not significantly addressed.  It is more likely to be 
related to the technical nature of the subject, study of which is normally the realm of 
engineers rather than economists.  Woo et al state: “The shipbuilding industry takes 
responsibility for the supply side of the shipping market and may be considered as a 
part of the shipping market sector.  However, this study regards ‘shipbuilding’ as a 
separate research area since this industry as a manufacturing industry, has different 
forms of market structure, policy and regulatory frameworks, industrial practices and 
so on” (Woo et al., 2013).   Various statements and reviews clearly ground 
shipbuilding in maritime economics, although from a very different direction when 
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compared to shipping.  Shipbuilding does not appear in a list of five suggestions for 
new directions in maritime economics research.   
The lack of publishing on the economics of shipbuilding extends to text books as well 
as to papers.  Stopford is almost alone in dedicating a chapter to the subject 
(Stopford, 2009, pp. 613 - 654).  Talley’s widely respected text book ‘The Blackwell 
Companion to Maritime Economics’, on the other hand includes virtually no 
references to shipbuilding and its economics (Talley, 2012).  Grammenos includes a 
chapter on the role of government policy in shipbuilding, although this is fairly 
general (Grammenos, 2010, pp. 557 - 576).  Similarly, shipbuilding textbooks, such 
as they are, consider solely the design and production aspects of the subject, without 
reference to economics.  Whilst there are occasional exceptions (Strandenes, 1986), 
where the economics of shipbuilding is considered it is normally a snapshot of 
market share, demand and price development that is given, without elucidation of the 
underlying economic principles.  A good example is the 1960 book: ‘The Economics 
of Shipbuilding in the United Kingdom’ , where “the emphasis has been placed on 
the current position of the industry as revealed by an examination of the current 
facts” (Parkinson, 1960, p. x), although Parkinson does include an interesting section 
on the relationship between shipping cycles and shipbuilding cycles.  Such 
‘snapshots’ inevitably have a ‘shelf life’ because the global shipbuilding industry is 
constantly in a state of flux with changes in the major players and competitive 
conditions.  Such publications are therefore of limited use in the long run, except 
perhaps to historians.  The conclusion drawn from this is that this dissertation 
presents an opportunity to add a new dimension to the area of maritime economics 
research by addressing what is thus far a relatively neglected sector, but is one that 
is of significant importance to the totality of the subject. 
The lack of publishing on the subject has added a dimension to this work that had 
not been envisioned at the start.  Because publications on the economics of 
shipbuilding are scarce it has been necessary to extend the literature review 
historically, a process afforded by the ‘Marine Technology Special Collection’ at 
Newcastle University.  As established earlier, the economic issues currently faced by 
the global industry are substantially the same as those faced a century and more 
ago, and publications over this extended period have therefore been able to provide 
a vital reference source for this work. 
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Finally, it is perhaps worth noting that this dissertation is written from the point of 
view of the shipbuilder, which is unusual in economic analysis of the industry.  In 
doing this it is hoped it will contribute to a need identified by Dikos in modelling 
newbuilding prices, where he concluded: “In order to understand fully the formation 
of the demand and supply functions for new vessels, we need to employ models of 
competitive exchange.  This task lies ahead for future research and will hopefully 
shed some light on the question of the nature of the behaviour (strategic or not) of 




3. Objectives and research questions 
3.1 Research objective 
It is the objective of this research to propose solutions to problems raised by specific 
barriers encountered in the application of the WTO’s subsidy and countervailing 
measures dispute process, identified in Korea – Commercial Vessels, so that the 
WTO’s mechanisms may be better available when such disputes arise in the future.  
This requires that the underlying difficulties of identifying ‘like products’ and ‘cross 
price elasticity’ between those products are addressed and, to enable this to happen, 
the precise nature of the ‘commercial shipbuilding market’ must first be established. 
Additionally, the dissertation uses this specific problem to examine the fundamentals 
of the sector and to contribute to the “deeper understanding” sought by the OECD, 
as discussed in Section 1.  The research seeks to improve the understanding of the 
nature of the business of shipbuilding and links between its investment and 
operations, products, markets and economics, which will hopefully stimulate further 
research into the complex economics of this fascinating industry.   
3.2 Research questions 
In the following list, the designation ‘H’ refers to hypothesis and ‘R’ to research 
question.  The overlying thesis is as follows: 
 H: The international commercial shipbuilding industry is not fundamentally 
different to other industry sectors in that it can be defined and analysed to 
make it governable by WTO instruments that aim to regulate competition. 
In order to support this thesis it is necessary to address the fundamental questions 
that arose in Korea – commercial vessels, as described above in Section 2, and this 
requirement leads to the identification of the hypotheses “each of which will be tested 
for its adequacy” (Phillips and Pugh, 2010, p. 49).  The fundamental questions that 
arose in Korea – commercial vessels are summarised as: does the commercial 
shipbuilding market exist, what are the characteristics of ‘like products’ in that market 
and can cross price elasticity be demonstrated between those products, which would 
be an indicator of a competitive market situation?  Three hypotheses resulting from 
these questions are: 
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 H1: The commercial shipbuilding market exists; 
 H2: Like products exist in the commercial shipbuilding market; 
 H3: Cross price elasticity exists between like products in the commercial 
shipbuilding market. 
Underlying all sections of the work is the requirement to understand the meaning of 
‘like product’ in its legal sense in WTO regulations and the first question that needs 
to be asked, therefore is: 
 R1: What is the legal definition of ‘like product’ in the context of WTO? 
To investigate H1 two questions must be addressed:   
 R2: Does the functioning of the international commercial shipbuilding market 
correspond to the accepted definitions of what constitutes a market in the 
economic sense? 
 R3: What are the boundaries of the market and how is it constituted in terms 
of products and their characteristics? 
To investigate H2 it has to be shown that likeness can satisfy the definitions required 
by WTO and, as will be seen in the answer to R1, this is essentially about 
competitiveness.  To investigate H2, therefore, two questions must be addressed: 
 R4: How do shipyards compete and what determines competitiveness 
between shipyards and between products? 
 R5: How can ‘like products’ be characterised based on the answers to R1 and 
R4? 
To investigate H3 two questions must be addressed: 
 R6: How is price determined in commercial shipbuilding? 
 R7: Can cross price elasticity be demonstrated across different products? 




Table 3.1 – Structure of Thesis, hypotheses and research questions 
 
  
The international commercial shipbuilding industry is not fundamentally different to other 
industry sectors in that it can be defined and analysed to make it governable by WTO 
instruments that aim to regulate competition.
H1: The commercial 
shipbuilding market exists
H2: Like products exist 
in the commercial 
shipbuilding market, 
H3: Cross-price elasticity 
exists between like 
products in the 
commercial shipbuilding 
market.
R2: Does the functioning of the 
international commercial shipbuilding 
market correspond to the accepted 
definitions of what constitutes a 
market in the economic sense?
R3: What are the boundaries of the 
market and how is it constituted in 
terms of products and their 
characteristics?
R5: How can ‘like products’ be 
characterised based on the answers 
to R1 and R4?
R4: How do shipyards compete and 
what determines competitiveness 
between shipyards and between 
products?
R1: What is the legal definition of ‘like product’ in the context of WTO?
R7: Can cross-price elasticity be 
demonstrated for ‘like products’?







4. R1 – What is the legal definition of ‘like product’ in the context of 
WTO? 
Establishing ‘likeness’ between products is a vital element in identifying violations in 
WTO law: “the ‘likeness’ element can offer more than just a comparison that 
provides the first step in the analysis.  It can also be the key to the provision” (Lester 
et al., 2012, p. 272).  The general term ‘like product’, along with similar terms such 
as ‘directly competitive or substitutable products’ (Lang, 2011, p. 261) appear many 
times in WTO and GATT instruments but generally without guidance or interpretation 
or meaning.  Bossche lists 10 uses of the term ‘like product’ in GATT 1994 but notes 
that “Nevertheless, the concept of ‘like products’ is not defined..” (Bossche, 2013, p. 
325).  Outside the GATT agreement itself, however, the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures, the specific agreement that was at the root of Korea – 
Commercial Vessels, does provide some guidance on the meaning of the term, 
which is defined in the agreement as: “a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all 
respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, 
another product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely 
resembling those of the product under consideration”(World Trade Organization, 
1994).    This is clearly a wide and rather vague definition.  What characteristics of a 
product can be considered, for example, and what are the bounds of “closely 
resembling”?  Thus, even where guidance is given the concept of ‘like product’ is 
complex and gives a wide scope for interpretation.  Even if the narrowest possible 
view of the term were to be taken, that is to say where two products appear to be 
identical, the ambiguity persists.  Lester et al point out that “two individual products 
could never be exactly the same in all respects.  They could share common features 
such as physical characteristics or end use, but would differ in others” (Lester et al., 
2012, p. 316).  A good example to illustrate this would be the difference between a 
genuine and a counterfeit Rolex wrist watch.  Even if the counterfeit were to be a 
perfect copy in every respect it would not be ‘like’ the genuine article. 
This vagueness may seem strange to non-legal readers or persons new to the WTO 
system, but there is a good reason for it and von Moltke notes that this ambiguity 
was intentionally introduced into the original draft of the GATT’s immediate 
predecessor in 1948, the ‘Havana Charter’, to reflect problems in the real world 
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(Moltke, 1998).  Lang argues that in drafting the original GATT agreement “there was 
an alternative view of the role of law… which saw legal ambiguity as a potentially 
constructive force” (Lang, 2011, p. 200), because it requires the context of a trade 
measure to be taken into account through interpretation, rather than simply 
proscribing an absolute and firm rule.  Lang points out that this view was developed 
during the negotiation of the ‘Havana Charter’ following a memorandum submitted by 
the UK during negotiations, which stated:   
“…there are numerous provisions in the charter which require the discretion and 
economic judgement rather than precise interpretation of the terms of the charter…In 
almost every conceivable case arising under the Charter the issues will of their 
nature involve the element of economic appraisal and assessment and will not be 
purely legal in character, and it will be impossible to say where the economic 
judgement ends and the legal judgement begins” (Ibid.). 
Thus, whilst the lack of a definition or even precision of language with respect to ‘like 
product’ may seem like an oversight on the part of the drafters of the WTO legal 
documents, it is in fact an important and intentional feature.  To quote further from 
Lang who, in turn, is quoting from another author (Robert. E Hudec): “..the issue was 
not just to ensure that dispute settlement was guided by economic (not just legal) 
forms of expertise, and controlled by ‘pragmatic’ economic experts whose judgement 
was not cluttered by legalistic ritual’5” (Ibid.).   In other words, the law is trying to 
avoid clear rules and thereby avoid ‘predictable behaviour’ (ibid.).  Naval Architects 
will recognise the features of this type of predictable behaviour in the development of 
‘paragraph ships’, common terminology for specific design features introduced to 
circumvent what are seen as disadvantageous proscriptive rules.  Blocksidge notes 
that the first known rule for tonnage calculation resulted from a 1694 Act of 
Parliament that proscribed a simple formula for calculating the tonnage of ships 
carrying coal.  He goes on to state that: “From this date onwards there have been 
frequent changes to deal with evasions, anomalies, and alterations in the design of 
ships” (Blocksidge, 1933, p. 124).  In any situation, therefore, proscribed firm 
limitations and rules are likely to be seen as a challenge, rather than a restriction.  It 
is only in the current century that ship design is finally getting to grips with this, 
                                            
5 From Hudec (1970): The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat’s Jurisprudence. 
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through the introduction of goal-based rather than rule-based design methodologies, 
directly analogous to the WTO’s legal approach to the meaning of ‘like product’.  
The lack of an explanatory definition of the meaning of the term ‘likeness’ in most 
instances of its use means that it has been up to case law to develop its 
interpretation, and it remains one of the most hotly debated features of WTO law.  As 
Lang puts it: “These rules of the game can be thought of as ‘customary norms’… The 
GATT’s legal system relied on the existence of this underlying and evolving 
substratum of informal norms, without which it simply could not function effectively” 
(Lang, 2011, p. 203).   
Consideration of the meaning of the term ‘like product’ is specific to the particular 
paragraph of the WTO agreements in which the term appears and thus there can be 
no single or general definition.  Strictly speaking, therefore, an overall meaning 
cannot be given, nor inferred between contexts.  Notwithstanding this, to gain the 
widest view of possible interpretations the following section looks at the definition of 
‘like product’ in all contexts, to gain an insight into the potential breadth and depth of 
meaning that could be inferred under the SCM agreement definition.  This is 
consistent with case law relating to the SCM agreement, which has found that 
assessment of likeness under this agreement should be similar to that for 
assessment under GATT in general.  The Panel in Indonesia – Autos (1998) ruled: 
“Although we are required in this dispute to interpret the term ‘like product’ in 
conformity with the specific definition provided in the SCM agreement, we believe 
that useful guidance can nevertheless be derived from prior analysis of ‘like product’ 
issues under other provisions of the WTO Agreement”. 
A good history of the development of term through legal rulings going back to the 
original 1947 GATT agreement is given in Cottier et al (2000).  Certainly the 
simplistic notion that products should be substitutes for each other in a functional 
sense is far too narrow to define what constitutes a like product within the ambit of 
WTO agreements, and early attempts to define the concept using dictionary 
definitions were therefore found to be too narrow.  The WTO’s Appellate Body (the 
organisation that deals with appeals following Panel rulings) in the case of Canada-
Aircraft in 2000 ruled that “dictionary meanings leave many interpretive questions 
open” and thus the meaning of ‘like product’ has to be interpreted on a case by case 
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basis.  The case of Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II in 1996 further concluded on 
appeal that the concept of ‘like product’ is not constant and products that are like in 
one situation may be considered to be not so in another, indicating that the features 
that determine ‘likeness’ are not simple or straightforward.  These rulings reflect the 
findings of an influential Working Party on Border Taxes from 1968, which 
considered the meaning of ‘like product’ and which concluded that such a case by 
case approach is necessary.   
The Working Party’s concept of likeness has subsequently been used, to varying 
degrees, in virtually all Panel and Appellate Body considerations of ‘likeness’, 
establishing the four primary considerations of the concept of ‘likeness’:   
In considering likeness “a panel examines on a case by case basis all relevant 
criteria or factors including: (1) the products’ properties, nature and quality, i.e. their 
physical characteristics; (2) the products’ end-uses; (3) consumers’ tastes and 
habits, also referred to as consumers’ perceptions and behaviour, in respect of the 
products; and (4) the products’ tariff classification”(Bossche, 2013, p. 363).   
Consideration of the tariff classification of products provides a relatively simple 
approach to defining likeness and Bossche notes that “tariff classification has been 
used as a criterion for determining ‘like products’ in several panel reports” (Bossche, 
2008, P.353).  The most appropriate classification would be the SITC system, that is 
to say the United Nations’ Standard International Trade Classification system (United 
Nations Statistics Division, 2013).  Under the taxonomy of this system the 
classification of ships can be found in: 
 Section 7 – Machinery and transport equipment 
 Division 79 – Other transport equipment 
 Group 793 – Ships, boats (including hovercraft) and floating structures 
This group is sub-divided into the following sub-groups: 
 793.1 - Yachts and other vessels for pleasure or sports; rowing-boats and 
canoes 
 793.2 - Ships, boats and other vessels (other than pleasure craft, tugs, 
pusher craft, special-purpose vessels and vessels for breaking up) 
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 793.3 - Vessels and other floating structures for breaking up 
 793.5 - Light vessels, fire-floats, dredgers, floating cranes, and other 
vessels the navigability of which is subsidiary to their main function; 
floating docks; floating or submersible drilling or production platforms 
 793.7 - Tugs and pusher craft 
 793.9 - Other floating structures (e.g., rafts, tanks, coffer-dams, landing-
stages, buoys and beacons) 
Clearly sub-group 793.2 is relevant as a potential context for likeness in commercial 
shipbuilding.  Sub-group 793.2 is further subdivided into the following ‘basic 
headings’: 
 793.22 - Tankers of all kinds 
 793.24 - Fishing vessels; factory ships and other vessels for 
processing or preserving fishery products 
 793.26 - Refrigerated vessels (other than tankers) 
 793.27 - Other vessels for the transport of goods (including vessels 
for the transport of both passengers and goods) 
 793.28 - Cruise ships, excursion boats and similar vessels 
principally designed for the transport of persons; ferry-boats of all 
kinds 
 793.29 - Other vessels (including warships and lifeboats other than 
rowing-boats) 
These ‘basic headings’ collectively sufficiently describe the vessels included in the 
market definition derived later in this dissertation but include two headings that are 
not appropriate to commercial vessels (as included in Korea – Commercial Vessels): 
793.24, fishing, and 793.29, other (including warships).  Heading 793.27 provides a 
possible classification for many commercial vessels and this group would confirm 
that container ships and bulk carriers, for example, are to some degree ‘like’ 
because they would be both within the ambit of this definition.  Where this approach 
breaks down, however, is that tankers and refrigerated vessels are included in 
separate categories and this approach therefore is inconsistent.  The demarcations 
in the system are evidently orientated to the trade in goods rather than the ships 
themselves as products, reflecting the most common use of this system in the 
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classification of trade and tariffs.  This is not appropriate in the definition of like 
product in the shipbuilding context.  This approach is therefore inadequate, except in 
that it establishes the principle that two apparently dissimilar vessels, for example a 
small feeder container ship and a large capesize bulk carrier, or a North Sea ferry 
and a general cargo vessel, may be considered as like at least in this context.  This 
reinforces the view that products that are like do not have to be substitutes for each 
other in a functional sense, counter to what was argued by Korea in the panel 
hearing of Korea – Commercial Vessels.  This also reflects the Appellate Body’s 
conclusions in the case of Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, where the Body 
“cautioned against the use of tariff bindings”.  The definition of likeness clearly has to 
be approached from another direction. 
Following interpretation of the term ‘like product’ on a dictionary or tariff-boundary 
approach, a more analytical market-based approach was developed and this is 
essentially the approach used today, which “looks to the consumer and the market… 
to make distinctions between products”.  It is worth noting that an alternative 
coherent approach for interpretation developed along the way was termed 
‘regulatory intent’, normally referred to as the “aim and effects test” (Cottier et al., 
2000; Lang, 2011; Bossche, 2013) whereby the consideration of likeness should 
take into account not the attributes of the product but what is the aim of the measure 
that is the subject of the complaint (the support of the commercial shipbuilding 
industry in South Korea in the case of Korea – Commercial Vessels) and what is the 
effect of the measure on the complainant (loss of business for EC shipyards in the 
case of Korea – Commercial Vessels).  This approach appears to have merit but was 
rejected as unworkable in 1996 by the Panel in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 
primarily because governmental intent is virtually impossible to deduce from 
analysis, and is now discredited and abandoned in the consideration of likeness in 
the WTO.  This was essentially the underlying approach taken in the arguments of 
the EC in Korea – Commercial Vessels and as outlined in the Panel ruling the case 
for likeness was rejected as unproven.  
Cottier et al note that: “For most purposes, however, meaningful comparisons of ‘like 
product’ definitions requires specifying the criteria by which likeness can be 
measured.  One must describe the individual criteria with some care, and after that it 
is possible to talk about degrees of likeness within the boundaries of those criteria or 
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characteristics”.   The flexibility of the term ‘like product’ has led to it being described 
in terms of an accordion, which can stretch and squeeze depending on the situation 
and the specific agreement concerned.  Bossche notes that “It is generally accepted 
that the concept of ‘like products’ has a different scope or ‘width’ in the different 
contexts in which it is used” (Bossche, 2013, p. 326) and goes on to list a framework 
of three questions that need to be resolved in considering the interpretation of the 
concept, based on the rulings on another case: EC-Asbestos  in 2001.  The 
questions are: 
1. “which characteristics or qualities are important in assessing ‘likeness’; 
2. to what degree or extent must products share qualities or characteristics in 
order to be ‘like products’; and 
3. from whose perspective likeness should be judged”. 
In considering these questions it is important to state that whilst similarity of physical 
characteristics may be the first consideration of likeness it is not necessary that such 
similarity exists for likeness to exist.  Conversely, products that share even 
apparently identical physical characteristics may not be ‘like’ within the context of 
WTO laws.   Konrad von Moltke points out that when the GATT agreements were 
drafted, those drafting the texts must have known that the English word ‘like’ in this 
context has no perfect counterpart in either French or Spanish, the other two 
designated languages for legal texts in the WTO (Moltke, 1998).  He points out that 
the French version of GATT speaks of ‘equivalent’ as the translation for ‘like’ and 
notes that: 
“Some products are equivalent but not like (for example, whisky and sake).  Some 
products are like but not equivalent (for example, wild caught salmon and the 
ranched version).  In the modern trading system, some products are identical but not 
alike (for example, generic and branded pharmaceuticals)”. 
The author points out that some generic and branded pharmaceuticals may be 
produced on the same machines but may not be ‘like products’ under the terms of 
the ‘TRIPS’ agreement, that is to say the WTO agreement on intellectual property 
rights.  The issue under discussion in Moltke’s paper is related to fishing methods for 
Tuna, where the author argues that dolphin-friendly methods for catching the fish 
must be distinguishable in trade law from non-dolphin friendly, but in determining 
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likeness in the WTO context the consideration of the production method, or process 
and production methods (ppm) as it is known, is not permitted: harvesting or 
production methods that do not alter the end product cannot make a product ‘less 
alike’.  Bossche notes that this aspect of likeness is increasingly being put under 
pressure on the basis of competitiveness of environmentally friendly and un-friendly 
means of production. As a general rule, however, “two similar products cannot 
become unlike on the basis of their method of production or process” and developing 
countries in particular argue against the use of production methods in determination 
of likeness (the so-called “ppm debate”) (Bethlehem, 2009, p. 546).  This is important 
in determining likeness between two units of shipbuilding capacity.  A unit of capacity 
in a modern shipyard building in a drydock, for example, cannot be seen as being 
dissimilar to a unit at a yard building on a slipway. 
Cottier et al point out that “as soon as any difference of physical characteristics is 
found, however, one has to resort to other criteria to determine whether the 
difference is relevant to the question of ‘like’ treatment”.  The example of a non-
physical characteristic that may be taken into account in this source is ‘commercial 
interchangeability’  and it is this concept, within the framework of questions listed 
above, that provides the basis of likeness in commercial shipbuilding proposed in 
this dissertation.   This reflects the generally held view that “‘likeness’ is essentially a 
determination of the competitive relationship between two products” (Bethlehem, 
2009, p. 547).  Lester et al put it as follows, with reference to key Panel and 
Appellate Body rulings: “With these statements, the appellate body has seemingly 
issued a clear and determinative statement that ‘likeness’ is about the economic 
competitiveness of products” (Lester et al., 2012, p. 271).  Cottier et al point out that 
substituting the words ‘competing products’ for ‘like products’ possibly gives a far 
more meaningful indication of the intent of the wording although with its own set or 
problems in the definition.   The authors go on to provide the basis of a test for 
likeness, additional to Bossche’s three questions listed above, in the following terms: 
“Many of the criteria of likeness that have been offered in GATT legal discussions of 
the ‘like product’ concept can be viewed as overlapping variations on the idea of 
competitiveness.  First there is substitutability – the extent to which consumers 
perceive two products as functionally equivalent, measured by the consumer’s 
willingness to substitute one for the other, a willingness which in turn is usually 
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measured by the extent to which relatively small changes in price affect consumer 
preferences for one or the other.  Next, there is concept of functional likeness, the 
extent to which the two products do in fact perform the same function, like sweeping 
dirt.  Finally, although the producer-orientated provisions sometimes do employ 
‘likeness’ criteria that do not, strictly speaking, relate to the competitiveness of the 
goods in question – e.g., the extent to which two products are made from the same 
raw materials, in the same establishments, by the same capital goods, or by the 
same workers – the competitiveness criteria are still the first and most important 
factor in the ‘like product’ decisions in those areas as well”. 
Bossche states, on the basis of the ruling of the Appellate Body in relation to EC – 
Asbestos (2001): “It is clear that an internal regulation can only afford protection of 
domestic production if the internal regulation addresses domestic and imported 
products that are in a competitive relationship” and this clearly places the issue of 
competitiveness in the evaluation of like product within the context of the SCM 
agreement.  The Appellate Body in question stated: “determination of likeness under 
[GATT] Article III:4 is, fundamentally, a determination about the nature and extent of 
a competitive relationship between and among products”(Bossche, 2013, p. 388).  It 
is also pointed out that the ruling requires that both the nature and extent of the 
relationship is examined and this means that the determination of likeness is a 
matter of judgement and not just economic analysis. 
To summarise these factors in terms that can be used to judge likeness in the 
following analysis, likeness has to show: 
1. Substitutability – consumers have to be willing to substitute one for the other; 
2. Functionality – the two products have to perform the same function; and 
3. Competitiveness – the two products have to actually be competing for the 
same opportunities. 
In general, therefore, both competitive factors and physical characteristics have to be 
taken into account in determining likeness.  Even products with physically similar 
characteristics may not be ‘like’ if their “competitiveness  of substitutability is 
low”(Bossche, 2013, p. 388).  A good example here that has been tested in the WTO 
is the comparison of luxury cars with cheaper more utilitarian vehicles.  The end use 
of the two cars is the same, the physical properties are more or less the same (they 
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are both cars) but consumer tastes and habits in the purchase of the two are very 
different and the two are therefore not competing or substitutable and are not 
considered to be ‘like’. 
These three factors will be used, along with Bossche’s four questions outlined 
earlier, in the analysis that follows to test the issues of likeness in commercial 
shipbuilding against the definition given in the SCM agreement. 
Finally it should be noted that the definition of ‘like product’ needs to take into 
account the intent of the context within which it is used.  The importance of context is 
central to the interpretation of the term: “the Appellate Body in Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages II did not hesitate to observe that the term ‘like products’ has different 
meaning in the various contexts in which it appears throughout the WTO 
agreements” (Bethlehem, 2009, p. 612).  In the case of the SCM agreement this 
intent is not specifically stated in the agreement per se, but it is clear from the 
agreement that the intent is to prevent the use of government financial support to 
favour domestic industry against foreign competition in the global trading arena.  The 
WTO’s own explanation of the intent of the agreement, published on the WTO web 
site, is as follows: 
“This agreement does two things: it disciplines the use of subsidies, and it regulates 
the actions countries can take to counter the effects of subsidies. It says a country 
can use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure to seek the withdrawal of the 
subsidy or the removal of its adverse effects. Or the country can launch its own 
investigation and ultimately charge extra duty (known as “countervailing duty”) on 
subsidized imports that are found to be hurting domestic producers”. (World Trade 
Organization, 2013a)   
This intent will be taken into account in the following analysis of like product in 
commercial shipbuilding, taking into account also the tests for ‘likeness discussed 
above’ and that the concept of likeness necessarily has to consider the competitive 
relationship between products from the point of view of shipbuilders and their 
customers, not in relation to the functional use of the ship.   
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5. H1 - The commercial shipbuilding market exists 
5.1 R2 – Does the functioning of the international commercial 
shipbuilding market correspond to the accepted definitions of 
what constitutes a market in the economic sense? 
5.1.1 Empirical acceptance of the existence of the market 
Wijnolst and Wergeland in 1996 considered the question “Is it relevant to talk about 
one world market for the building of ships” (Wijnolst and Wergeland, 1996, p. 183) 
and concluded statistically that a single market exists: “The conclusion is that it 
seems relevant to talk about one, global market for the building of ships. The price 
correlation is very high for most segments, so prices adjust quickly to either regional 
or ship type differences.  The technological diffusion process is also very rapid, 
making it difficult, if not impossible, to protect a new innovation or design from strong 
competition” (ibid., p. 186)6.   This was done in part by reviewing price correlations 
between market sectors, which were shown to be substantially positive.  Even 
without positive statistical proof, however, it is widely accepted by industry 
practitioners that a commercial shipbuilding market exists and it is widely discussed 
as such in key texts and books.  A small number of the wide uses of the term are as 
follows: 
 The “newbuilding market” is identified by Stopford as one of “shipping’s four 
market places” (Stopford, 2009, p.177) and  Stopford uses two 19th Century 
economists’ definitions to define what a market is, the essence being that 
traders are in “close communication with each other” and as a result “the 
prices of the same goods tend to equality easily and quickly”.   
 Strandenes talks about the economic concepts of the shipbuilding market in 
another standard work on the shipping markets commonly referred to in 
maritime economics (Grammenos, 2002, p. 186 to 202). In other work, 
Strandenes classifies newbuilding along with the spot freight markets as “’real’ 
markets with market clearance between supply and demand for transportation 
services and vessels, respectively.  The time charter markets and markets for 
                                            
6 In drawing this conclusion the authors appear to be quoting from a paper: “One shipbuilding 
market?”, SNF-Working Paper 30/96, Bergen SNF, Haddal, R., and Knudsen, K, (1996) 
80 
 
second hand vessels, on the other hand, are ‘auxiliary’ markets.  In these 
markets shipowners may spread their risk or get information as to the view of 
the future held by the ‘market’.  This implies that both the time charter and the 
second hand market reflect the economic agents’ expectations of the future 
development of the spot freight rate” (Strandenes, 1984). 
 In discussing the key themes in shipping economics research, Cullinane 
notes: “the importance of analysing the shipbuilding, ship sale and purchase 
(S&P) and scrap markets” (Cullinane, 2005, p. 2) and goes on to list a range 
of data providers and consultants that provide information and analysis in the 
market. 
 In the Institute of Chartered Shipbrokers guide for trainee ship brokers it 
states that trainees must: “understand what factors influence the state of the 
S&P [sale and purchase] market generally and what factors influence each of 
these markets particularly” and in defining the scope of this market the 
trainees must “thoroughly understand the differences and relationships 
between the markets for newbuildings, second hand tonnage and demolition”  
(Institute of Chartered Shipbrokers., 2012b). 
 The widely regarded ‘Platou Report’, published annually for over 30 years by 
Norwegian ship broker R.S. Platou, is similar to many brokers’ state of the 
market reports in including a section specifically titled “The Shipbuilding 
Market” (R.S. Platou a.s., 2014, pp. 12-15).  Other published brokers reports 
similarly contain sections referencing the ‘shipbuilding market’ or the 
‘newbuilding market’ (Clarkson Research, 2014; Fearnleys, 2014). 
 The OECD has a working party on shipbuilding: “Since its creation in 1966, 
the OECD’s Council Working Party on Shipbuilding (WP6) has addressed 
factors that distort normal competitive conditions in the shipbuilding industry in 
accordance with its mandate” (OECD Working Party 6, 2012a).  WP6’s 
background paper on market distorting factors in 2012 and its supporting 
documentation extensively discuss an entity specifically titled the “shipbuilding 
market” (ibid.). 
Notwithstanding the widely accepted existence of an entity called, interchangeably, 
the “shipbuilding” or “newbuilding” market its existence was questioned at the WTO 
hearing (World Trade Organization, 2005).    In preliminary hearings the Korean side 
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argued that there is no entity that could be termed the ‘shipbuilding market’ and that 
each contract for a new vessel had to be considered as a separate entity in its own 
right.  The panel rejected this notion, not least because the Korean technical expert 
themselves were engaged in publishing reports analysing an entity called the 
“shipbuilding market” (Drewry Shipping Consultants, 2001).  Later discussions 
included in the report of the panel centred on the definition as to what constituted 
such a market.  The European submission claimed the existence of a general “world 
market” or “global market” where new ships are bought and sold on a global basis 
and with the existence of “market prices” within that market.  The Korean submission 
denied the existence of such a market, arguing that “some markets are reserved for 
national producers (citing LNGs, and the US cabotage market, as particular 
examples).  Korea further argues, as described above, that price suppression/price 
depression must be established in relation to (a) particular national market(s).  Korea 
seems to imply that therefore a case based on a world market must fail on this basis 
alone” (World Trade Organization, 2005).    The “US Cabotage” market referred to 
here is the protected ‘Jones Act’ market, whereby ships involved in cabotage trades 
in US waters are restricted by law, inter alia, to being built in US shipyards.  Clearly 
this is an example of shipbuilding trade that could not be included within the 
definition of a world market.  The LNG example cited is rather confused, due to an 
apparent misunderstanding by the Panel.  The building of LNG tankers is not 
reserved nationally in any protected way, unlike contracts that fall within the terms of 
the Jones Act, but it is concentrated in a small number of specialised builders and 
there are significant barriers to entry in that sector that may be argued preclude it 
from any discussion of a “global market” in a general sense.  It must be concluded, 
given these two exceptions, that the Korean argument correctly recognises that there 
may not exist a single homogeneous entity called a ‘shipbuilding market’ but this 
does not preclude that a group of more or less discrete sub-markets may exist, nor 
the possibility of linkages that connect pricing mechanisms between these markets7. 
There is clearly merit in both sides of this argument.  The panel accepted the 
existence of a world market for “commercial vessels” in its ruling but key aspects and 
the nature of this market remain ill-defined.  What are the boundaries of the market 
                                            
7 In reality, cross price analysis presented later in this dissertation suggests that LNG tankers are like 
other ships, despite the barriers to entry, and the distinction proposed by Korea is found to be false. 
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in terms of products, that is to say what could be considered as ‘like product’ in such 
a market, and is there any meaningful concept that could be called a ‘market price’, 
for which cross price-elasticity within the bounds of like products must be shown? 
5.1.2 Benchmarking commercial shipbuilding against definitions of the 
economic concepts of a ‘market’ 
In defining the market it is helpful to return to basic economic principles and examine 
underlying definitions of what constitutes a market.  The shipbuilding market can 
then be tested against these definitions. 
The Oxford English Dictionary’s (OED) basic definition is “A place at which trade is 
conducted”, with first use noted as being in the Anglo Saxon Chronicles in the year 
963 AD.  The concept of a market being constituted in a physical place persisted 
until relatively recently, up to the 1980s, with the Baltic Exchange and the London 
Stock Exchange being good examples of places where trade was done physically in 
a specified locality.  Such physical places persist in many forms, for example in food 
and other retail markets, but the development of electronic trading means that the 
physical place is no longer necessary for the transaction of intangible items or what 
has historically been termed the trade in ‘paper’.  Such intangible items may be 
linked to tangible products, for example relating to a contract for production of a new 
ship.   
Subsequent OED definitions come closer to what may be referred to as the 
‘shipbuilding market’ under discussion here.  Definition 4 refers to: “The action or 
business of buying and selling; a commercial transaction, a purchase or sale; a 
(good or bad) bargain”, and definition 5 to:  “The rate of purchase and sale of a 
commodity. Now usually (chiefly in Stock Market): the market price or the market 
value”.   These represent the modern economic definition of a market, as an 
economic construct rather than a physical place, although surprisingly are only 
marginally younger in terms of first use than the first definition (the years 1340 and 
1592 for definitions 4 and 5 respectively).  Based on these definitions the underlying 
concept of a market can be seen to include:  
1. facilitation of economic transactions (buying and selling); 
2. a mechanism for setting of price.   
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This ‘classical’ definition concurs with that discussed by Stopford in relation to the 
newbuilding market, discussed above.  To expand this, four further definitions from 
economics reference sources have been examined.  These are outlined below, with 
comments on the situation described in the WTO panel ruling. 
Definition 1: Routledge dictionary of economics (Rutherford and Ebooks 
Corporation., 2002)  
"A medium for exchanges between buyers and sellers...markets for goods and 
services are termed 'product markets' and for labour and capital are determined 
'factor markets’.  There is a linkage between product and factor markets in that the 
demand for a factor is derived from the demand for its product.  Dealers in a market 
seek to create an equilibrium between demand and supply at a particular price”.   
Essentially the European view expressed in the panel ruling takes a ‘factor market’ 
approach, with the factor traded being shipbuilding capacity.  The Korean view, on 
the other hand, takes the ‘product market’ approach, suggesting that trades are 
specific to the particular contract and thereby to the specific product involved in a 
particular trade.  As suggested by this definition, however, the two approaches are 
not mutually exclusive but are linked.  In a very real sense shipyards do, of course, 
sell ships.  At the time of contract, when the sale is made, however, the ship, except 
in rare circumstances, does not exist and what is actually being traded is a 
commitment to provide capacity to build that ship at a future time.  Brokers 
commonly refer to this future capacity as a ‘slot’ in the shipyard’s build programme.  
It is demonstrated later in this dissertation that not only is commercial shipbuilding 
capacity flexible in terms of the products that it can economically produce, it is 
essential to competitiveness that this flexibility exists due to the fluctuating nature of 
demand.  One-product shipyards have existed in the past and to some extent current 
examples could possibly be postulated, for example dedicated cruise ship builders, 
but in the long run pure one-off shipbuilders have been unable to survive without 
adaptation of their capacity for other purposes.  The forward capacity that is sold 
when an order is placed, therefore, could be booked for a range of product types and 
it is therefore capacity that is being traded, a factor of production, as well as the 
product.  The sale is directed to the product and purchaser that offer the best 
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economic prospect to the shipbuilder at that particular time and the nature of this 
trade will vary depending on shifting market conditions. 
The length of time from contract before which capacity is actually utilised can be 
significant, depending on market conditions and the shipyard’s backlog of work at the 
time of taking the order.  For example, records in Sea-Web show that 12 large 
container ships (over 10,000 TEU) ordered from Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) of 
South Korea in 2006 did not see keel lay for 32.5 months on average after the orders 
were placed, with the longest waiting 39 months for keel lay.  If the order were to be 
cancelled before production commences the capacity ‘slot’ would wherever possible 
be re-sold but the subsequent contract would not necessarily be for the same 
product.  Thus, whilst in product terms a ship itself is not substitutable for another 
ship type when in operation, for example an LNG tanker could not carry containers, 
the factor of production that is traded, capacity, is substitutable at least to some 
extent between products.  This characteristic of shipbuilding capacity was noted by 
Adland et al in studying the nature of ‘asset bubbles’ in shipping: “It is worth 
emphasising that the different types of ships will compete for the same slots” (Adland 
et al., 2006).  Of course the proposed ship has to be compatible with the factor of 
production, taking into account both the size and technical characteristics of the 
vessel, which have to be within the shipyard’s capability, the shipyard’s strategy with 
respect to product mix and access to factors of competitive advantage that the 
shipyard holds.  As an example, HHI has in the recent past used the same units of 
capacity to build VLCCs, capesize bulk carriers, large container ships and LNG 
tankers.   
The question that arises is how flexible is a unit of shipbuilding capacity between 
products and what determines the limits of this flexibility?  This could be stated in 
terms of what products could the capacity be competing for and this is central to the 
issue of like product that is also addressed later in this dissertation.   
The attributes of both factor and product are taken into account in the theory of price 
for new ships.  Haralambides et al, in conducting a review of ship price research and 
publications, conclude that: “In addition to market expectations, the price of new 
ships depends on shipbuilding costs and shipyard capacity” (Haralambides et al., 
2005).  This recognises that price is determined both by the attributes of the product 
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(a cruise ship, for example, with sophisticated public spaces and systems, will self-
evidently be more expensive than a bulk carrier which contains a limited amount of 
outfit, or a small bulk carrier will self-evidently cost less to build than a large bulk 
carrier) and the attributes of the availability of capacity, with prices likely to be higher 
when the supply of capacity is limited (i.e. when shipyards are relatively full of work 
with long backlogs) and lower when orders are scarce.   
In the context of this definition there remains the question about the existence of a 
mechanism that can account for the determination of a ‘market price’.  This is 
discussed further below. 
Definition 2: Dictionary of economic terms (Gilpin, 1977)  
"An area, however large or small, where buyers and sellers are in sufficiently close 
contact with each other to ensure that the price of a commodity tends to be the same 
in all parts of the market”. 
This definition addresses the key question of the identification of a mechanism for 
pricing and the issue of cross price elasticity between differing products, which are 
competing for the same units of capacity.  It is necessary, therefore, to consider the 
existence of a potential mechanism for this “close contact”, to confirm the existence 
of a market within this definition and conforming to the basic OED definition given at 
the start of this section and also discussed by Stopford.   
It is proposed that this mechanism can be shown to exist as a combination of two 
elements.  The first element stems from the common practise of the use of agents, in 
the form of ‘sale and purchase’ (S&P) brokers, to negotiate between buyer and seller 
in the fixing of newbuilding contracts.  The role of S&P brokers is summarised as 
follows by Branch in a widely used shipping textbook:  “The sale and purchase of 
vessels is a very specialized activity and is undertaken by a sale and purchase 
broker.  He (sic) normally acts either for the buyer or seller of a ship”. (Branch, 2007, 
p. 332)  The Institute of Chartered Shipbrokers (ICS) outlines the role of an S&P 
broker as: “S&P brokers tend to specialise, some dealing exclusively in new ships 
where a close knowledge of the prices yards are quoting and the availability of 
building berths is needed” (Institute of Chartered Shipbrokers., 2012a, p. 64).  Thus, 
the use of ship brokers appears to fulfil the criteria in the above definition that, whilst 
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there is no sophisticated mechanised exchange for new ships such as in the stock 
markets, there is a mechanism providing “sufficiently close contact” to justify the 
claim that a pricing mechanism may exist in the market.  The ICS further classifies 
brokers into “bulk carrier (dry and tanker) general purpose and small ships ...small 
also includes such craft as fishing vessels, barges, tugs and other specialised 
vessels.. Passenger and ferry” (ibid.) and this demarcation may give some clues to 
the boundaries of like product, to be discussed further.  It should also be noted that 
many shipbrokers span more than one market classification, thereby offering a 
potential route for cross price mechanisms. 
The second element demonstrating ‘close contact’ relates to the statement quoted 
above from the ICS that part of the job of the broker is to have a “close knowledge of 
the prices yards are quoting”.  This close knowledge will come partly from direct 
contacts with shipyards and with fellow brokers within the same firm and between 
firms.  Additionally, however, as with any sector of the shipping market, there are a 
range of sources available that track shipbuilding prices and publish information on 
the generality and, in some cases, specifics of contracts.  Perhaps the most widely 
used general source in this respect is Clarkson’s World Shipyard Monitor, which 
publishes both guide prices for specific products and a market index for prices in 
general, but there are many other publications and broker’s reports available to 
advise on prices.  Prices are reported in generality, for example, in Lloyd’s Shipping 
Economist and Fairplay, and specific contract prices in journals including Lloyd’s List 
and Tradewinds. 
In this way it is proposed that prima facie the mechanisms for price setting that are 
part of the definition of a market exist in general terms and as such supports the 
contention that a market can be said to exist, although no doubt there will be 
exceptions.  A good example is the cruise ship sector, where negotiations tend to be 
direct between shipyard and owner, rather than through an S&P broker.  The 
purchase of smaller and specialised vessels, for example tugs, may also be outside 
the scope of the S&P broking sector, with direct negotiation between buyer and 
seller.  The Dutch tug producer Damen, for example, has sufficient brand presence 




Definition 3: Collins Internet-linked dictionary of economics (Pass et al., 2005)  
"An exchange mechanism that brings together sellers and buyers of a product, factor 
of production or financial security... Economists generally define a market as a group 
of products that consumers view as being substitutes for one another (that is, they 
have a high cross elasticity of demand).  This market may not correspond exactly 
with industrial classifications, which group products into industries in terms of their 
technical and production characteristics rather than consumer substitutability.  .... In 
the absence of reliable cross elasticity of demand data, economists are often forced 
to fall back on industrial classifications as a best approximation of markets in 
empirical analysis. .. From the point of view of applying competition policy, however, 
a dis-aggregation of such groupings into sub-markets is necessary”. 
This definition provides good justification for the decision of the WTO Panel to accept 
the existence of a market, even though the detail was uncertain at the time and the 
industrial classifications proposed by the EC submission were therefore accepted to 
enable the case to be heard.  This definition opens up the option that a market may 
exist even where its parameters are ‘fuzzy’, without very specific definition of the 
boundaries.   
Definition 4: The penguin dictionary of economics (Bannock et al., 2003)  
"A collection of homogeneous transactions.  ... In traditional economics a market is 
characterised by a single prevailing price for commodities of uniform quality.  This is 
not necessarily the same as the business view - the market is a collection of selling 
opportunities; or the legal view; where the market is a trading zone free of artificial 
restrictions on transactions”. 
This definition is useful in considering the Korean claim that no market exists, simply 
individual transactions.  Even this is hard to argue as not constituting a market, 
however, under the “business view” given in this definition.  In supporting the EC 
contention of the existence of a “world market” it would be impossible to conclude 
that all newbuilding contracts are homogeneous: the setting of the price of a cruise 
ship or a standard tug as a direct negotiation between shipyard and owner, for 
example, lead to the conclusion that at best a series of markets exists, bounded by 
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the limits of ‘like product’.  In terms of price, the existence of a single prevailing price 
can only be demonstrated using cross price elasticity within those sectors. 
5.2 R3 – What are the boundaries of the market and how is it 
constituted in terms of products and their characteristics? 
5.2.1 The broad definition of the ‘commercial market’ 
It is clear, without further need for justification, that a 10m GRP pleasure yacht has 
little in common with a VLCC and it would be ludicrous to include them within the 
same definition of a market.  It would be very difficult to propose a framework in 
which they could be considered as ‘like products’ and they certainly do not compete 
for the same factor of production (capacity).  The problem lies in the identification of 
the precise nature of the boundaries between the two and identifying precise 
definitions that specify the extent of the boundaries.  A 150m steel mega-yacht, for 
example, could make a case for inclusion in the same market as a VLCC and shares 
more of the characteristics of the VLCC and its production than it does if compared 
to the off-the-shelf plastic product from the ‘production-yacht’ sector.  Clearly there 
are issues of both materials and scale in the production-yacht analogy, but what 
about a 20m aluminium workboat?  This broadly shares the same production 
process as steel vessels, albeit with specific requirements within those processes, 
but can this be compared to the steel sector and how far does the issue of scale 
extend? 
The WTO case is titled “Korea – measures affecting trade in commercial 
vessels”(World Trade Organization, 2005) and this gives a starting point for defining 
the market, but what is meant by “commercial” and what is meant by “vessel” in this 
context?  Interestingly, the word “commercial” appears 123 times in the WTO Panel 
ruling, both in the general sense of the word and the specific use in naming a market 
for “commercial vessels”, but nowhere in the document is its meaning defined.  EC 
provide the only specific definition in the ruling relating to part of the market as 
follows:  “7.518 - The EC also has clarified that the focus of its price 
suppression/depression claim is three particular types of commercial vessels:  
container ships, product/chemical tankers (that is, tankers that can be used for either 
petroleum products or chemicals, rather than tankers dedicated exclusively to one or 
the other), and liquefied natural gas carriers, or "LNGs"” (ibid.).  This clearly relates 
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to parts of the sector of large steel ocean-going cargo vessels, but no further 
guidance is given.  It should also be noted that this was a clarification of the EU 
position when pressed to be specific about which products were the subject of price 
suppression that affected EU shipbuilders.  In retrospect the factor approach being 
developed in this dissertation may have been a more appropriate response. 
In the absence of a specific definition it has to be concluded that the term 
“commercial vessels” is used in a generally accepted form that would be recognised 
by operators in the industries to which it relates.  In a general sense this would 
suggest that the market includes vessels involved in commercial, that is to say 
trading, activity, the OED definition of commercial being: “Engaged in commerce; 
trading”.  As such it specifically excludes military vessels and pleasure craft.  The 
former exclusion is appropriate in that the decisions relating to the builder of a 
warship are predominantly taken on the basis of political policy and such vessels 
rarely compete for general shipbuilding capacity, but the latter exclusion requires 
further thought.  There are examples of shipyards (including Damen of Holland and 
Babcock Marine Appledore of UK), where large luxury yachts compete for shipyard 
capacity with commercial tonnage, both types having been built in recent years by 
the same capacity.  The word “vessel” in this context would further suggest that non-
propelled structures, such as topside modules or jackets for offshore energy 
extraction, should also be excluded.  It is not possible to exclude all offshore 
products, however, and stick to a definition of purely cargo and passenger vessels, 
as many offshore types, including FPSO and OSV, compete with cargo ship types 
for shipyard capacity and therefore should correctly be included within the market 
definition. 
Clearly, any such broad definitions are insufficiently precise to form the basis of legal 
discussion and a more detailed definition is needed to provide this precision. 
5.2.2 Legislative and industry definitions 
Two definitions of the commercial shipbuilding market exist within the context of 
legislative instruments, both in relation to measures that seek to limit government 
economic assistance to shipyards.  The first is from the EC and the second the 
OECD.  Whilst these two definitions contribute to the understanding of the nature of 
the market, neither is adequate to define the market in the context of like product 
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evaluation.  This is because of the predominant concentration on function and end 
use of the ship rather than the capacity and activities of the shipbuilder. 
Details of these definitions along with discussion of relevance are presented in 
Appendix 4. 
Further clues as to what constitutes the commercial market can be found by 
examining information published by shipping data providers.  Details of these 
definitions along with discussion of relevance are presented in Appendix 5. 
Using these definitions it is possible to specify a set of data to be examined which is 
proposed for this dissertation to constitute the “commercial market”.   This is 
summarised as follows: 
All ship structures that: 
 Are greater than 100 Gross Tons or 365kW in the case of tugs 
 Excluding military vessels 
This definition includes fishing and other service craft, inland waterway vessels and 
any other ship structure that competes for shipbuilding capacity. 
This simple definition will be used in the evaluation of ‘like product’ characteristics to 
follow but, before doing that, it is necessary to consider whether this is a single 
market or may be constituted by more than one market on the basis of construction 
material or size of vessel.  This question in particular is raised by the classification of 
ship brokers by the Chartered Institute of Shipbrokers discussed earlier in the 
section, where it was identified that brokers are classified both by ship type and by a 
category designated “small” vessels.   
Having concluded that a market exists, therefore, the following Sections consider the 
nature of this market in terms of product, whether the market is split in terms of size 
or materials and, if so, at what size and what the characteristics of the split are. 
5.2.3   Material demarcation 
At first sight it may be considered possible to exclude vessels constructed from wood 
or GRP (and other composite materials) from the market definition, on the basis that 
they will not be competing with steel shipyards for capacity and thereby fail the 
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general test of a market.  Having said this there are always exceptions, such as VT 
Shipbuilding in the UK which has constructed vessels in both GRP and steel.  
Aluminium differs from GRP in that aluminium vessels could be manufactured in 
steel facilities and vice versa, both being welded.  In practice there are practical 
considerations that make this less straightforward than it may first appear, but it is 
nevertheless a viable proposition.       
Having said this, there is no exact demarcation of materials, in particular for builders 
of yachts and smaller specialised vessels.  This was tested against a dataset of 
20,438 vessels built in the five years at the recent peak of the market between 2008 
and 2012.  The results are shown in Figure 5.1, identifying the number of builders 
crossing boundaries between materials. 
 
Figure 5.1 – Number of shipbuilders delivering vessels 2008 to 2012 by 
material of construction8 
It can be seen from this charts that steel shipbuilding dominates, with 90% of 
shipbuilders building in steel only.  Aluminium is second in importance but only 
around half of the shipyards constructing in aluminium restricted products to 
aluminium only, the other half constructing both aluminium and steel vessels.  As 
would be expected composite materials was third in importance but there was a 
significant overlap with other materials, in particular with shipyards building in steel.  
Because of these overlaps, which suggest competition for capacity, and for the sake 
of completeness, it is concluded that the definition of a commercial shipbuilding 
                                            












market cannot strictly be restricted to any specific material.  Having said that, 
aluminium and GRP are a feature of small ships and for larger seagoing vessels the 
products will impose a restriction to steel only by their design. 
5.2.4 Size demarcation 
The maximum size of vessel is limited by the market itself and no upper bound is 
necessary.  But what about a lower bound?  It would seem appropriate to include 
some lower bound to separate industries commonly referred to as shipbuilding from 
boat building/workboat building.  The question then has to be asked as to whether 
the market above this lower bound is constituted by a single market or are there 
further boundaries that have to be taken into account?  Are the industry sources 
cited in Appendix 5 correct to concentrate on larger steel vessels only in the 
consideration of the commercial market? 
It is clear that the shipbuilding market must be demarcated by size.  Taking two 
extreme examples, a tug and a VLCC cannot be considered to be within the same 
market because it is not credible to conjecture that they might compete for the same 
capacity.  For a tug builder the restriction is obvious: the shipyard’s facilities are 
unlikely to be able to physically cope with a vessel that is typically 330m in length.  
From the opposite direction a VLCC yard could clearly build a tug but the question 
has to be asked whether this would be a proposition that the yard would ever 
consider in competitive terms?  The question needs to be viewed in terms of work 
content.  A VLCC is equivalent in terms of work content to around twenty six, 40m 
tugs.  26 tug orders would be required to replace just one order for the VLCC builder, 
not taking into account the gross under-utilisation of assets, in particular a large 
building dock served by very large goliath cranes, which such a transition would 
represent.  It makes no sense at all for the VLCC builder to compete for small ship 
types.  The question remains, therefore, as to where the boundaries should be 
drawn in terms of size? 
Figure 5.2 presents an analysis of the distribution of number of ships and work 
content (CGT) by ship size (GT) for vessels over 100 GT built in the five years 2008 




Figure 5.2 – Distribution of number of ships and work content of all vessels 
over 100GT built 2008 to 2012 by vessel size (GT) 
It can be seen from this figure that there is a very steep rise in number of vessels 
built below 5,000 GT, with a gradual slackening of the gradient thereafter, whilst the 
proportion of work content rises only slowly in this size range.  The rise in number of 
ships can be seen to be particularly steep up to about 500 GT.   
To examine the divergence between number of ships and work content further, the 


































Figure 5.3 – Difference between proportion of number of ships and work 
content built between 2008 and 2012, by vessel size (GT) 
It can be seen that the divergence increases very rapidly up to about 500 GT and the 
increase remains rapid up to about 5,000 GT.  After that point the rate of increase in 
divergence slows and peaks at 10,000 GT, after which the two parameters start to 
converge. 
The differences between proportions of ships and work content at 500 and 5,000 GT 
are shown in Table 5.1. 






Below 500 GT 26% 3%  
Below 5,000 GT 49% 12% 
Table 5.1 – Proportion of vessels over 100GT built 2008 to 2012 by number of 























In rough terms it could be said that the smallest one quarter of the vessels built over 
this period accounted for only about 3% of the total shipbuilding work undertaken 
and about 90% of the work undertaken was accounted for by larger vessels over 
about 5,000 GT.  This distribution is shown graphically in the following two figures. 
 
Figure 5.4 – Distribution of market size in each sector by number of ships 
 
 
Figure 5.5 - Distribution of market size in each sector by work content (CGT)  
This provides a justification for the limitations imposed by commercial data providers, 
as discussed above and in Appendix 5. 
A further significant factor in the distribution of shipbuilding by ship size is a shift from 





















payload-carrying vessels which predominate at the larger end of the market.  This is 
summarised in the following chart, which shows the distribution between the three 
sectors. 
 
Figure 5.6 – Proportion of workboats and payload carrying vessels by number 
of ships built 2008 to 2012, by ship size 
It can be seen that below 500 GT workboats are dominant and above 5,000 GT 
payload-carrying vessels predominate.    
It is concluded from this analysis that in terms of products the shipbuilding market is 
not homogeneous at least in the split between workboats and payload-carrying 
vessels.  The characteristics of the markets are analysed further below, using cut-off 
points at 500 and 5,000 GT.  The selection of these two points has been made on a 
pragmatic basis.  Further analysis revealed no significantly more appropriate cut-off 
between 3,000 and 5,000 GT and there is no absolute cut-off that the market 
provides that could be used: the split can only be made on the basis of judgement. 
These sectors of the market have been analysed against the following 
characteristics: 













 How ‘global’ is competition in each sector, evaluated by examining the 
incidence of domestic and regional purchasing? 
 How volatile is demand in each sector, evaluated using analysis of variance, 
bearing in mind that volatility of demand and its effect on capacity utilisation 
and price is at least in part at the root of the market distortion issues 
examined in this dissertation. 
5.2.5 Product types and materials 
Figure 5.7 shows how the product mixes vary between the three market sectors, by 














Figure 5.7 – Variation of product mix by size category (by CGT) 
It can be seen that the split by size is not perfect with types leaking to some degree 































mid-sized sector whilst predominantly being a feature of the smallest-sized sector of 
the market).  The product mixes are characterised as follows: 
 Under 500 GT: tugs and fishing vessels predominate, accounting for two 
thirds of the sector.  Other workboats (‘other’ in the diagram) take this total up 
to around 90% of the sector, the remaining 10% being made up by small 
cargo carrying vessels, including inland waterway.  In general, however, it can 
be seen that in the smallest sector the market is predominantly comprised of 
workboats of different types. 
 500 to 5,000 GT: a shift can be seen in this sector from workboats towards 
cargo carrying vessels, the two split roughly 50% each.   Offshore supply 
vessels make up the most important workboat sector, accounting for around 
one third of the total of the sector as a whole and about two thirds of the 
workboat sector specifically. 
 Over 5,000 GT: the largest sector is predominantly payload-carrying vessels 
(including passenger) but with a small proportion of large workboats included 
in addition.  These include larger OSV and specialist offshore vessels. 
Given the split between workboats and cargo carrying vessels by size category, as 
well as the technical and cost difficulties arising from building larger vessels out of 
other than steel, it is no surprise to reveal that the use of aluminium as a hull material 
is predominantly for vessels below 500 GT, and for GRP virtually all vessels are 
below 500GT.   
In summary there is some logic in using these three sectors to demarcate the market 
by product type and material. 
5.2.6 Variation in market cycles and volatility  
As discussed in Section 2 the modern (i.e. post-WWII) industry experienced two long 
cycles of about 30 years each, with more localised variability between the two.   The 
most recent two major cycles can be clearly seen in Figure 5.7, showing shipbuilding 
output in the fifty five years from 1960 to 2015.  Due to the unprecedented volume of 
the recent peak it is difficult to see in this Figure that the previous peak in the 1970s 
was similarly dramatic.  For this reason the graph also shows the ratio of output in 
GT to the size of the fleet in the same year, which demonstrates that the two peaks 
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were relatively equivalent in magnitude.
 
Figure 5.8 – Commercial shipbuilding output 1960 to 2015 (left hand scale) and 
ratio of output to existing fleet size (right hand scale) 
The question arises as to whether this high volatility was manifested in each of the 
three sectors of the market?  The output for the three individual sectors of the 























































Sector Output (GT) 1963 to 2012 
Under 500 GT 
 
500 to 5000 GT 
 
Over 5000 GT 
 
Figure 5.9 – Comparison of output from the three main commercial market 
sectors 1963 to 2012 
It can be seen from the comparison of the sectors in Figure 5.8 that the large cyclical 
variation in the markets over the period shown was driven overwhelmingly by the 
largest sector over 5,000 GT.  In particular the most recent very large peak that 
dominates output from all previous years has little parallel in the two smaller market 
sectors.  A peak can be seen in the sector between 500 and 5,000 GT but is no 
















































































It is concluded from this that the two smaller sectors were not directly affected by the 
‘superheated’ levels of demand that occurred in the period 2008 to 2012, 
notwithstanding that market conditions were good in both the smaller sectors at the 
time, but production volumes were not unprecedented in either sector.   
The coefficients of variance for each sector are as follows: 
Sector Coefficient of 
variance 
100 to 500 GT 19.67 
500 to 5,000 GT 26.02 
Over 5,000 GT 86.01 
Table 5.2 – Coefficient of variance by sector 
It is evident from the statistics presented in this table that the larger the sector the 
greater the amount of variability, or lower the stability of the market.   
The question then arises as to how the variability has changed over time.  This is 
examined by reviewing the change of coefficient of variance by decade over the fifty 




Figure 5.10 – Change in coefficient of variance by decade and summary of 
output by sector between 1963 and 2012 
It can be seen that the smallest sector shows a relatively steady level of variability 
over each decade, suggesting limited volatility over the long term trend.  The mid-
sector shows a greater level of variability reflecting the two peaks that characterise 
the time series shown, but within relatively narrow bounds.  The large vessel sector 
shows much higher variability.   
It is concluded that the smaller market sectors, below 5,000 GT, are more stable 
than the large ship sector over 5,000 GT and that as a consequence the trading 
conditions likely to lead to trade disputes are more common in the large sector.  In 
the context of defining the commercial shipbuilding market of relevance to the WTO’s 
ability to rule on trade disputes, the market above 5,000 GT is the most relevant. 
5.2.7 Local and regional purchasing 
Shipbuilding is a highly international industry.  For the purchaser of a large vessel it 
could be regarded as normal practice that the buyer will source globally and will 
accept the cost of building a vessel possibly across the other side of the world.  
Where domestic ordering is possible, however, that is to say where domestic 

































language factors) and lower transaction cost in ordering domestically are likely to 
see a preference for domestic orders.  There are also instances where government 
policy might dictate an obligation for domestic ordering, the most overt example 
being the Jones Act in the United States.  Other examples include domestic content 
requirements in some sectors of shipbuilding in both Brazil and Canada.  As vessel 
size reduces the relative cost of transactions to order the vessel, supervise 
construction and to deliver the vessel on completion, compared to the cost of the 
vessel, increase and it would therefore be expected that the incidence of domestic 
ordering will increase as vessel size reduces.     
The feasibility of a domestic order clearly depends on the availability of suitable 
competitive shipbuilding capacity to take the order.  In the absence of suitable 
domestic capacity it would be assumed, based on previous statements, that if no 
domestic capacity is available then a suitable (i.e. competitive) regional supplier 
would be chosen where available, before taking the decision to order from a supplier 
at a greater distance.  Region is defined in the following analysis by geographical 
location, with countries being divided between twelve regions as follows: 
Africa Mediterranean Europe 
Central America North America 
Central Asia North Europe 
East Europe Oceania 
Far East South America 
Middle East SE Asia 
Table 5.3 – Regions used for geographical analysis 
The pattern of ordering postulated is confirmed in Figure 5.11, which shows the 
proportion of deliveries of domestic and regional orders over the peak period (2008 




Figure 5.11 – Proportion of domestic and regional (including domestic) orders 
in vessels delivered 2008 to 2012 
Almost three quarters of the smallest category were ordered domestically or 
regionally, compared to around half of the 500 to 5,000 GT category and about 40% 
of the largest category.   
5.3 Conclusions for Hypothesis H1: The commercial shipbuilding 
market exists 
In reviewing the general definitions given above it is possible to say that the WTO 
Panel was correct in accepting that a shipbuilding market exists.  Apart from the 
pressure of supporting opinion from those in industry and academia: 
 the existence of “economic transations (buying and selling)” (OED) between 
shipyards and buyers is not in question (both EC and South Korea accepted 
this); 
 the use of S&P brokers and market intelligence sources on shipbuilding prices 
provide a mechanism for the “sufficiently close contact” to exist in the 
determination of price; 
 the commercial shipbuilding market has attributes relating both to the 
products and, more importantly, to a factor of production: capacity.  Capacity 
is flexible, within limits yet to be determined, and ship pricing mechanisms 
relate to the elements of both the factor market and the product market.   
 the concept of a market can be relatively loosely defined and may be made up 
of a series of sub-markets.  Clear exceptions in shipbuilding demonstrate that 



























sub-markets must exist: there can not be a single entity called a ‘shipbuilding 
market’; 
It has not been possible to conclude that a single entity that could be termed the 
“commercial market” in shipbuilding exists that could cover all commercial vessels.  It 
has been possible to conclude that three market sectors exist, which demonstrate 
characteristics that define the economic concept of a market, demarcated by size, 
with the largest of these accounting for around 90% of all work done in the 
commercial shipbuilding industry.  The characteristics of the three sectors vary in a 
number of ways, including in terms of the products, the geographic nature of 
competing shipyards and the nature of demand, specifically its variability.  The 















<100 GT Boatbuilding Not within the scope of this dissertation 
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large shifts in 
demand 
Table 5.4 – Summary of derived market sectors 
The products included in Korea – commercial vessels were from the dominating 
sector above 5,000 GT.   The remainder of this dissertation concentrates on that 
sector in isolation to evaluate the parameters of the sub-market as they relate to 
trade regulation and like product and cross price elasticity.  Importantly, however, 
links between sectors have been shown by virtue of shipyards operating across the 
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boundaries between sectors.  This is important in that it establishes potential 
channels for a mechanism for factor and price linkages between the sectors and the 
potential for disputes in smaller sectors triggered by the volatility of the largest 
sector.  This is recommended for further study, following the analysis of the main 




6. H2 – Like products exist in the commercial shipbuilding market 
6.1 R4 – How do shipyards compete and what determines 
competitiveness between shipyards and between products? 
6.1.1 Overview of commercial shipbuilding competitiveness 
As established in Section 4, the issue of ‘likeness’ is essentially about 
competitiveness.  In general the discussion of shipbuilding competitiveness in 
literature in the past has been heavily orientated towards technical aspects of the 
industry, published in technical journals such as Ship Production, with fewer 
researchers looking at the overall economic aspects of competitiveness  (Jiang and 
Strandenes, 2012; Jiang et al., 2013).  Such technical research tends to be 
introspective, concentrating on factors within the control of the firm and being 
focused primarily on productivity.  This approach therefore may miss the essential 
elements of competitiveness that relate to location and the shipyard’s context. 
In the seminal book ‘Competition in Global Industries’, edited by Michael Porter of 
Harvard Business School, shipbuilding is examined as a specific case.  Porter notes 
that: “In shipbuilding, the competitive advantage tends to be more location-specific 
than firm-specific” and uses this observation to validate the aggregation of firms at 
the national level for strategic and market analysis in shipbuilding (Porter, 1986, p. 
542)9.  The key determinants of competitiveness are summarised by Porter as 
follows: “Shipbuilding is labor-intensive, depending mostly in semi-skilled workers.  
The domestic availability of steel and ship component industries influences the 
competitiveness of shipbuilding firms in that country.  Shipbuilding contract invariably 
involves a substantial amount of financing to a ship buyer.  A well-established local 
finance market (often influenced by government) is a key to the competitive position 
of a shipbuilding firm” (ibid.).  Porter goes on to note that “three production –related 
factors (procurement of input materials, labor efficiency, and economies of scale in 
operations) are the major determinants of cost position” (ibid., p, 548).   
Whilst costs may normally be regarded as the main determinant of competitiveness 
there may be exceptions where other factors predominate.  Parkinson, for example, 
                                            
9 Note that this is contrary to the stance taken by South Korea in ‘Korea – commercial vessels’, where 
the validity of such potential aggregation was denied. 
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proposed a slightly wider view: “In the last resort what determines where ships are 
produced is where costs are lowest, or where orders can be attracted by favour, 
custom or subvention [i.e. subsidy] , or where delivery can be made speedily to take 
advantage of a transient situation” (Parkinson, 1960, p. 198).  More recently, Bruno 
and Tenold list the factors of success in the development of the industry in South 
Korea as: “government support, low labour costs and the repression of labour, 
favourable access to international and domestic funds, and assistance in technology 
transfer” (Bruno and Tenold, 2011).     
Despite this range of competitive factors it is often assumed intuitively, in particular 
by those in industry facing the challenge of lower labour cost competitors, that low 
labour cost is not only a contributing factor to competitiveness in shipbuilding but 
also is a (or even the) key factor.  This view harks back to an era when the labour 
portion of shipbuilding costs was significantly greater than it is in modern times: “The 
inability of the American yards to compete with those of Great Britain and the 
Continent during the late ‘sixties [1860s] and ‘seventies [1870s] was a cause of 
considerable surprise and disappointment both within and without the industry.  
Much was said about foreign subsidies, foreign naval construction as a supporting 
influence, and the failure of owners to appreciate the American-built iron ships, but 
apart from these considerations, the cost structure was heavily weighted against 
American builders for normal economic reasons.  Probably the primary difficulty was 
to be found in the high cost of labour” (Fassett, 1948, p. 45).   The view of the role of 
labour costs in determining competiveness has prevailed in much of the industry 
since the time of this quotation and before, even though cost structures have 
changed.  A perception of the dominating significance of cheap labour in shipbuilding 
competitiveness continues, at least in the general perception of the industry, up to 
the present time.  The UK Government’s advice to exporters of marine equipment to 
Vietnam, for example, states that:  “Concerted efforts of the Government and 
enterprises have transformed Vietnam in to a fast growing shipbuilding country, 
mainly on the basis of its low cost labour sources” (UK T&I, 2012).  Such a view is 
common.  Vietnam has yet to fulfil its promise, with the main State yards becoming 
insolvent and output has remained limited.  KPMG in their 2008 assessment of the 
prospects for Indian shipbuilding proposed a similar view of competitiveness: “Given 
the inherent labor intensive nature of the shipbuilding industry, India has a natural 
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advantage by virtue of its lower cost of labor and availability of skills”(KPMG, 2008).  
The same report in comparing the Indian shipbuilding industry with China, states that 
“China’s biggest economic advantage is low labour cost” although later on goes on 
to acknowledge that the lower cost that enables competitiveness “comes from 
inherent economic advantages  (e.g. cheap labour) and enabling Government 
support”.  India has never achieved the anticipated increase in market share of 
commercial shipbuilding that was deemed achievable, based on the advantages of 
low labour cost as outlined in this report, despite significant capital investment in 
shipyard development, and this suggests that low labour cost may be less effective 
as a determinant of competitiveness than many in the industry believe. 
The notion that labour cost is less powerful than it may at first appear is not new to 
economists: “Indeed, advocates of what is branded ‘technological determinism’ do 
not scruple to put the ‘technology factor’ ahead of other ‘factors of production’ 
considerations, including that of labour, when it comes to accounting for industrial 
development” (Todd, 2011).  So, what ‘technology factors’ or ‘factors of production’ 
do give competitive advantage in commercial shipbuilding?  A number have already 
been mentioned in the quotations from Porter and Bruno and Tenold above and 
Alderton notes the importance of “economies of scale – a trained workforce and an 
established market with secure outlets” (Bruno and Tenold, 2011) as the key 
features of comparative advantage for South Korea in addressing the question “what 
can give a group a comparative advantage” (Alderton, 2011, p. 119).  What else 
contributes to competitiveness and what is the relative power of each element in the 
goal of competing in the global market? 
The following sections consider this question by reviewing the structure of ship costs 
and examining the competitive potential of each element of the structure.  Before 
doing that, however, it is important to review seminal developments in the structure 
of both the industry and its products, which have taken place in the post-war period 
and which have had an overriding influence on competitiveness.  These are the 
pursuit of volume and standardisation of the product.  These two factors have led to 
economy of scale that has had a strong influence on the ability of market-leading 
shipbuilders to reduce material costs through volume purchasing, in addition to 
economic benefits that accrue within the firm. 
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6.1.2 The development of economy of scale in commercial shipbuilding in the 
fifty years 1960 to 2010 
Over the past fifty years, developments in automation, equipment and supporting 
systems have self-evidently contributed to the development of productivity and 
thereby competitiveness in commercial shipbuilding.  Key technological 
developments have included: direct links between design and production (eliminating 
traditional lofting), automated panel production, the integration of outfitting and 
steelwork (facilitated by improved planning and larger cranes), sophisticated 
planning and logistic control systems, automated cutting and marking, improved 
welding processes to increase productivity and reduce heat input and distortion, 
quality assurance to reduce rework, the maximisation of block size prior to final 
erection and the use of high volume building docks rather than slipways, to name the 
most significant developments.   In addition to these technological advancements 
there have been two key shifts in the nature of the commercial shipbuilding business 
that have been fundamental to the development of competitiveness, these being the 
pursuit of volume and standardisation of the product.  These two factors, which 
essentially together relate to economy of scale, play a key role in the understanding 
of the economic development of competitiveness in the industry.  
The introduction of more automated processes into shipbuilding and the application 
of machinery in place of skilled craftsmen were given a boost in WWII by the need to 
produce cheap standard ships in large numbers as discussed previously in this 
dissertation.  By the 1960s the general applicability of mass production methods was 
understood in shipbuilding but introduction was problematic.  This was discussed by 
Hardy and Tyrell in 1964 as follows: “There has been another and even more 
important change in methods of ship construction.  Since Henry Ford first made the 
Model T by mass-production methods, steady material flow – taking the job to the 
man and his tools – has become the accepted basis for increasing productivity and 
reducing costs in engineering.  The application of flow production to shipbuilding has 
not been easy because of the large size and weight of the ship…coupled to the 
complexity and variety..” (Hardy and Tyrrell, 1964, p. 2).  Part of the problem was the 
lack of standardisation of the product (the preponderance of “variety” referred to in 
this quote), the authors of this book noting that: “The advantages of standardization 
are obvious, but difficult to achieve in practise”.    The authors further note that two 
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key reasons for this difficulty are “the relatively small capacity of most yards” and 
“Shipbuilders tend to regard each ship as individual, and ship-owners all have their 
own ideas of what a ship should be like” (Hardy and Tyrrell, 1964, pp. 1-15).     
The move to a globalised economy post-WWII and the consequent explosion in 
seaborne trade has led to the standardisation of ship types (if not to the absolute 
standardisation of ships, for which reason this could be better termed ‘quasi-
standardisation’) to suit commodities and parcel sizes (in the application of 
economies of scale to the shipping industry), moving away from the idiosyncratic 
cargo liners and tramp ships that served the ‘empire trades’ up to the 1960s, which 
led to Hardy and Tyrell’s difficulty with automation and economy of scale in 
shipbuilding.  The pursuit of volume and the standardisation of products therefore go 
hand in hand.  The market leading shipyard in 2010 produced twenty eight times the 
gross tonnage of the market leader in 1960 and five times as many ships.  The level 
of volume achieved presents a significant opportunity to develop the supply chain 
and reduce material costs.  Details of the development of volume and product 
standardisation are presented in Appendix 6. 
The development of economies of scale in shipbuilding has direct analogies in the 
automobile industry, with progression from early bespoke craft-based production 
through automation and absolute limitation of product variety to lean production.  
Womack in the book “The Machine that Changed the World” produced a framework, 
within which the elements of economy of scale can be analysed (Womack et al., 
1990).  The horizontal axis presents the number of different products sold by a 
company and the vertical axis presents the average number of units of each product 
being sold.  The product of both axes (number of products x volume per product) 
equals number of units sold.  Clearly the higher the volume per product the greater 
the standardisation, as described in the context of this analysis, and the higher the 
number of products and the volume per product the greater the volume of production 
of the business.  Volume of production can be increased both by increasing the 
volume per product offered and by increasing the number of products offered. 
It is possible to use the chart proposed by Womack to place the global shipbuilding 
market leaders.  In this analysis a ‘product’ is regarded as a coherent series of 
similar ships, irrespective of the number of ships in the series built over the year.  It 
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is acknowledged that variation in design between sister ships is common so ships 
within a product group do not need to be identical.  As described by Packard in the 
book ‘Sale and Purchase’, in the modern industry shipyards are “constructing 
standard vessels, their basic concept being varied only marginally in accordance 
with the purchaser’s wishes” (Packard, 2006). The criteria applied to define 
acceptable variation are that they are of the same ship type, the hull form is similar, 
with L and B being within 5% of each other, and that capacity is similar, with GT and 
dwt being within 10% of each other.  Where a clear standard has developed over the 
year, for example with increasing dwt within a very similar hull form, as was the case 
with the development of VLCCs at Mitsubishi in 1975, these are regarded as a single 
product.  Analysis has been undertaken for the industry in 1960 and then around the 
two peaks in output since that time, in 1975 and 2010. 
The results are shown in Figure 6.1, tracing the development of the shipbuilding 
industry over the peaks of output over the past fifty years.  The resulting chart is 
similar to that shown for automobiles by Womack, showing a similar path of 
increasing volume with reducing then expanding variety. 
 
Figure 6.1 – Progression of product variety and production volume in the 
shipbuilding industry market leaders 
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The progression of commercial shipbuilding shown in this chart is as follows: 
 In 1960 Kieler Howaldtswerke was essentially a ‘bespoke’ shipyard and a unit 
of capacity was almost completely flexible, capable of building almost any 
type of ship.  Each product was either one-off or built in a very short series 
with a small number of sister ships.  Reliance on craft skill of the workers was 
high. 
 In 1975 Mitsubishi Nagasaki had progressed to complete standardisation with 
a single product (VLCCs), replacing craft skill with automation as far as was 
possible. Volume per product was high.  The concentration on a single 
product was found to be unsustainable due to market shifts, however, as 
discussed in Appendix 6, and the yard had to subsequently introduce a 
product mix to survive10. 
 In 2010 DSME’s volume per product was about half that achieved by 
Mitsubishi in 1975 but the number of products offered was nine times greater, 
leading to significantly greater volume produced.   
The chart misses the influence of Liberty ships, which would not fit on the scale, but 
it is argued that these were something of a unique situation in shipbuilding for their 
time, a response to a specific crisis, although as discussed they were highly 
influential in the development of the modernised industry.  This chart also addresses 
only the market leaders to show the track of the development of the industry and, as 
was the case with the original Womack diagram quoted above, is therefore 
something of an ‘idealisation’.  Positioning on both the horizontal and vertical scales, 
for example, is partially a function of capacity and is therefore likely to reflect the 
level of capital investment.  Analysis of smaller competitors using this framework, 
however, confirms in general that the trend has been present throughout the 
industry.  The increase in concentration of the industry in large groups, discussed in 
Section 2, should also be taken into account, with capacity increasingly being 
concentrated in high volume shipyards. 
The resulting economies of scale and standardisation lead to significant 
opportunities to reduce material costs, something that until relatively recently was 
                                            
10 Note that this experience demonstrates that flexibility of capacity to produce a range of compatible 
(or like) products is an imperative in shipbuilding, due to shifts in demand. 
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regarded as largely outside the control of the shipyard.  The assumption that material 
costs cannot generally be addressed to improve competiveness is summed up in an 
influential report prepared by consultants for the UK DTI11 in 1973, in a discussion 
relating to how competitiveness in the industry in the UK could be improved.  The 
report states: “Because of the cost structure of shipbuilding, significant cost 
reductions can only be achieved through capital investment designed to increase 
productivity…..It is assumed that material costs could be reduced only marginally by 
the shipbuilders, although some savings could be made by marine equipment 
manufacturers, if volume increases could be achieved” (Booz-Allen and Hamilton 
International BV, 1973, p. 235).  This statement has proven to be incorrect in the 
long term. 
It would follow that the larger the shipyard the greater the competitive advantage that 
could be gained from economy of scale, provided that sufficient work can be 
maintained to utilise the expensive capacity developed.  This caveat identifies what 
might be regarded as a ‘double-edged sword’ characteristic of the strategy of pursuit 
of economy of scale, given the variable nature of demand in the largest sector of the 
market.  The vulnerability of this strategy relates to the difficulty (or, probably, more 
correctly impossibility) of keeping capacity occupied in a market downturn such as 
that prevailing at the time this dissertation is being written.  It is possible that the 
model of ultra-large shipyard developed at the start of the twenty first century is not 
the optimum in the long term, despite very high efficiency at the peak of the market, 
due to the cyclical nature of demand.  Efficiencies at the peak will be countered by 
inefficiencies due to low demand in the trough and such large capacity yards will be 
very difficult to manage over the full cycle.  This is recommended for further study, 
including consideration of the bounds of flexibility of capacity to minimise the 
downside economic effects of cyclical demand whilst at the same time facilitating 
access to economies of scale and increased business in times of peak demand. 
6.1.3 The structure of costs in commercial shipbuilding  
Examination of the structure of ships costs provides a framework for analysis of 
elements of competitiveness.  There is a long-established rule of thumb in 
                                            
11 Department for Trade and Industry, the ministerial division of the government responsible for 
industry at that time. 
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shipbuilding that the cost of building a ship splits roughly 60% materials and 40% 
labour and overhead.  The ‘Booz-Alan’ report on British Shipbuilding published in 
1973 reflected this generality, showing that the average split of costs between six 
merchant shipbuilders at that time was 59.5% materials, 25.6% labour and 14.9% 
overheads.  (Booz-Allen and Hamilton International BV, 1973).  Interestingly, this 
split is different to that reported in the construction of ships in the United States 
around the end of WWII, where the proportions were reported to be 40% materials, 
35% labour and 25% overhead (Fassett, 1948, p. 11).  This reflects the more labour-
intensive work in the shipbuilding process at that time and the lower outfit content in 
ships that were inherently simpler than modern tonnage.  Comparison of these two 
sources also suggests that the generality will change over time and across ship 
types.  Porter in his value chain analysis for shipbuilding in 1986 noted that “the 
major portion (63 to 70 percent) of the total cost of a ship consists of inputs such as 
steel, engines and other components.  The second biggest item is cumulative labor 
costs (12 to 30 percent), which vary by country of shipbuilding and the type of 
vessel.  Then comes infrastructure costs (1 to 11 percent), which include interest 
expense and depreciation” (Porter, 1986, p. 548). 
A more detailed “rough breakdown” of the elements of shipbuilding costs is 
























Major purchases 20% 
Main Engine 16% 
Steel 13% 
Table 6.1- Cost Structure of merchant ship (developed from Stopford, 2009, p. 
639) 
Whilst rather general, this information confirms the broad guidance that the cost of 
material purchases predominates in a commercial shipbuilding contract.   It can also 
be seen that the sphere of influence on which low labour cost can act on the costs of 
a shipyard is therefore relatively limited.  The influence is greater than the specific 
17% indicated for direct labour in the above table because overhead and material 
costs are also influenced by labour costs.  The extent to which low labour cost in a 
country can contribute to the reduction of material costs depends on the extent of the 
availability of domestic sources of steel and marine equipment.  Clearly if domestic 
suppliers are plentiful and also take advantage of low labour costs, and are 
acceptable to buyers, then this will be of significant benefit to the shipyard’s 
competitiveness.  The labour cost influence within the shipyard also extends to both 
direct labour and overheads because a part of the overhead cost in shipbuilding, or 
any business, will typically be related to overhead labour costs and it may be inferred 
that a low labour cost base in relation to a company’s production workforce is likely 
to confer a similar benefit to the same company’s overhead workers.  For example 
Table 6.2 presents the breakdown of “Selling, General and Administrative Expenses” 
for Hanjin Heavy Industries of South Korea in the first six months of 2010 (Hanjin 
Heavy Industries & Construction Co., 2010): 
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Cost category million 
Won 
 
Salaries 19,442 25% 
Provisions for severance benefits 2,068 3% 
Employee benefits 3,971 5% 
Taxes and dues 888 1% 
Advertising expense 1,574 2% 
Bad debts expense 14,671 19% 
Service fees 5,967 8% 
Service contract expense 6,919 9% 
Warranty expense 10,050 13% 
Others 11,240 15% 
Total 76,790 100% 
Table 6.2- Selling, General & administrative expenses at Hanjin Heavy 2010 
(Source: published company accounts) 
It can be seen that the first three categories of this table relate to labour costs and it 
can be inferred from this that around 1/3 of the overhead cost is labour-related and 
will respond to the influence of unit labour cost.  Using this information and the 
simple model proposed in Table 6.1 the relative power of reduction in unit labour 
cost, including reduction in direct labour and overhead categories, is compared to 
that of materials costs in Figure 6.2, assuming this labour-related overhead cost 




Figure 6.2- Change in total contract cost per reduction in unit labour or 
material cost 
The gradient of the labour line shown in Figure 6.2 is 26%, that is to say that the 
advantage conferred on a total contract cost by a lower labour cost is little more than 
one quarter of the absolute labour cost advantage, all other things being equal.  The 
gradient of the material line is 62% or in other words, almost two thirds of any 
reduction in material costs achieved is felt directly on the bottom line.       
The above analysis is simplified and idealised.  In reality the structure of cost varies 
over time, between shipyards and between ship types.  The reasons for variation are 
summarised as follows: 
 Wage costs change and this is compounded by the effect of exchange rates, 
bearing in mind that commercial ships are normally traded in $US. 
 The material cost proportion will vary by ship type.  For example the material 
and equipment cost of a cruise ship is likely to be proportionately higher than 
the material and equipment cost for a bulk carrier. 
 The direct labour proportion will depend on the combination of both labour 
cost and the efficiency/productivity of the shipbuilder.  
 The level of overhead will depend on the efficiency of the company.  
Companies with low overhead structures or those that achieve economy of 



































 The material cost will vary according to the market price of steel and major 
equipment, the buying power of the shipyard and the nature of the marine 
equipment supply industry in the country in which the shipyard is located.  
Exchange rates will also have an influence as, for example, main engines are 
often traded in $US. 
Any analysis of cost breakdown structure can only be a ‘snapshot’ therefore and will 
be subject to change over time and between producers.  Given this limitation, 
however, it is possible to obtain an indication of the variation of cost structure 
between ship types by analysing work undertaken for the EC, DG Enterprise, in 
preparation for the WTO dispute.  Significant effort, over six years, was put into 
establishing cost estimates for market leading shipyards in South Korea, with the 
results published in a series of cost reports12 (First Marine International Limited, 
1999 to 2005).  Using information published in these reports as base data, Figure 6.3 
presents an estimate of how the elements of cost vary by ship type for a large and 
efficient (high throughput and good efficiency) Far East builder, based on a steel cost 
(Grade A plate) of $645 per tonne, total labour cost (wage and additional costs) of 
$15.40 per hour and an exchange rate of 1,000 Won to the $US, being 
representative of a competitive level of cost at the time of writing.  This has been 
achieved by looking at the relative values published across the reports to compare 
proportions of cost.  The Figure also includes a measure of the relatively complexity 
of the build process for the different products using the CGT system (OECD, 2007).  
Complexity is represented by the ratio of the Compensated Gross Tonnage value of 
the ship to its Gross Tonnage, or what in previous incarnations of the CGT system 
was known as the ‘CGT Factor’.  The products shown are ordered with increasing 
complexity from left to right.  The CGT factor effectively measures the relative 
amount of shipbuilding work content per GT.  It is also important to note that the cost 
structure shown is at the operating level and does not include depreciation or, in 
cash terms, interest costs relating to the investment in the shipyard or the servicing 
of general company debt. 
                                            




Figure 6.3– Variation in cost breakdown by ship type 






















































Steel Other Materials Other direct costs Labour Overhead Complexity
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Cost category Definitions 
Steel Structural steel of all grades, including 
primarily plate and rolled sections. 
Other materials All other materials (other than steel) and 
subcontractors (other than labour 
subcontracts), including propulsion and 
main engines, auxiliary engines and 
generators, cargo handling equipment, 
cargo containment equipment, deck 
equipment and all other equipment and 
materials.   
Other direct costs Design licenses, classification and 
surveys, warranty reserve, builders risk 
insurance, and any other costs that may 
be required depending on the ship type 
and design. 
Labour Cost of direct labour in all areas of the 
shipyard and including subcontracted 
labour. 
Overhead Provision for selling, general and 
administrative overheads and all 
overhead labour. 
Table 6.3– Definitions of cost categories (First Marine International Limited, 
1999 to 2005) 
It can immediately be seen that the split of material to labour and overhead costs in 
this series is 70:30, not 60:40 as assumed in commonly held rules of thumb.  This 
reflects the high volume efficiency of the builders represented in this chart, with 
overhead spread over a large throughput and high productivity achieved.   
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The proportion of steel cost decreases from left to right, as the complexity of the 
product increases.  Conversely the proportion of other materials increases as does 
the proportion of other direct costs such as working capital finance, classification, 
licenses and so on.  In aggregate, however, the total proportion spent outside the 
shipyard (steel plus other materials plus other direct costs) is remarkably consistent 
at around 70%.   
Figure 6.4 shows how the product mix (proportion of output of the main commercial 
ship types) developed at Hyundai Heavy Industries Ulsan shipyard between 1980 
and 2009 and Figure 6.5 shows how the average size of ship constructed over that 
period developed.  These graphs illustrate the progression that shipbuilders in South 
Korea and more recently in China have pursued as their capability and labour cost 
increase, moving from less to more complex products over time and moving from 
smaller to larger ships.   
 
Figure 6.4– Development of product mix (proportion of GT delivered) at HHI 











































































































































Figure 6.5 – Average GT produced at HHI Ulsan shipyard (main commercial 
ship types only – data sourced from Sea-Web) 
This progression is based on the assumption that more complexity and larger size is 
linked to greater value of work.  The validity of this assumption can be reviewed by 
looking at the influence of labour costs on specific ship types.  The level of influence 
of labour cost on the total contract cost for each ship type, comparable to the general 







































































































































Figure 6.6 – Variation in the influence of labour cost on total cost 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this analysis: 
 In moving from smaller to larger products in the same ship type (for example 
from panamax to capesize bulk carriers) the influence of labour cost reduces.  
This suggests that shipyards with higher labour costs should pursue the larger 
ship sizes whilst those with low labour cost should pursue smaller ships, 
where their advantage has the greatest effect.   
 Counter-intuitively, the data suggests that the progression from simple to 
more complex products, the strategy generally pursued by shipbuilders as 
their labour cost rises, may result in some cases in a detrimental increase in 
the influence of labour cost.  In other words labour cost influence is greater in 
a large container ship than a VLCC and the VLCC shows a greater labour 
cost influence than the capesize bulk carrier.  The LNG tanker, the next 
product logically in this progression, shows significantly less labour cost 
influence than the large container ship, and thereby is an improvement for a 
higher labour cost producer, but is no better in this respect than a VLCC and 
is worse than a capesize bulk carrier.     
 The product experiencing the least influence from labour cost in the data 























has provided the ‘last refuge’ for high labour cost large European shipyards 
and why Far East builders are so keen to try to break into this sector.        
Finally, it should further be noted that there is no provision in the cost breakdown 
used so far for servicing of debt or depreciation of the facilities.  In other words this 
breakdown of costs does not provide for payment for the shipyard itself and this can 
be substantial.  The difference between the total contract costs and the contract 
price should be regarded as contribution, rather than profit.  In cash terms the 
surplus provides contribution to the payment of interest and servicing of debt for 
capital and working capital finance before profit is truly recognised.  For the efficient 
high throughput builder referred to above it was estimated by the EC’s cost 
modelling exercise that this may add around an additional 5% on average to the total 
contract cost.  Any profit included in the price would then be additional to this total 
amount. 
6.1.4 Determinants of competitive advantage 
6.1.4.1 Labour cost 
Because of the difficulty of calculating meaningful comparisons, data on comparative 
wage costs are not generally published.  An indication of the range encountered in 
international shipbuilding can be obtained, however.  The United States Bureau of 
Labor Statistics produces an annual comparative report on international labour costs 
for countries where statistics support this (BLS, 2013).  The 2013 report includes the 
following comparison of countries that have significant shipbuilding interests.  The 
table includes also a comparative index of costs compared to market leader, South 




Nationality US$ Index 
(ROK= 
100) 
 Nationality US$ Index 
(ROK= 
100) 
Norway 63.36  306  Italy 34.18  165  
Germany 45.79  221  Spain 26.83  129  
Finland 42.6  206  Singapore 24.16  117  
France 39.81  192  South Korea 20.72  100  
Netherlands 39.62  191  Brazil 11.2  54  
Canada 36.59  177  Philippines 2.1  10  
United 
States 
35.67  172  China 2009 1.74  8  
Japan 35.34  171  India 2010 1.46  7  
Table 6.4 – Hourly compensation costs in manufacturing, US dollars, 2012 
(BLS, 2013) 
Whilst the absolute values cannot be seen as being an accurate reporting of the 
labour cost in shipbuilding per se, the relative values demonstrate clearly the range 
of labour cost between countries that will be encountered.    Statistics for China and 
India are shown in different font because the reliability of statistics is questioned and 
the comparability with other nationalities is not clear.    National Bureau of Statistics 
Data for China, for example, shows that state-owned enterprises in Shanghai have 
double the national average wage, at 83,519 Yuan in 2011, the latest year reported 
(National Bureau of Statistics China, 2014).  At the prevailing exchange rate and 
using an assumption of 2,000 hours worked per annum, this suggests that in a state-
owned enterprise in Shanghai a worker would have been earning around $6.50 per 
hour and the figure given in this table cannot be representative of hourly labour costs 
in large Chinese shipyards.  This rough estimate suggests that labour costs in major 
Chinese shipyards, including additional employers’ costs, are likely to be similar to 
that reported in the table above for Brazil.  The level of cost shown in India in this 
table is consistent with the level of labour cost in shipbuilding estimated by KPMG in 
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the blueprint for the development of the industry from 2008 (KPMG, 2008).  It may 
have risen since that time. 
6.1.4.2 Productivity 
The labour cost element in a shipbuilding contract is not a function of the wage cost 
alone but of the combination of wage cost and productivity.  As Bruno and Tenold 
state of the decline of the European shipbuilding industry in the 1980s: “European 
costs, in particular wages, were too high, and the strategic measures did not lead to 
a sufficiently large improvement in productivity and production costs” (Bruno and 
Tenold, 2011).   In other words it was not wage costs per se that caused the decline 
in European shipbuilding but this in conjunction with the failure of improvements in 
productivity and other strategic assistance to offset the high wage cost in the face of 
falling contract prices caused by overcapacity. 
Labour cost per unit of output is a product of the unit input cost times the productivity 
defined as follows: 
𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟 × 𝑚𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 
The metric normally used to define a unit of output in shipbuilding is the 
Compensated Gross Ton (OECD, 2007) and labour cost per unit of output is a 
function of cost per hour and hours per CGT.  Benchmarking has shown that the 
level of productivity achieved in shipbuilding can vary greatly between shipyards 
(Craggs et al., 1995; Craggs et al., 2004) .  Craggs et al., (2004) clearly shows a 
difference between commercial shipbuilding yards in the United States in 1999 of 
around 55 manhours per CGT compared to an assessed figure for Japan in the 
same year of about 15 manhours per CGT: 3.7 times as many manhours to produce 
the same unit of work in the US compared to Japan.  Figure 6.7 presents an 
estimate of the development of productivity in South Korean shipyards between 1990 
and 2003, using output data from Sea-Web and employment data from Koshipa (the 
Korean Shipbuilders Association), including direct and subcontract labour engaged 
in shipbuilding in South Korean shipyards.  Productivity increased from around 50 




Figure 6.7– Estimated development of productivity in South Korean 
shipbuilding (Source: analysis of data sourced from Sea-Web and KoShipa) 
The development of productivity is discussed by Craggs et al (Craggs et al., 2004) 
where “organisational learning” and “ship learning” are separately addressed.  Ship 
learning is the improvement in productivity that results from construction of a series 
of quasi-identical products.  Problems are ironed out in the early ships in the series 
and later ships will be relatively easier to build as a consequence.  The workforce will 
also have learned from experience with the product, and productivity will improve.  
Conversely, when the workforce shifts to a new product the productivity achieved will 
reduce, termed by Craggs et al “first of class performance drop-off”.  Organisational 
learning is the general process of improvement in the building of ships in an 
organisation over time that results from the experience of the workforce in general 
and investment in training processes and facilities.  The experience of the workforce 
is significant in this process because of the complexity of the product and the 
processes to produce it.  Because of the extent of human input in commercial 
shipbuilding, productivity in a new shipyard will inevitably build up over time and 
early years of operation will incur a penalty in terms of performance. 
Jiang and Strandenes estimated productivity in 2011 to range from a maximum of 
about 8 manhours per CGT in Japan to 14 manhours per CGT in South Korea and 


























These values are consistent with productivity estimates published from time to time 
by First Marine International  (First Marine International Limited, 1999 to 2005).  
Significantly poorer productivity than this may be found in some circumstances.  
Data in KPMG’s report on Indian shipbuilding, for example, provides information from 
which the level of productivity for building handysize tankers in India can be 
estimated at over 120 manhours per CGT (author's estimate, based on KPMG, 
2008).  Low productivity can easily eliminate some or all of the competitive 
advantage gained through low wage cost and low wage cost is not a substitute for 
good performance but an accessory to it in the pursuit of competitiveness.   
6.1.4.3 Steel costs 
Steel costs are not constant between countries and between global areas.  
Shipbuilders located in some areas will pay less for their steel than those located in 
other areas.  Essentially, prices in Asia appear to be generally lower than prices in 
Europe or North America.   This is demonstrated in Figure 6.8, showing the 
development of prices over time of hot rolled mild steel plate in Europe, North 
America and the Far East. 
 





























On average over the period shown in Europe and North America steel prices were 
around 25% higher than in Asia.  It is not only the base price of steel that varies, 
however.  Economy of scale for large producers will enable them to negotiate deals 
for volume that will be reflected in lower prices specifically for that shipyard.  For 
example in 2009 the Hyundai Heavy Industries Ulsan Shipyard in South Korea 
delivered 103 significant merchant ships (not including offshore and other non-
merchant ship products) with a total estimated net steelweight of around 2.75 million 
tonnes (author’s estimate), equating to over 3 million gross steel tonnes purchased 
for production in that year.  Taking into account that Hyundai Heavy Industries’ total 
production in South Korea in the same year at all yards was around double that at 
the Ulsan shipyard alone (199 ships in total) the potential purchasing power of the 
shipyard can be judged to be very significant.  Significant demand is likely to lead to 
a strong local source of supply, minimising delivery and transaction costs.  For a 
competitor in a country with no domestic availability of shipbuilding steel, transaction 
and delivery costs will increase the cost of raw materials further. 
The level of significance of the influence of steel price on the total cost varies 
according to the type of vessel.  This is illustrated in Figure 6.9, where the influence 







Figure 6.9 – The influence of steel price on total cost (including labour 
influence for comparison) 
The influence of steel price on total cost is higher than that of labour cost in all cases 
except for the LNG tanker and the passenger ship.   The results can be summarised 
in three categories: 
Steel influence is: Ship type 
Significantly greater  VLCC 
 Capesize 
Slightly greater  Panamax bulk carrier 
 Handy tanker 
 Panamax container 
 Post-panamax container 
Lesser  LNG tanker 
 Passenger 
























6.1.4.4   Other material costs 
Other material costs, apart from steel, generally make up the largest single category 
of cost for a commercial shipbuilding contract and cost advantages gained in this 
sector will therefore inevitably have the greatest influence on total cost.  Cost 
advantages can be gained from three main sources: 
1. Pursuit of economies of scale: buying power, and therefore the ability to 
negotiate a lower cost, will stem from volume of purchases.  High throughput 
is therefore an advantage in the same way that it is for steel. 
2. Control of the makers list: volume shipyards will seek to restrict choice of 
equipment as far as possible.  This increases the volume of business 
undertaken with chosen suppliers, increasing buying power and enabling 
efficient supply chains to be established. 
3. Location in a country with a strong marine equipment supply industry is an 
advantage, minimising trade costs.  Trade costs are not limited only to 
delivery costs but include a range of transaction costs such as documentation 
and customs clearance and the cost relates to time as well as pure cash 
(Sourdin and Pomfret, 2012).  The World Bank lists these costs in its annual 
‘doing business’ data, referring to the cost of “Trading Across Borders: 
documents, administrative fees for customs clearance and technical control, 
customs broker fees, terminal handling charges and inland transport” (World 
Bank, 2014). 
To illustrate the working of these factors, the manufacturers of main engines installed 
by shipyards in 2010 in the three largest competing nations have been analysed 
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485  11,600,866   10,691,166  92%  23,919   14   34.6   828,633  
China 
(2010) 
948  10,556,504   4,291,838  41%  11,136   47   20.2   224,606  
Japan 
(2010) 
460  5,720,503   5,673,623  99%  12,436   17   27.1   336,500  




The effect of economies of scale in the top three shipbuilders is clearly seen in this 
table.  The strength of the domestic marine equipment supply companies in both 
South Korea and Japan is also clear from this table, with very little importing seen.  
The marine equipment supply industry in China has improved significantly as the 
shipbuilding industry in that country has developed, but it still lags behind South 
Korea and Japan, with more than half of main engines imported in 2010.       
The level of control exercised over the makers list can also be seen in Table 6.6, in 
the number of suppliers and the average number of units purchased from suppliers.  
South Korean builders show the smallest number of suppliers and the largest 
number of units purchased per supplier, with Japan also showing a good level of 
control over suppliers.  Chinese shipbuilders had a significantly larger number of 
suppliers but still show a good number of units purchased per supplier, with the 
consequent potential for development of the supply chain.   
The potential for control of the makers list can be judged further by examining the 
behaviour of the leading shipbuilding competitors in the countries shown.   South 
Korea has three significant marine engine manufacturers:  Hyundai, Doosan and 
STX and all Korean shipbuilders buy predominantly from these companies.  Table 
6.7 shows the number of significant suppliers used by the seven large South Korean 
shipyards, along with the proportion of main engines purchased from the leading 


















Daewoo Shipbuilding & 
Marine 
1 71% 85% 
Hyundai Heavy Inds - Ulsan 1 98% 100% 
Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co 
Ltd 
1 98% 100% 
Samsung Heavy Inds - 
Geoje 
1 72% 74% 
STX Offshore & Shbldg - 
Jinhae 
1 91% 98% 
Sungdong Shipbuilding & 
Eng 
1 100% 100% 
Hyundai Samho Heavy 
Industries 
1 100% 100% 
Table 6.7 – Profile of main engine suppliers in 2010 for leading South Korean 
shipyards 
It can be seen that the large yards in South Korea all rely heavily on single suppliers, 
giving a strong opportunity for supply chain integration and economies from volume 
purchasing.  In the case of the three Hyundai subsidiaries shown almost 100% of 
main engines are purchased from within the Hyundai group. 
Japan has one large engine manufacturer, Mitsui, responsible for 40% of all main 
engines supplied in the country in 2010, but with eight other significant smaller 
suppliers.  A greater choice of maker is therefore given by some Japanese yards, 
although as can be seen in the table below a number also restrict the makers to a 
single supplier as in South Korea.  Almost all main engines are sourced from 
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Japanese suppliers.  This is shown for the leading ten shipyards (by GT completed) 
in 2010 in Table 6.8. 









Universal Shbldg – Ariake 1 100% 100% 
Koyo Dockyard Co Ltd 1 93% 100% 
Oshima Shipbuilding Co Ltd 3 64% 100% 
Namura Shipbuilding - Imari 2 69% 100% 
Imabari Shbldg – Saijo 3 35% 100% 
Universal Shbldg – Tsu 2 75% 100% 
Imabari Shbldg - Marugame 3 35% 100% 
IHI Marine United – Kure 1 100% 100% 
Mitsubishi Nagasaki 2 50% 100% 
Mitsui Chiba Ichihara 1 100% 100% 
Table 6.8 – Profile of main engine suppliers in 2010 for leading Japanese 
shipyards 
The leading supplier of main engines to Chinese shipyards in 2010 was STX of 
South Korea, and three of the top four suppliers were the three main South Korean 
manufacturers.    China’s leading domestic supplier was Hudong, with an 11% share 













Dalian Shipbuilding Ind - No 
2 
2 68% 68% 
Shanghai Waigaoqiao 
Shbldg 
3 44% 89% 
Shanghai Jiangnan 
Changxing SB 
2 86% 85% 
Jiangsu Newyangzi 
Shipbuilding 
3 64% 21% 
Jinhai Heavy Industry Co 
Ltd 
4 44% 11% 
New Times Shipbuilding Co 
Ltd 
2 76% 6% 
Jiangsu Rongsheng 
Shipbuilding 
2 63% 0% 
Hudong-Zhonghua 
Shipbuilding 
2 75% 75% 
Nantong COSCO KHI Ship 
Eng 
2 47% 87% 
Guangzhou Longxue 
Shipbuilding 
2 57% 57% 




It can be seen from this table that control of the makers list by Chinese shipbuilders 
is less well established than seen in South Korea and Japan, with no shipyard 
having a single dominant supplier, and the opportunities for domestic purchases are 
also significantly fewer.  This will be reflected in increased material costs in Chinese 
shipbuilding when compared to shipyards in the other two leading shipbuilding 
nations, with lower opportunity for streamlining of the equipment supply chain and 
higher delivery and transaction costs for equipment. 
How much the need to import marine equipment adds to the cost is variable and 
difficult to measure in general terms.  Sourdin and Pomfret point out that general 
measures are difficult because there is no agreed definition of trade costs and 
evaluations are only possible for countries where data is available (Sourdin and 
Pomfret, 2012).  They point out that the cost of importing “will exceed the shipping 
cost if, for example, poor infrastructure or other factors increase dwell times at the 
port of entry or exit” and that the cost clearly varies according to distance and other 
factors.  Trading costs are measured into Australia and Brazil, with an average of 
6.4%, minimum of 1.6% and maximum of 19.2%.  The authors note that “For 
economies trading more commodities, the results lie below 10%”.  They also note 
that trading costs have been reducing steadily over the past two decades. 
The level of influence of changes in other material costs, with labour costs for 




Figure 6.10 - The influence of other material costs on total cost (including 
labour influence for comparison) 
It can be clearly seen that the influence of other material costs is significantly greater 
than both steel (Figure 6.9) and labour costs.  The level is fairly similar across the 
bulk ship sectors but higher for LNG tankers and significantly higher for the 
passenger ship sector.  This supports the conclusion that an advantage held by 
European shipyards in maintaining a lead in the passenger ship sector, and in 
particular the cruise ship sector, is the availability of clusters of well-established 
specialist suppliers in the locality of the shipyards.  Conversely the lack of such an 
infrastructure of suppliers and the additional cost of importing goods and services 
over a long distance will inevitably present something of a barrier to entry, although 
clearly a barrier that could be overcome by the development of such an 
infrastructure. 
6.1.4.5 State aid  
State support in many forms has been a common feature of shipbuilding in the past, 
as discussed in general terms in Section 2.  The many forms of aid clearly will have 























The availability of sources of finance for new ship construction, including access to 
repayment guarantees and the provision of loans for construction, can have a 
significant effect on competitiveness.  Details of this provision are outside the scope 
of this dissertation. 
6.1.4.7 Group strength 
As a final input to competitiveness, we should not forget the potential assistance in 
being part of a large diversified group of companies, from which strength can be 
gained from other members in times of adversity or expansion.  This strength has 
been used in Japan and, particularly, through the Chaebol structure in South Korea.  
Professor Joon notes: “Shipbuilders belonging to diversified corporations have the 
advantage of being able to rely on corporate resources for expansion and support 
which are independent of the State shipbuilding market” (Joon Soo Jon, 2002).  At 
times such group strength can disappear such as happened in 1998 when a number 
of Daewoo subsidiaries, including Daewoo Motor and Daewoo Shipbuilding and 
Marine Engineering, got into financial difficulty at the same time.  As Joon points out, 
however, the other advantage in belonging to a powerful group is “Conglomerates 
have political clout..This can mean easier access to capital markets and more 
sympathetic treatment by politicians, than could be expected by a dedicated 
shipbuilding company” (ibid.).  Having said this, the downside to group membership 
may be bureaucracy and high group costs, which in themselves detract from 
competitiveness. 
6.1.4.8 Summary of determinants of competitive advantage 
Based on the foregoing analysis the following determinants of competitive advantage 
can be summarised: 
1. Location of the shipyard in a country with strong steel making and marine 
equipment manufacturing industries.  This minimises transaction and delivery 
costs. 
2. Development of production volume, standard vessels and control of the 
makers list.  These enable strong and efficient supply chains to develop and 
discounts for volume to be negotiated. 
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3. Good productivity.  If this is coupled to low labour cost, so much the better.  
Low labour cost per se is not a determinant, however, without being coupled 
to good performance. 
4. Investment in facilities that support the volume and level of productivity 
pursued.  Particularly important are the steelworking facilities and the 
arrangement of final assembly site and cranage. 
5. Investment in human capital and continuity of work to support the level of 
productivity pursued.   
6. Investment in product-specific aspects that may be required for specific 
sectors where barriers to entry might otherwise exist.  A good example is the 
investment required to gain access to the LNG market.  This includes 
investment in skills and capability in general and also specific investments in 
facilities, for example for manufacture and installation of the containment 
system.  Another good example is the cruise ship sector, where investment is 
required in technical skills and product development, and in establishing the 
required infrastructure of subcontractors and suppliers. 
7. Other factors may be important, for example access to finance to support 
purchasers, membership of a powerful group and government support. 
6.2 R5 – How can ‘like products’ be characterised based on the 
answers to R3 and R4? 
6.2.1 Guidance from WTO case law 
It follows from the discussion of ‘like product’ within the context of WTO, presented 
earlier in this dissertation, that there can be no single definition of the term in 
commercial shipbuilding but that ‘likeness’ will depend on circumstances.  The 
following section, therefore, sets out to explore the potential bounds of the concept, 
the factors that could be used to determine it in commercial shipbuilding and to give 
examples of arguments for interpretation of ‘likeness’ in specific instances.  These 
examples and concepts can only be proven with reference to case law, that is to say 
that they would have to be confirmed through tribunal and appellate body decisions 
in the WTO to finally conclude that they hold water.  What follows, therefore, is 
effectively a recommended approach to the subject in commercial shipbuilding, 
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which is congruent with the concept itself and the working of the commercial 
shipbuilding market and factors of competitiveness. 
A number of guidance points are given in the case law relating to ‘like product’, as 
discussed earlier in Section 4.  These are summarised as follows. 
The WTO’s 1968 Working Party on Border Taxes (see Section 4) proposed the 
following four primary considerations to determine likeness: 
1. The products’ properties, nature and quality, i.e. their physical 
characteristics:  this factor is important in that the physical nature of 
the product has to be compatible with the shipyard capacity that 
competes to produce it.   
2. The products’ end uses: is of relevance only in so far as it determines 
the physical characteristics of the ship, for example size or proportion 
of steelwork content, which may be more or less compatible with the 
unit of capacity competing for it.  From the point of view of shipyard 
capacity the end use of the product per se has no bearing on that 
capacity which may, for example, compete for products that are very 
disparate in terms of their end use, for example container ships and 
LNG tankers.   
3. Consumers’ tastes and habits, also referred to as consumers’ 
perceptions and behaviour, in respect of the products: domestic 
buying preferences, for example, indicate that this may be an important 
consideration in specific circumstances. 
4. The products’ tariff classification: has already been examined and 
discounted as not useful in this context. 
Two of these considerations (1 and 3) provide useful guidance in the assessment of 
‘likeness’, providing that the nature of the product is clearly understood as to 
encompass both the physical entity produced by a shipyard and the factor of 
production, that is to say shipyard capacity.  This reflects the guidance given by the 
ruling on EC-Asbestos from 2001, which proposed three questions that need to be 
resolved in assessing ‘likeness’: 
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1. Which characteristics or qualities are important in assessing 
‘likeness’: the characteristics in this case are those that render the 
product accessible to the determinants of competitive advantage 
attributable to the capacity competing for that product. 
2. To what degree or extent must products share qualities or 
characteristics in order to be ‘like products’: the products must be 
compatible with the capacity competing for them in physical terms, 
primarily size-related, and also in terms of the attributes that relate to 
the determinants of competitive advantage.   
3. From whose perspective likeness should be judged:  the point of 
view of the builder must be used to judge likeness.  That is to say that 
likeness is judged by substitutability between products that compete for 
the same units of shipbuilding capacity, irrespective of the end use of 
that product.  The ship operator’s viewpoint, that, for example, a 
container ship is not a substitute for a tanker, is not relevant to this 
discussion.    
Finally, three factors were summarised in the assessment of ‘likeness’, as follows: 
1. Substitutability – consumers have to be willing to substitute one 
for the other: in this case it must be remembered that what is being 
substituted is units of shipbuilding capacity, not differing products.  The 
customer has to be prepared to utilise competing units for the 
production of their ship, being satisfied that the shipyard has the 
technical capability to produce the ship. 
2. Functionality – the two products have to perform the same 
function: this relates to the function of capacity in producing 
commercial ships, not to the function of the ship.   
3. Competitiveness – the two products have to actually be 
competing for the same opportunities: this is at the core of ‘likeness’ 
and the determinants of competitiveness are therefore of significant 
importance.  At one level the judgement of likeness from this point of 
view is simple.  If a shipyard has a current track record of 
competitiveness in the sector in question then products in that sector 
would prima facie be ‘like’.  It becomes more difficult when considering 
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potential competition: opportunities that a shipyard could compete for 
but for which it has no current market presence.  The absence of 
current market presence, however, does not necessarily preclude 
capacity from competing for the sector in question providing that it is 
compatible.  The re-introduction of capesize bulk carriers to the product 
mix of HHI in 2008 (see figure 6.4) being a prime example. 
The dimension of competitiveness is central to the consideration of ‘likeness’ in 
commercial shipbuilding because from a purely technical standpoint there is only one 
thing that limits the products that a shipyard could build and that is size.  Specialist 
build functions can be subcontracted if they do not form part of the expertise of the 
yard and work can also be subcontracted to enhance capacity.  A unit of shipyard 
capacity could, in a technical sense, be used for any product within its size limitation.  
Certainly in the post-war years shipyard capacity was almost completely flexible 
within the size limit.   
6.2.2 Barriers to entry 
A further factor that has to be taken into account that may limit the scope of ‘likeness’ 
is the concept of barriers to entry.  Clearly, a unit of capacity cannot compete for a 
fleet sector to which it cannot gain access.  A good, but mistaken, example is the 
general perception that certain shipyards will be unable to build more sophisticated 
tonnage due to lack of experience.  The analysis of what might be regarded as the 
‘normal’ progression of product mix in the development of a shipyard would suggest 
that the progression starts with the notionally simplest ship type, dry bulk carriers, 
progressing through more difficult types, tankers to container ships, and with only 
advanced shipyards able to gain access to the specialist and technically difficult 
market sectors, LNG, cruise and offshore.   This pattern was clearly demonstrated in 
the development of the product mix at HHI in Figure 6.4.  In reality, whilst this pattern 
may assert itself there are no actual barriers to entry that mandate shipyards to 
follow this progression.  That this is so can be demonstrated by pointing out that 
ships number 3 and 4 from the (then) new Shanghai Waigaoqiao shipyard in China, 
delivered in 2004, one year after the shipyard delivered its first ship, were both 
offshore FPSOs: ‘Hai Yang Shi You 111’ (140, 723 dwt) and ‘Hai Yang Shi You 113’  
(150,000 dwt).  Within two years of opening the shipyard was delivering aframax 
tankers as well as the main product, capesize bulk carriers.  It is not only 
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Waigaoqiao where technically more difficult products have formed an early part of 
the product mix.  The first ship delivered by Hyundai Shipbuilding & Heavy 
Industries, as it was then, in 1974 was a VLCC.   
In general, therefore, there are no barriers to entry that preclude a unit of capacity 
from any particular sector, providing it is within the size capability of the shipyard, but 
with two exceptions.  These are, firstly, LNG tankers and, secondly, cruise ships.  
Building of LNG tankers requires investment in specific facilities for the manufacture 
of the cargo containment system.  Additionally, the technical difficulties of LNG 
construction mean that the quality requirements of the builder are onerous and 
contracting in this sector will be impossible for general shipbuilding capacity that 
cannot demonstrate the level of expertise and experience that customers require.  
Such barriers can be overcome, however, and in 2014 there were 17 shipyards in 
South Korea, Japan and China building LNG tankers.  In the cruise ship sector the 
barriers are different and relate to the unique characteristics of the product in 
shipbuilding terms and the nature of the customer.  The product characteristics 
dictate the need for a supply chain the characteristics of which are very different to 
those of a cargo carrying ship.  It is also difficult to break into the mainstream of that 
sector without experience.  Stopford also cites cruise ships as a specific example of 
competitive advantage based on technical innovation, which new entrants will find 
difficult to compete with: “the manufacture of complex products such as cruise ships 
and aircraft are all examples where one country has developed a competitive 
advantage based on technical innovation and is protected by barriers such as the 
high cost of entry” (Stopford, 2009, p. 399).   
From this standpoint the EU was correct in arguing likeness in LNG products.  Both 
Chantiers de l’Atlantique of France and Izar of Spain had current track record in this 
sector at the time and were seeking to take further orders and the barriers to entry 
did not apply in this case: the shipyards had already entered the ‘club’ of LNG 
builders. 
6.2.3 Consumers’ tastes and habits 
If a product shares a characteristic that would normally be expected to favour a 
particular shipbuilder because of customer preference then this would form part of 
the assessment of likeness.  A particular case may be found in the consideration of 
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domestic ordering.  A strong preference for domestic ordering is exhibited in Japan, 
for example, and it is no surprise therefore to find a correlation between the products 
produced by the Japanese shipbuilding industry and the products purchased by 
Japanese shipowners.  This is shown in Figure 6. 11, which shows the proportions of 
ship types in the Japanese fleet compared to the proportions of ship types produced 
in Japanese shipyards between 2008 and 2012. 
 
Figure 6.11 – Comparisons of proportions (by GT) of ships delivered from 
Japanese shipyards and ships controlled by Japanese owners 
No such coincidence is seen between the Korean fleet and the output of South 
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Figure 6.12 - Comparisons of proportions (by GT) of ships delivered from 
South Korean shipyards and ships controlled by South Korean owners 
In competitive terms, therefore, the concept of ‘likeness’ has to be viewed from this 
perspective as being different for Japanese shipyards when compared to South 
Korean shipyards.  From Japan’s point of view it could be argued that the “accordion 
of likeness” stretches to incorporate any product that is of interest to Japanese ship 
owners, a relationship by which Japanese shipyards at least partially derive their 
competitiveness.  Thus tankers and container ships, whilst of lesser importance to 
Japanese shipyards according to their recent track record, could be argued to be 
‘like products’ for Japanese shipyards because of their significance to Japanese 
buyers, as can clearly be seen in the diagram above. 
It should be remembered that there is no mandate for Japanese buyers to source 
from Japanese shipyards, as may be the case in other countries, such as USA, 
Canada and Brazil, but domestic purchasing is clearly a significant aspect of 
“consumers’ tastes and habits”.  This can be more subtle than the general domestic 
procurement preference seen in Japan.  A good example is the use of KG funds to 
finance ship purchase in Germany: “the Kommanditgesellschaft, or the KG model, 
based upon the German limited partnership structure that has been around for nearly 
100 years.  Originally, in the early 1970s, the policy was aimed at simply attracting 
equity into domestic real estate and infrastructure project financing via single 
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provided even greater tax incentives to shareholders who invested in the shipping 
sector.  Under the system a KG has one general partner and several limited 
partners, comprising private investors who take shares (and therefore limit their 
liability to the extent of those shareholdings) in a fund established to invest in new or 
second hand tonnage and, in this way, participate in the profitability of the shipping 
sector.  Individuals, who alone would not be able or willing to invest in the sector, 
pool their resources with other investors, creating a fund that can invest in single 
ship companies”.  Norway has had similar arrangements under the ‘KS’ system 
(Institute of Chartered Shipbrokers., 2010, pp. 61,62).  The arrangement whereby 
general investors that may be inexperienced in shipping are enabled to participate in 
ship purchase leads to specific consideration in terms of “consumer tastes and 
habits”.  Figure 6.13 shows the proportions of ship types in the German fleet 
compared to the proportions of ship types produced in German shipyards between 
2008 and 2012 along with the profile of KG financed ships ordered between 2002 
and 2008: 
 
Figure 6.13 - Comparisons of proportions (by GT) of ships delivered from 
German shipyards, ships controlled by German owners and KG financed ships 
The importance of the export cruise sector to the German shipbuilding industry is 
clear from this diagram. It can also be seen that German shipyards concentrated on 
container ship orders, specifically mid-sized between 800 TEU and 3,500 TEU, 
















German built 2008 to 2012
German controlled fleet 2014
KG orders 2002 to 2008
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of ship type.  61% of container ship orders built in German shipyards in the period 
examined came from German ship owners.  It can be seen that the much smaller 
general cargo sector also shows congruence between all three profiles.  It might be 
assumed that where the option to order in home shipyards is available, 
inexperienced investors would perceive lower risk from placing orders with home 
shipyards.  This is confirmed by analysis of fleets that shows: 
 The probability of a German ship being ordered in a home shipyard for orders 
placed between 2002 and 2008 was 8%. 
 The probability of a KG financed container ship in the target sector of German 
shipbuilding, that is to say mid-sized container ships between 800 and 3,500 
TEU, being ordered in a home shipyard for orders placed between 2002 and 
2008 was 24%. 
Given the higher domestic ordering preference in the KG sector where competitive 
capacity is available it could be argued that at least in part the concept of ‘likeness’ 
for German shipyards, when looked at from the point of view of the seller, extends to 
any product that is of interest to owners planning to use KG financing. 
The attribute of customer preference may extend to specific owners and their 
relationships with specific shipyards.  Clear examples can be found in the cruise 
sector.  Carnival Corporation, for example, has purchased over 60% of its vessels 
from the Fincantieri Group of Italy.  Another example was the relationship between 
Odense Steel Shipyard of Denmark and its owner AP Moller Group.  Between 2000 
and the closure of the shipyard in 2012, 75% of the ships delivered from the shipyard 
were container ships for Maersk, AP Moller’s shipowning company.  From this 
perspective any AP Moller vessel, particularly container ships, could have been 
argued to be ‘like product’ for the shipyard. 
From this perspective, therefore, the EU was correct in arguing for container ships in 
general to be potentially ‘like products’ for EU-based builders. 
6.2.4 Attributes of the product – ‘technical substitutability’ 
6.2.4.1 Summary of attributes that determine likeness 
From a competitiveness standpoint in a more general sense there are a number of 
attributes that impinge on ‘likeness’ that arise from technical characteristics of the 
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products and the facilities that are developed to build these products and that key  
into factors of competitive advantage.  Another way to term this would the ‘technical 
substitutability’ between products.  The attributes are grouped into two types in the 
following discussion: those that consider compatibility between the product and the 
nature of the investment in the shipyard and those that consider compatibility 
between the product and factors of competitiveness that may be inherent in a 
particular shipyard. 
 The characteristics of the product should be compatible with the nature of the 
investment in the shipyard.  In particular:  
o the size of the product should be compatible with the size of the 
shipyard’s launching and fabrication facilities.  Self-evidently a 
shipyard cannot build a vessel that is too large for it to launch.  It may 
also be difficult for a shipyard to construct ships that are significantly 
smaller than those for which it is designed.  Not only will the investment 
be inefficient but also the market share requirements to fill capacity 
increase as size reduces and may become infeasible.  Similarly, a 
shipyard that is designed and invested to build steel panels for large 
vessels may have difficulty in fabricating thin plate panels needed, for 
example, for passenger vessels. 
o The market for the product should be of sufficient volume to 
utilise capacity within an achievable level of market share.  If this 
is not the case then investment will be under-utilised and economic 
efficiency will be reduced.  As an extreme example, building tugs in a 
very large shipyard makes little sense, because even with a very high 
market share the utilisation of available capacity would be low and the 
sector would therefore contribute little to the business. 
o The characteristics of the product in terms of the balance of steel 
work and outfit work should be compatible with the investment 
and with the skills balance and experience of the workforce.  This 
may make it difficult, for example, for a cruise ship builder to seek work 
in the tanker markets, even where the dock is big enough.  This would 




 The characteristics of the product should key into the factors of 
competitiveness that characterise the shipyard.  In particular: 
o The product should be compatible with the supply chain to ensure 
efficiency of purchasing.  For example, the construction of cruise 
ships requires subcontracting and supplier companies that are 
experienced in outfitting high quality public spaces, and which are 
acceptable to the image-conscious buyers.  Such suppliers are not 
required for the construction of cargo ship types and cruise ships may 
therefore be incompatible with the supply chains that contribute to 
competiveness in the large cargo ship sectors.  Another example is 
found in the diversification from cargo ship building into offshore 
fabrication.  The level of control of the makers list by the shipyard in the 
offshore sector is limited, with offshore products often designed and 
specified by external companies, not the shipyard, and the suppliers 
and subcontractors needed in that sector are not likely to be the same 
as those found in the supply chain developed to construct large 
commercial vessels. 
o The product should be compatible with the proportion of 
steelwork that is inherent in the characteristics of the investment 
and which may gain competitive advantage from volume ordering.  
For shipyards that have invested in high capacity steelworking facilities 
it would make economic sense to choose products that will utilise that 
investment.   
o The product should be compatible with the experience and skills 
balance of the workforce.  As described earlier experience is a key to 
productivity, through “organizational learning” (Craggs et al., 2004).  
Switching between products leads to a drop-off in performance and the 
level of novelty in the characteristics of the new product will determine 
the level of the drop-off and thereby the reduction in competitiveness.  
If the balance of skills is significantly different, for example in switching 
between large cargo ships with limited outfitting requirements and 
passenger ships with very high outfitting requirements, retraining will 
be necessary and competitiveness will reduce. 
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o The product should be compatible with any target sectors that 
may give the shipyard a competitive advantage.  This is difficult to 
quantify in any general sense and will be shipyard-specific.  The most 
overt example relates to sectors where there may be barriers to entry. 
To evaluate these attributes it is necessary to propose proxies that will present 
information on which judgements can be made relating to fit with the factors 
proposed above.  4 proxies are proposed with which to evaluate ‘likeness’: 
 Market volume (CGT) of the product sector. 
 Typical steelweight for the product in question and typical proportion of work 
content represented by steelwork. 
 Presence of quasi-standard ship types for the product in question. 
 Presence of any barriers to entry. 
Table 6.10 summarises how these proxies approximate to the attributes that 
determine likeness.   
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Compatibility  Product attribute Proxy for quantification 
Compatibility with 
the nature of 
investment in the 
shipyard 
The size of the product should be compatible with the size of the 
shipyard’s launching and fabrication facilities.   
 Typical GT values 
The market for the product should be of sufficient volume to utilise 
capacity within an achievable level of market share. 
 Market volume (CGT)  
The characteristics of the product in terms of the balance of steel 
work and outfit work should be compatible with the investment and 
with the skills balance and experience of the workforce. 
 Typical proportion of work content 




The product should be compatible with the supply chain to ensure 
efficiency of purchasing.   
 Typical steelweight 
 Market volume (CGT) 
 Availability of quasi-standard ships  
The product should be compatible with the proportion of steelwork 
that is inherent in the characteristics of the investment and which 
may gain competitive advantage from volume ordering. 
 Typical proportion of work content 
represented by steelwork 
The product should be compatible with the experience and skills 
balance of the workforce.   
 Proportion of work content represented by 
steelwork 
The product should be compatible with any target sectors that may 
give the shipyard a competitive advantage. 
 Presence of any barriers to entry. 




6.2.4.2 Fleet sectors, market volume and quasi-standard ships 
Market volume is assessed according to the level of work content per product sector, 
represented by CGT, representing the opportunity presented over time to 
shipbuilders by each fleet sector.  As the mix of products that make up the demand 
for shipbuilding changes over time, the relative proportions of different sectors of the 
fleet under construction will vary in response.  It is therefore not possible to use any 
fraction of shipbuilding output data to represent relative volumes per sector.  The 
total volume of the fleet has therefore been used to represent market volume by 
sector, using fleet statistics correct at July 2014.  The data used represents the total 
quantum of shipbuilding work content inherent in the fleet. 
The relative distribution of market volume by main product type is given in Figure 
6.14. 
 
Figure 6.14 – Distribution of work content in the fleet by sector 
It can be seen that significant volume of work is contained in the largest four sectors 
of the fleet: container, dry bulk, tanker and LNG, together accounting for 71% of the 
total CGT.  To analyse the fleet in more detail it has been split into two sector types: 
volume and niche.  These two types are defined as follows: 
 Volume sectors provide significant market volume and incorporate quasi-
standard sub-product types. 
 Niche sectors offer lower volume or little or no opportunity for developing 





















To make this classification it is necessary to identify which sectors of the fleet 
incorporate quasi-standard products.  Examples of such products are listed in terms 
of ship brokers’ terminology in Appendix 1.     
Table 6.11 summarises the important attributes of products from a competitiveness 
standpoint.   
Main fleet 
sector 
Designation Proportion of 


































Cruise Niche 8% Low  
Car 
carrier 
Niche 6% High Panamax 
Ferry Niche 6% Low  
General 
cargo 
Niche 4% Intermediate Shipyard specific 
LPG Niche 2% Intermediate Shipyard specific 
Roro 
cargo 
Niche 2% Intermediate Shipyard specific 
Chemical Niche 1% Low  
Table 6.11 – Classification of attributes of competitiveness for the main 
commercial shipbuilding products 
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6.2.4.3 Identification of size classes 
The sub-products in the volume sectors identified are analysed in Figure 6.15 
according to vessel net steelweight and vessel size.   
 
Figure 6.15 – Identification of volume shipbuilding sectors 
Each data point in this chart represents the typical characteristics of the quasi-
standard products identified in the table above.  For example, the three tanker data 
points in the large sector of the chart represent VLCC, suezmax and aframax 
products.  The market has been subdivided into three divisions in this figure relating 
to the characteristics of the shipyard to which they are most relevant, that is: 
 Large vessels, typically over 20,000 tonnes net steelweight and 80,000 GT, 
but including also aframax tankers that are slightly smaller than this.  This 
sector relates to shipyards that will typically have VLCC building docks.   
 Panamax, typically between 7,500 tonnes and 15,000 tonnes net steelweight 
and 20,000 GT and 50,000 GT, relating to shipyards that typically have 
panamax building docks or slipways.   
 Small, under 7,500 net tonnes and 20,000 GT, relating to shipyards that 





















This classification of the market by size of vessel is used in the following analysis. 
6.2.4.4 Identification of ‘technically substitutable’ products 
In the following analysis the markets have been subdivided by ship size into the 
three sectors identified above.  For products in each sector for which reliable 
steelweight information could be obtained and for which reliable market information 
could be obtained to enable cross price elasticity to be subsequently examined, a 
chart has been developed that shows the following: 
 market volume is represented by bubble size; 
 GT by product is represented by positioning on the vertical axis.  In effect this 
is a proxy for compatibility with investment in the launching facility of the 
shipyard; 
 steelweight as a % of work content, represented by typical CGT, is 
represented by positioning on the horizontal axis.  In effect this is a proxy for 
compatibility with investment in the workshops that support the launching 
facility and in the development of the human capital and skills base; 
 incidence of quasi-standard ship types is represented by bubble colour; 
 barriers to entry are indicated by patterned shading.   
Technical substitutability is related to proximity of positioning of products in these 
charts:  the closer products appear the greater the level of substitutability.    Figure 





Figure 6.16 – Identification of technical substitutability in the large ship sector 
(patterned shading indicates barriers to entry) 
 The potential for standardisation is present for all products except cruise, 
where short series remains the norm. 
 Barriers to entry exist in the cruise and LNG sectors.  
 Steelwork density can broadly be divided into three categories: 
1. low, under 0.5 tonnes per CGT, for cruise and LNG tankers; 
2. high, clustered around about 0.7 tonnes per CGT, for aframax, 
suezmax and post-panamax container; 
3. very high, at about 0.9 tonnes per CGT, for capesize and VLCC. 
 Low steelwork density for the cruise sector in particular indicates low 
compatibility with volume products. 
 The range of size of vessels is high, with the largest, VLCC, being over 
double the size of the smallest, aframax. 
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Figure 6.17 – Identification of technical substitutability in the panamax ship 
sector (shading indicates barriers to entry) 
 The potential for standardisation is present for all products except ferry and 
roro, where short series remain the norm. 
 Barriers to entry exist in the ferry sector, although arguably are less strong 
than for the cruise and LNG sectors. 
 Steelwork density is similar for all the volume products at around 0.5 tonnes 
per CGT for the smaller products and 0.6 tonnes per CGT for the panamax 
products.  This may be due to some degree to scantling difference, rather 
than relating to relative steelwork content absolutely. 
 Steelwork density for the niche products is low, with the ferry sector in 
particular indicating low technical substitution with the volume sectors. 
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Figure 6.18 – Identification of technical substitutability in the small ship sector 
 Only volume products are shown although it should be noted that minor niche 
sectors also exist, for example dredgers or research vessels.  
 No barriers to entry are identified in the products shown. 
 Steelwork density is consistent for the dry cargo products, at around 0.35 
tonnes per CGT, but considerably higher for the tanker at around 0.55 tonnes 
per CGT.   
The vertical scales in the above charts are adjusted to obtain the optimum illustration 
of trends.  The following chart plots the three sectors together so that relative 
































Figure 6.19 – Identification of technical substitutability in all sectors 
A small number of significant cross sector compatibilities are suggested by this chart: 
 aframax tankers show a close proximity to panamax vessels (dry bulk, tanker 
and container); 
 roro cargo shows a close proximity to the smaller handy size dry cargo and 
container sectors. 
 Small tankers and ferries have few close technical substitutes. 
Steelwork density for volume products reduces with ship size.  Average values are 
0.73 tonnes per CGT for large ships, 0.53 for panamax and 0.35 for small ships.  
This may be expected due to reducing scantlings. 
These charts summarise why, for example, from a technical sense a suezmax tanker 
may be ‘like’ a post-panamax container vessel, despite the radically different nature 
of the products from the viewpoint of the ship operator.  It also summarises, 
importantly, why, for example, a small bulk carrier is technically ‘not like’ a capesize 
bulk carrier, despite their apparent similarity, and why a cruise ship is not like a 
VLCC or a large container ship and a shift of product mix from one to the other would 
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does not mean to say that a volume shipbuilder could not physically build a cruise 
ship.  What it does mean is that competitively it is likely to find this difficult.  The 
cruise ship does not key into the factors of competitiveness for the VLCC builder. 
It should be remembered that these technical characteristics alone may or may not 
define ‘like product’ but should be reviewed along with attributes of consumers’ 
tastes and habits that may transcend the cells identified in this matrix.  The examples 
presented in Section 6.2.3 relating to Japanese ships or German container ships 
may in some circumstances be regarded as more significant than the attributes of 
competitiveness presented in the matrix. 
6.2.5 Flexibility of product mix 
To evaluate the extent of flexibility of shipyard capacity between products and size 
sectors, all vessels built in the five years between 2008 and 2012 have been 
examined to look at shipyard product mixes. 
Only one shipyard sector showed exclusivity to a single ship type and that was 
cruise ship builders.  Cruise ships were built in 8 shipyards, all in Europe.  98% of 
the work undertaken by these shipyards was for cruise vessels and the other 2% 
was for occasional ferry work.  Other general capacity did not compete successfully 
for work in this sector and it is regarded therefore as different to any other sector.  
Cruise ships are ‘not like’ any of the other products examined apart from ferries.  
Ferries are competed for, however, by general shipbuilding capacity that is engaged 
in building other ship types.  The LNG sector is also different by virtue of the barriers 
to entry and thereby builders are restricted in number, but LNG tankers are mixed 
with other ship types as part of product mixes and are not built in dedicated 
shipyards.  For those that can build LNG tankers, therefore, they are ‘like’ other 
products because they are competed for within the structure of product mix.   
The following analysis therefore considers all products excluding only cruise ships.  
The analysis is undertaken separately for the three size categories: large, panamax 
and small, as described above.  Table 6.12 presents a summary of the statistics 





Large Panamax Small 
Number of shipyards 88 161 221 
Output per year in CGT 
Average 321,784 67,615 13,818 
Max 2,994,151 1,410,928 131,733 
Min 3,780 2,629 2,275 
Market share (by CGT) 
Average 1.1% 0.6% 0.5% 
Max 10.6% 13.0% 4.3% 
Min 0.01% 0.02% 0.1% 
Output per year in number of 
ships 
Average 11.5 4.2 1.3 
Max 81.4 69.0 8.4 
Min 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Number of product sectors 
competed 
Average 3.9 2.4 1.5 
Max 13 9 5 
Min 1 1 1 
Number of shipyards with single product 
range 
5 48 137 
Proportion of shipyards with single 
product range 
6% 30% 62% 
Table 6.12 – Analysis of shipyards and product mix size per sector 
The following conclusions are drawn from this table: 
 The output per shipyard in terms of both CGT and number of ships increases 
as the size category increases. 




 The potential to focus on a single product increases as the size category 
reduces. 
Whilst the focus on a single product in the small sector is shown to be significant, the 
low level of output of only 1.3 ships per year per shipyard on average is also 
significant.  The number of products produced over the 5 years examined is only 6.5 
ships, compared to 21 ships on average in the panamax sector and 57.5 ships in the 
large sector.  The significance of focus on a single product in the small sector is 
therefore regarded as misleading over the longer term.  Shipyards in the small ship 
sector that managed to maintain output on a single product basis over these five 
years are likely to have to find alternative products to react to market shifts at some 
point when demand shifts. 
Histograms of the number of products offered by each size category are presented in 
Figure 6.20. 
 
Figure 6.20 – Distribution of number of products offered by size class 
The spread of the distributions clearly reduces as the size class reduces and the 
opportunity to offer a single product increases as size class reduces.  Generally 
speaking, therefore, the larger the shipyard the larger the product range offered.  









































































number of ships built and number of products offered. The relationship between the 
two factors is shown in Figure 6.21. 
 
Figure 6.21 – Number of ships built and number of products offered per size 
class 
In the large class there is some relationship seen in this figure and the two largest 
shipyards, HHI and DSME, have to have particularly wide product ranges in order to 
achieve the market share needed for viable capacity utilisation.  In general in the 
large size class those shipyards delivering over 30 ships per year, that is to say over 
150 ships in total in the graph shown above, required a product range of 9 or more 
ship types to achieve the throughput needed.  The exception to this is the third 
largest shipyard, Samsung, which achieved its throughput across only five product 
types, container, VLCC and tanker, but with Samsung building a small number of 
ferries also.  Daewoo also built a small number of ferries whilst HHI did not 
participate in that market sector in the five years examined. 
It can be deduced from the above that the potential flexibility between products for 
which a unit of capacity can compete is wide.  The width includes variations by 
vessel type and also by size.  Figure 6.22 presents an analysis of the product mixes 































































































Figure 6.22 – Share of CGT per product built 2008 to 2012 for shipyards 
building large vessels 
It can be seen that whilst the majority of work is in the large ship type sector, in 
particular container, dry bulk, LNG and tanker, significant share is also taken from 
the panamax sector, in particular panamax container, panamax dry bulk, pure car 
carrier (PCC) and panamax tanker.  To compete for sufficient throughput it is 
concluded that large shipyards have to be flexible by size and will ‘trade down’ to find 
work where necessary.  Trading down in this way clearly provides a potential 
mechanism for cross price behaviour between the size categories as well as within 
the product sectors.  Some small and specialised vessels were also found in this 
largest size category, in particular ferries and other specialised niche sectors, 
although this is at its most significant for yards with low throughput, building one or 





A similar pattern, including trading down, is seen in the panamax size sector, with 
shipyards competing for smaller vessels to maximise throughput.  The product mix is 
shown in Figure 6.23. 
 
Figure 6.23 – Share of CGT per product built 2008 to 2012 for shipyards 
building panamax vessels 
The sector is dominated by dry bulk (including both panamax and handymax 
(supramax) vessels), with significant contributions from container, panamax 
(including handymax) tankers and from pure car carriers.  The smaller classes of 
container, tanker and bulk carrier are also of significance to panamax shipyards 
along with general cargo ships, again indicating trading down. 






Figure 6.24 – Share of CGT per product built 2008 to 2012 for shipyards 
building small vessels 
The small shipyard sector clearly cannot ‘trade down’ into a smaller sector within the 
context of this analysis, although could potentially take work from the smaller market 
sectors not included within the scope of this study, providing a potential link for cross 
price elasticity between the three shipbuilding markets (including additionally small 
ship and workboat) that have been identified. 
Based on this analysis it is possible to state that the ‘accordion of likeness’ for 
commercial shipbuilders is wide, with the exception of the cruise ship sector.  
Shipyards clearly cannot build vessels that are too large for the launching facility but 
it has been shown that to gain sufficient market share to utilise capacity, shipyards 
will compete for smaller vessels and for specialist and niche sectors when the 
opportunity arises.  In terms of the attributes of the product, therefore, these are of 





which barriers to entry exist.  Vessel size is of greater significance and shipbuilders 
are likely to target the largest vessels that the yard can construct to maximise 
throughput but targeting smaller vessels also where the opportunity to utilise 
capacity arises.  Factors of the product that would seem to determine ‘likeness’, for 
example between cruise and ferry sectors, are not as significant as might be 
intuitively supposed.  In terms of competition for capacity utilisation, ferries have 
more in common with volume shipbuilders than with cruise ship builders. 
6.2.6 Flexibility between niche and volume ship types 
The factors of competitive advantage outlined earlier suggest that it may be difficult 
for niche shipbuilders to compete for volume ship types because of the limited 
potential for a niche builder to obtain economies of scale in the supply chain due to 
low volumes.  Conversely, volume shipbuilders may have difficulty in competing for 
niche sector orders if the build does not key into the factors of competitive advantage 
for the yard, in particular the control of the makers list, and volume ordering of 
materials.  Analysis of the output of shipyards in the period 2008 to 2012, however, 
reveals significant building across the two sectors.  
Overall, 73% of shipyards reporting deliveries between 2008 and 2012 concentrated 
in the volume sectors only, 25% built both volume and niche ship types and only 
10% built in the niche sector only.   The statistics vary depending on the size of the 





Large Panamax Small 
Number of yards 
operating 
88 161 221 


























Table 6.13 – Number of shipyards delivering ships between 2008 and 2012 by 
size class 
The presence of shipyards concentrating only on the niche sectors increases as size 
reduces but the number that concentrate solely on volume sectors and the number 
participating in both is similar for each of the size classes.  Shipyards operating 
solely in the niche sectors tend to have low output but shipyards competing for both 
niche and volume products tend to be larger than the average in the sector, as 




 Large Panamax Small 
Average output all shipyards 11.5 4.2 1.3 
Average output for shipyards 
operating 100% in the volume sector 
9.9 3.7 1.4 
Average output for shipyards 
delivering combined volume and 
niche vessels 
16.8 7.6 1.6 
Average output for shipyards 
operating 100% in the niche sector 
NA 1.0 0.7 
Table 6.14 – Average annual output per shipyard, number of ships, for ships 
delivered 2008 to 2012 
From this analysis it is concluded that the ability to compete in both volume and 
niche sectors is dependent on the order and the specifics of the shipyard and that in 
general it is not possible to conclude that niche and volume ship types are ‘not like’.  
In fact the data suggests that there is an imperative for large shipyards to compete 
for as wide a range of products as possible to provide sufficient work to occupy 
capacity. 
6.3 Conclusions for Hypothesis H2: Like products exist in the 
commercial shipbuilding market  
‘Likeness’ in this context has to be judged from the point of view of the shipbuilder 
and, from this point of view, differences in end use in the shipping industry are of no 
relevance.  Likeness is concerned with attributes that determine whether or not a unit 
of capacity can competitively bid to attract a particular product.  This means that 
‘likeness’ is determined to some degree by whether or not a product keys in to the 
factors of competitive advantage inherent in a particular shipyard.   
Technical substitutability is limited in terms of guidance of likeness because, at least 
within size classes, substitutability is high for the main products.  From this viewpoint 
likeness is shown to be wide, with few exceptions: primarily cruise and LNG, both of 
174 
 
which have barriers to entry.  Likeness is not found to be limited by vessel size, 
function or market size or depending on the availability of quasi-standard products. 
As well as technical substitutability and factors of competitiveness, the element of 
‘consumers’ tastes and habits’ may also be relevant in specific circumstances.  
Examples of strong preferences for nationality of build, between established 
customers and shipyards or by virtue of government schemes such as the German 
KG scheme. 
As is accepted in the interpretation of like product in WTO case law, there is no 
absolute definition of likeness that can be applied to commercial shipbuilding.  The 
determinants of likeness are linked to the nature of investment in the shipyard, its 
personnel and their skills and training, the characteristics of the product and aspects 
of customer consumers’ tastes and habits.  The analysis demonstrates that the 
‘accordion of likeness’ in commercial shipbuilding is very wide, ultimately restricted 
only for cruise ships and with a limited influence from barriers to entry, for LNG ships 
in particular, and from consumers’ tastes and habits.   
It is true to say that at the peak of output between 2008 and 2012, the majority of 
shipyards competed within their own size category (small, panamax or large) but 
with trading down where this was deemed to be advantageous by the shipyard.  It 
may be possible to argue that ships built in this way are to some degree ‘less like’ 
ships from the appropriate size category, but it cannot be argued that they are not 
like.  This aspect of trading down provides a mechanism for price effects between 





7. H3 – Cross price elasticity exists between like products in the 
commercial shipbuilding market 
7.1 R6 – How is price determined in commercial shipbuilding? 
The following review looks at prior research into newbuilding price, including 
references to the existence of market price, determinants of price and prior 
suggestions of cross price behaviour between products in commercial shipbuilding. 
Cross price behaviour in the shipbuilding market was noted, without naming it as 
such, almost 100 years ago.  Shipbuilder Maxwell Ballard, in a paper presented to 
the North East Coast Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders in 1921, produced a 
set of curves of newbuilding price for six different ship types and noted “a marked 
consistency of movement”, not only between the different ship types but also 
between newbuilding prices and freight rates (Ballard, 1921).  Ballard also noted as 
strange that high peak prices in 1900 and 1912 were of a similar magnitude and had 
not reduced as expected due to improving technology and lower shipbuilding costs: 
“It might have been expected that, by virtue of the saving in weight of the material 
used, the increasing production, more scientific construction and economical 
machinery, an appreciable difference would have been observable” (ibid.).   Maxwell 
mistakenly, however, concluded that the failure of peak price levels to fall was due to 
increasing labour cost: “Labour is ultimately receiving a greater proportion nowadays 
than ever, which is actually the case”.   This was despite noting in the very next 
paragraph of the paper that: “A comparison of these price fluctuations with those of 
the freights shows a marked consistency in movement”.  What Ballard was 
commenting on, which clearly came as unexpected for a shipbuilder 100 years ago, 
was that newbuilding prices are determined not only by shipbuilders’ costs but also 
by what the customer is willing to pay for the ship, which in turn is determined by 
their predicted earnings from freight.  It is not only costs and the state of the shipping 
market that determine price, however.  For example, in a low market the price may 
be determined by the lowest cost producer that has acceptable available capacity, or 
by a higher cost competitor with sufficient subsidy to undercut a lower cost supplier.  
The determinants of price are therefore predicted to vary at different stages of the 
cycle.  Ballard drew this conclusion in his paper, despite the ‘red herring’ of labour 
costs:  “Prices of cargo tramps are governed in times of good trade mainly by freight 
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levels…In periods of depression, however, prices would seem to be more a matter of 
the state of the yards”.   
Wijnolst and Wergeland in 1996 further discussed the correlation of prices between 
sectors and noted: “Newbuilding prices are not necessarily linked to actual 
shipbuilding costs for the yards.  The prices of newbuildings are determined by the 
forces of supply and demand” (Wijnolst and Wergeland, 1996, p. 282).  Haddal and 
Knudsen, quoted by Wijnolst and Wergeland in the same source, repeated the 
analysis that Ballard had undertaken and noted a strong correlation between prices 
for 12 different ship types between 1970 and 1994, strongly suggesting cross price 
behaviour between products in commercial shipbuilding: “...prices are quite closely 
correlated to those of other segments…All correlations are above 0.70, so the 
general conclusion must be that newbuilding prices are affected by the same market 
forces over time” (Wijnolst and Wergeland, 1996, p. 184).  The authors use this to 
demonstrate that commercial shipbuilding products are competed within a single 
market. 
Concurrence of pricing between products in commercial shipbuilding and the 
relationship between newbuild price and the shipping market has therefore long 
been known.  Acknowledgement of cross price mechanisms in price modelling has 
been rare, but the use of freight rates and, in particular, time charter rates, has been 
more or less common in econometric analysis of prices in shipbuilding.   Inclusion of 
shipyard cost as a determinant has been more problematic, because of the difficulty 
of finding an adequate proxy.  Identification of an adequate proxy for shipyard 
capacity has also proven to be difficult.   
Zannetos in 1966 discussed the relationships between freight rates and demand for 
new ships.  He also, to some degree, addressed price, although the analysis of price 
in his work is limited.  One of his main problems was the lack of data that 
characterised maritime economics at that time: “To give operational content to the 
theoretical relationships governing orders for new vessels, we need to have, among 
other data, monthly time series of shipbuilding costs.  The latter type of information is 
not available both because it is often considered proprietary and because 
transactions for tankship building do not occur continuously” (Zannetos, 1966, p. 82).  
He also came up against the problem that the variety of products at the time was too 
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great to allow practical analysis even within a single ship sector, tankers in the case 
of Zannetos.  Notwithstanding, some important principles were established in this 
work.  Zannetos argued that demand for new ships is a function of “freight rates and 
shipbuilding costs” (ibid., p. 51) and that “The movement in short-term rates can 
explain 86.5% of all changes in shipbuilding cost” (ibid., p. 83).  There is some 
confusion in this work in that the words ‘cost’ and ‘price’ appear at times to be used 
interchangeably.  Zannetos’s conclusions indicated freight earnings as the 
dominating factor determining price in shipbuilding and this has informed much 
research on the subject since.  Note also, however, that the influence of shipbuilding 
costs (used in the correct sense) is implicit in Zannetos’s work and is important in 
determining price as discussed below.  Zannetos argued that government 
intervention would not have any appreciable effect on the demand for new ships: 
“any legislative effect on orders, however important it may be for the domestic 
industry, is not expected to affect the world total in any significant manner”  
(Zannetos, 1966, p. 76), but made no comment on the potential effect of subsidy on 
market price.  Price was stated to be part of an economic system that included also 
freight rates and demand for new ships, which suggests that Zannetos accepted 
implicitly the concept of a shipbuilding market with a market price, even though the 
market was difficult to define due to product variety.  Zannetos also noted problems 
with his model that still recur in the modelling of newbuilding prices, that is to say that 
prices do not correlate with demand as would be expected.  Later research phrased 
this as: prices show “a weak dependence with respect to demand for new vessels” 
(Dikos, 2004).  Dikos pursued this theme with the question “why do new building 
prices appear sub-optimal?”.  A number of reasons were postulated, generally 
referring to externalities such as subsidy or the strength of labour unions.   
Strandenes makes it clear that the principal underlying factor impinging on  a buyer’s 
decision to orders new ships is their view of freight rates:  “A decision to order a 
vessel should reflect the expected future freight rates or correspondingly the future 
income level over the economic life of the new vessel”  (Strandenes, 2002, p. 189).  
That freight rates can quickly reach high and occasionally irrational levels due to 
inherent inelasticity in the shipping markets was much discussed by Zannetos 
(Zannetos, 1966) and this is reflected in Strandenes’ use of the conditional “should” 
in this quotation.  Inexperienced investors for example, and in particular speculators, 
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may be overly swayed by current conditions in the freight markets, leading to over-
ordering that periodically characterises shipbuilding.  This is also reflected in 
Strandenes’ earlier work on pricing and demand in the bulk sectors where she 
discusses agents behaviour as “semi-rational” (Strandenes, 1984), that is to say 
partially based on analysis of future expectations.  Strandenes established that 
“Demand for new vessels is a function of expected earnings relative to the 
newbuilding price...Supply of newbuilding capacity on the other hand is a function of 
the cost of building the vessel in relation to the price obtained.  The newbuilding cost 
is influenced by the available berth capacity and thus by contracting of other types of 
vessels” (Strandenes, 1986).  The work referenced in this case relates to the bulk 
ship sectors, but clearly acknowledges the influence of other ship types on the 
demand and price mechanisms: “The shipbuilding industry produces different types 
of vessels.  The capacity available at the beginning of each period is the maximum 
capacity less the capacity needed to build the tonnage already on order.” 
(Strandenes, 1986).   
The high importance of freight rates as a determining factor for newbuilding price 
had been firmly established and further research suggested that the economic 
mechanism centred around demand, and, by extension, capacity utilisation in the 
shipbuilding industry.  Charemza and Gronicki, for example, in econometric 
modelling of the relationship between the shipping and shipbuilding industries noted 
that: “ship prices… are positively correlated with the supply of orders for new 
tonnage”  (Charemza and Gronicki, 1981), linking price to capacity utilisation.  Many 
researchers refer to shipbuilding costs additionally and further research has also 
touched on the variation of price determination at different stages of the market.  
Jiang et al, for example, include a dummy variable “to control for different conditions 
in the newbuilding market” in their modelling of shipbuilders’ profit (Jiang et al., 
2013).  Haralambides et al noted that: “The price of a ship, like that of every other 
capital asset, depends on the ship’s expected future profitability or, in other words, 
on the investor’s expectations regarding future developments in the markets he [sic] 
operates.  Prices, particularly those of second hand ships, thus correlate strongly 
with freight rates and, together with them, fluctuate widely” (Haralambides et al., 
2005, p. 65).   The authors distinguish the behaviour of newbuilding prices from 
second hand, however, by noting that, in addition to market expectations, the price of 
179 
 
a new ship also has to take into account shipbuilding costs and shipbuilding 
capacity: “In the face of a burgeoning demand and tight shipyard capacity, second-
hand ships would thus sell at a premium [compared to the newbuilding price for the 
same ship]. On the contrary, in a depressed and over-supplied market, second-hand 
ship prices would tend to converge to the ships’ scrap values while newbuilding 
prices could still keep close to shipbuilding costs” (ibid., p. 66).   This conclusion 
echoes what Ballard had noticed 80 years earlier, suggesting that the determinants 
of newbuilding price vary depending on the state of the market. It is interesting also 
that the authors also note the potential for cross price behaviour as a conclusion 
from their modelling: “New contract prices for dry bulk carriers may therefore be 
driven by the demand and price of alternative vessels like tankers” (ibid., p. 97).   
Haralambides et al provide a succinct literature review of the econometric modelling 
of newbuilding and second-hand price, which reveals some surprising and counter-
intuitive results that the authors found difficult to explain.  The modelling approaches 
reported by Haralambides et al tend to include “contradictory results”  (Haralambides 
et al., 2005).  A good example is the reporting of the results of Beenstock (1985) 
where it was observed that “second hand prices are flexible whereas newbuilding 
prices are relatively sticky, implying that newbuilding prices adjust to second hand 
prices over time”, or in other words the dependency between demand and 
newbuilding price was found to be weaker than expected.  Beenstock’s paper is 
based on an asset pricing approach from the perspective of the buyer and nowhere 
in the model are shipbuilding costs discussed, except indirectly with a very brief 
mention that government subsidy to shipbuilding may affect the supply of ships. 
Haralambides et al reject Beenstock’s explanation of this behaviour (Haralambides 
et al., 2005), which was postulated by Beenstock to be related to newbuilding prices 
adjusting over time to the second-hand price, but no alternative explanation is 
proposed.   The “sticky”  nature of newbuilding prices is also discussed by Dikos, 
where he states: “newbuilding prices appear far less volatile than time charter rates 
or oil prices and furthermore, it seems that they adjust really slowly” (Dikos, 2004), 
referring to this as a “paradox” in economic terms.  One possible explanation for this 
paradox lies in the selection of the parameter used to determine demand and its 
balance with capacity, which is discussed later in this section.  The observation may 
also be viewed in light of the likely behaviour of shipbuilders depending on the state 
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of the market.  In a rising market a shipbuilder would be expected to increase prices 
as fast as they are able, acting on the profit maximisation basis, with prices 
determined on the basis of expectations of future earnings, or what Strandenes 
refers to as a “rational and semi-rational basis” (Strandenes, 2002, p. 199), as well 
as the shipbuilder’s cost and competitive position.  Conversely, in a falling market 
shipbuilders are likely to try to preserve prices for as long as possible, only reducing 
prices offered to buyers when they are in need of orders, which in turn is dependent 
on the length of the shipyard’s backlog.  At the recent peak of the market in 2008, for 
example, the backlog in global shipbuilding, estimated by dividing the total orderbook 
in CGT by the prevailing annual delivery rate in CGT13, was 4.7 years.  With a 
forward orderbook of this length shipbuilders will be slow to reduce offer prices, not 
being in any immediate need of new business, and this may help to explain why, in a 
falling market, newbuilding prices are found to be ‘sticky’, not falling as expected 
when demand falls.  Backlog is psychologically very important for shipbuilders as it 
measures when the shipyard is likely to run out of work if no further orders are won.  
A shipbuilder that takes typically nine months to build a ship, for example, will 
become desperate for work if the backlog falls below that nine month threshold – in 
effect the shipyard would be working on its last order in that situation.  The difficulties 
of managing a shipyard in this situation are well recognised in the industry, using the 
term “last ship syndrome”  (Henderson and Game, 2013).  The most difficult issues 
are that a workforce that believes itself to be working towards redundancy will be 
reluctant to finish the last order, and the most able workers will find alternative 
employment and leave.  In extremis, last orders may never be completed unless 
towed to another shipyard for finishing.  If the backlog falls below the penultimate-
order point, that is to say 18 months in the example cited above, the requirement to 
win new orders is likely to become pressing and shipbuilders will be highly motivated 
to reduce offered prices.   
Dikos argues that prices should be determined with respect to “construction costs, 
but also with respect to the demand, and uncertainty in demand, for new vessels and 
the market prevailing conditions” (Dikos, 2004).  Uncertainty for the shipbuilder will 
take into account expectations of forward earnings in shipping and the effect of this 
on future demand, as it does for the buyer, but for the shipbuilder uncertainty is likely 
                                            
13 Calculated as the total of deliveries in CGT over the previous 12 months. 
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to be modified by backlog that will moderate the uncertainty stemming from the 
shipping market and its prospects.  In other words, even if freight rates fall the 
shipbuilder is likely to take comfort from a confirmed orderbook containing several 
years’ worth of work.  From another viewpoint, backlog for the ship owner is 
equivalent to delivery period and this will form an element in the consideration of risk, 
along with the forward view of potential earnings.  Backlog is therefore an important 
determinant of price that impinges on risk for both seller and buyer.  Another way of 
looking at this would be to say that backlog provides a measure of scarcity of 
capacity for the buyer and scarcity of orders for the builder. 
Haralambides et al’s modelling of newbuilding price reveals some interesting 
conclusions: 
 “Overall, shipbuilding costs were found to have the most significant and 
extensive effect on the determination of newbuilding prices for all ship types” 
(Haralambides et al., 2005, p. 96)14. 
 “New contract prices for dry bulk carriers may therefore be driven by the 
demand and price of alternative vessels like tankers” (ibid., p. 97).  Note that 
this directly suggests the presence of cross price behaviour in prior theoretical 
modelling of newbuilding price. 
 “Timecharter rates were found to be statistically significant in the 
determination of newbuilding prices in [certain ship types but less so in 
others]” (ibid.).  The authors explain this by referring to timing of orders but it 
is generally not adequately explained by the model.  The lower significance of 
freight earnings in the determination of newbuilding price in this model might 
be explained by the presence of cross price behaviour, with price better 
determined with reference to overall capacity utilisation rather than in relation 
to a single ship type and its earning potential. 
A number of inconsistencies were noted in the outputs from the model created by 
these authors, in particular ambiguity over the effect of exchange rates on price and 
the inconsistency of freight earnings as a determinant of price in different ship types.  
This ambiguity and inconsistency may possibly be explained by a variation in 
                                            
14 Note that this is the opposite conclusion to that reached by Zannetos who found that 86.5% of price 
was determined by freight rates. 
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determinants between different market conditions.  In market conditions where 
shipbuilding costs may be relatively more important (compared to other 
determinants) in influencing price it would be expected that exchange rate 
fluctuations would show some effect on prices.  In market conditions where buyers’ 
expectations of earnings are relatively more important the opposite effect would be 
expected.     
Jiang and Lauridsen provide a further comprehensive literature review of research to 
determine shipbuilding price, along with modelling of newbuild prices in Chinese 
shipyards (Jiang and Lauridsen, 2012).  Contrary to Haralambides et al’s conclusion 
that shipbuilding costs predominate in importance over freight earnings in 
determining price, in modelling the formation of prices of dry bulk carriers in the 
Chinese shipbuilding industry, Jiang and Lauridsen conclude: “the time charter rate 
has the most significant positive impact on shipbuilding price; increases in three 
other factors, namely the cost of shipbuilding, the price-cost margin and the 
shipbuilding capacity utilisation, have positive influences in the descending order” .  
Jiang and Lauridsen note the influencing factors on the price of a ship as: “national 
industrial policy, the shipyard cost of production, currency fluctuation, ship design 
and payment options”.  Significant conclusions from this modelling include: 
 “shipbuilding and shipping markets are tightly connected”; 
 “shipbuilding cost index...is found to be the second most important factor”; 
 “capacity utilisation is found to have a significant, but the smallest, effect”.  
Capacity utilisation in this instance was estimated as output in China 
compared to an estimate of the industry’s total capacity. 
This last conclusion may be caveated with the observation that capacity utilisation 
had remained high over the period evaluated by the authors, with limited variation.  It 
also addressed capacity utilisation in China only, not taking into account utilisation in 
competitor industries, which may be expected to be competing in the same market.  
The data period examined by the authors was 1995 to 2009, which corresponded 
both to a period of extended and almost unbroken growth in demand and also the 
establishment of the modernised and expanded Chinese industry.  The conclusions 
are therefore based on a specific set of market circumstances and evaluation of data 
using this model outside these boundaries may confirm the variation of determinants 
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depending on market conditions and could explain the difference in conclusions 
compared to other researchers.  The authors also conclude that “What is also 
implied from the model is that international competition in the shipbuilding industry is 
more closely tied to the dry bulk carrier prices than shipbuilding capacity utilisation”.  
This provides further theoretical evidence for the expectation of cross price 
behaviour in the market, although again was linked to a very specific market 
construct. 
Further suggestion of the existence of cross price behaviour between substitute  
products can be found in Papapostolou et al, who consider the effect of sentiment in 
the second hand values in the dry bulk shipping markets and conclude that 
sentiment ‘leaks’ across boundaries between ship types (Papapostolou et al., 2013).  
The authors conclude that “The fact that market sentiment contains significant 
information for future vessel price returns and cycle phases implies the existence of 
possible cross section sentiment contagion in the dry bulk shipping market”.  The 
authors also conclude that: “On the whole, synchronization statistics point toward 
market integration and herd-like behaviour, where the market sentiment may play a 
major role compared to the sector-specific sentiment”.  The authors also show that 
sentiment and herd behaviour act between fleet sectors, not just within sectors, 
although they consider only the different sectors of the dry bulk fleet in this analysis.  
They also consider second hand prices, rather than new.  The question remains, 
therefore, as to whether this behaviour stretches across sectors and how much it 
might apply to newbuilding prices, which are not considered specifically by the 
authors. 
 Based on the above review it is concluded that the determinants of newbuilding 
price vary in importance over time, the most important determinants being (in 
random order) shipbuilding costs, shipping market expectations of earnings, demand 
and shipbuilding capacity.  Based on these determinants, Jiang and Lauridsen 
usefully summarise prior approaches to newbuilding price research as having been 
predominantly in two camps: models based on supply and demand theory and 
models based on an asset pricing approach (Jiang and Lauridsen, 2012).  This could 
be elaborated, bearing in mind that a shipbuilding contract requires both a buyer and 
a seller and the motivations of both are unlikely to be the same.  For the buyer, the 
decision to purchase a new ship is likely to be taken on the basis of an asset pricing 
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approach, taking into account the expected future value of the vessel in relation to 
the price to be paid and the delivery period.  For the seller, the decision to accept an 
order for a new ship is likely to be taken on a profit maximisation basis, assuming no 
ulterior strategic motive, in relation to the building cost and the backlog.  The 
negotiation of price between the two parties will be undertaken within a supply and 
demand framework, most often with the assistance of a sale and purchase broker, 
whose motivation is also profit maximisation for the ship broking firm.  The 
determinants are summarised in the following table, indicating the significance to 
buyer (ship owner) and seller (shipyard) in a newbuilding contract. 
Determinant Significance to the ship 
owner 




Forward view of freight rates 
determines the rational value of 





Contributes to risk, determining 
the delivery date for the new 
vessel and provides a measure 
of scarcity of capacity 
Contributes to risk, determining 
the extent of forward work and 
how important the sale is to the 
shipyard and provides a 
measure of scarcity of orders 
Shipbuilders’ 
cost 
 Determines the minimum price 
without incurring loss or 
requiring subsidy 
Table 7.1 – Summary of the principal determinants of newbuilding price 
The economics of the supply and demand system within which price is determined 
are described succinctly by Stopford (2009, pp. 628-638).  Shipbuilding prices are 
set by the interaction between supply (capacity), demand and cost.  The theoretical 
supply function may be described in the form of a series of steps ordered by cost of 
production.  The theory is that there are few differentiators between suppliers and 
that shipbuilding contracts will be placed with the lowest cost acceptable supplier 
that has available capacity.  As demand increases the identity of the lowest cost 
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available supplier moves up the stepped function up to the point that all acceptable 
capacity is full, at which point the supply curve becomes near vertical and “there is 
an auction for any remaining berths that the yards have held back in the hope of 
such a situation arising” (Stopford, 2009, p. 633) and prices become very high.  With 
falling demand the price descends back down the stepped function, leaving higher 
cost producers unable to cover the cost of building the ship without subsidy.   
Stopford’s supply and demand curves are shown in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1 – Short run bulk shipbuilding demand and supply functions 
(Stopford, 2009, p. 633) 
A similar form can be found also in Jiang et al (Jiang et al., 2013).  The basis of the 
EU’s complaint can be seen in the supply and demand functions.  In essence the EU 
argued that subsidization in South Korea caused a vertical shift in the supply curve in 
the downwards direction, or what Stopford in the diagram above refers to as the 
‘subsidy kink’.  In this diagram Stopford refers to subsidies in Western Europe, which 
was appropriate when the diagram was drawn.  EU’s argument in Korea – 
commercial vessels was in essence (although not specifically stated in these terms) 
that support to South Korean shipyards in the early 1990s had caused a significant 
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shift in the supply function (a subsidy kink in Stopford’s terms and price suppression 
and price depression in WTO terminology (World Trade Organization, 2005)) leading 
to lower prices in the market.  The basis of this mechanism is important in 
considering cross price elasticity.  In particular it should be noted that EU did not 
argue that alleged subsidy in South Korea led to any detrimental change in demand.   
To address the Panel’s ruling (ibid., paragraph 7.556 p.128) the analysis must show 
that products under contention are part of the same market in the context of the 
supply and demand system.   In other words it is required to show that changes in 
demand for one product may lead to changes in price for a different product that is 
part of the same market and it is this causation that the EU failed to demonstrate. 
7.2 R7 – Can cross price elasticity be demonstrated for ‘like 
products’? 
7.2.1 The concept of cross price elasticity 
Elasticity is the economic concept that measures how demand, supply and price 
respond to changes in the economic system: “it is not enough to know whether 
quantity rises or falls in response to some change.  It is important to know by how 
much”  (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2007, p. 64).  It may be viewed as a sensitivity factor in 
the determination of price by equilibrium of the supply and demand functions. 
Price elasticity of demand is a common way of viewing this concept in economics, 
being a factor that determines the rate at which the demand for goods or services 
changes in response to a change in price.  It may be defined as:  “a units-free 
measure of the responsiveness of the quantity demanded of a good to change in its 
price when all other influences on buying plans remain the same” (Parkin, 2014, p. 
84).  It may be calculated as follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 =  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 
𝑖𝑛 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 
Cross price elasticity of demand is a factor that determines the rate at which the 
demand for goods or services changes in response to a change in price for a 
substitute good or service.  It may be defined as: “a measure of the responsiveness 
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of the demand for a good to a change in the price of a substitute or complement, 
other things remaining the same” (ibid., p. 92).  It may be calculated as follows: 
𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 =  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 
𝑖𝑛 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 
𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
 
Lancaster and Massingham summarise the significance of cross elasticity of demand 
as: “a measure for interpreting the relationship between products.  It measures the 
percentage change in the quantity demanded of a product to a percentage change in 
the price of another product” (Lancaster and Massingham, 2011, p. 168).   
Cross price elasticity of demand of this form is commonly taught in economic text 
books but cross price elasticity in general can refer to any changes in the factors in 
the supply and demand system (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2007, p. 79).  This is significant 
in the context of the methodology discussed below.  The fundamental requirement is 
to demonstrate that different products are part of the ‘same market’ by showing 
elasticity of price of one product with demand for another, as discussed in the 
context of the supply and demand system above.  Further comments are made on 
this context in the methodology discussion below.   
7.2.2 Methodology and data 
7.2.2.1 Overview 
Two statistical techniques have been used to demonstrate the existence of cross 
price elasticity in commercial shipbuilding:  
1. Correlation: provides empirical evidence of the link between prices in the 
market, demonstrating the potential for price suppression as argued by EU in 
Korea - commercial vessels.  This was the methodology used by Wijnolst and 
Wergerland to demonstrate that a single market exists in commercial 
shipbuilding, concluding that different commercial shipbuilding products are 
part of a single market (the ‘same market’ in WTO terminology) (Wijnolst and 
Wergeland, 1996).  The method also provides empirical evidence for cross 
price relationships by reviewing correlations between demand and price.  
Correlation is further used as part of data examination, in particular in 
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reviewing the potential for multicollinearity in the subsequent regression 
analyses. 
2. Linear regression has been used to identify the existence and relative 
strengths of elasticities in statistically valid relationships between demand for 
one product and price of another.   
Prices and demands for the following products are examined: 
Sector Products evaluated 
Large ships VLCC tanker  
Suezmax tanker 
Aframax tanker 
Capesize dry bulk 
LNG tanker 
Post-panamax container ship 
Panamax Panamax dry bulk carrier 
Panamax container ship 
Panamax tanker 
Handymax dry bulk carrier 
Handymax tanker 
Sub-panamax container ship 
Roro 
Small ships Feeder container ship 
Handysize dry bulk 
Handysize tanker 
Small feeder container ship 
Table 7.2 – Products examined for evidence of cross price elasticity 
These products are chosen because coherent time series’ of demand, price and 
earnings are available for them and they map onto the products used to identify 
technical substitutability in Section 6.  Further information on the detailed definition of 
the products and how they map to the data source can be found in Section 1 of the 
data annex accompanying this dissertation.  All data is sourced from Clarksons 
Shipping Information Network, with access dates as specified in the data annex.   
189 
 
In all cases statistical analysis has been done using IBM SPSS.   
7.2.2.2 Correlation methodology 
Data (described in Sections 2 and 3 of the data annex) are not normally distributed 
and a non-parametric method has therefore been chosen, using the Spearman-Rho 
correlation coefficient (Field, 2009, p. 179).  Correlation between prices and demand 
for different products is examined, both within each sector and then between sectors.  
7.2.2.3 Linear regression methodology 
Two potential mechanisms could be postulated for cross price elasticity of demand in 
shipbuilding, in the common sense of the use of that term in economics, as follows.  
Either: 
1. Change in price of one product may change the demand for another that is a 
substitute from the point of view of the buyer.  This at first glance appears 
unlikely to be the case in general because products in commercial 
shipbuilding are not substitutable, at least not fully substitutable, from the 
point of view of the buyer.  A bulk carrier operator engaged in coal transport, 
for example, is unlikely to consider the purchase of a tanker as a substitute for 
a dry bulk vessel in the case that the bulk carrier price increases.  Having said 
that, a bulk carrier operator may consider diversification into another fleet 
sector if it were to present better economic prospects, so this mechanism may 
exist on that basis. 
2. Demand for one product may be suppressed at specific times if price is 
increased by virtue of increased prices of other products, which are 
substitutable from the point of view of the seller, and that are competing for 
the same units of capacity.  Correlation matrices (described later) show in the 
majority of cases a positive relationship between demand for one product and 
price of another, which would support the existence of this mechanism.     
It has not been possible to demonstrate cross price elasticity of demand in this form, 
however, using linear regression.  The most significant problem is the difficulty of 
constructing demand forecasts, for which accuracy is difficult to achieve for reasons 
discussed below – certainly the level of accuracy that would be needed to detect 
suppression of demand for a specific product in a time series.   
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A common method of demand forecasting is described by Stopford (Stopford, 2009, 
p. 636) and involves not only forecasting of economic demand for a particular ship 
type but also analysis of economic and technical obsolescence in the fleet.  Stopford 
summarises this method as: “expansion demand, which is the tonnage of new ships 
needed to carry trade growth in a given period, and replacement demand, which is 
the tonnage of new ships required to replace ships scrapped or removed from the 
fleet in the same period”.  The level of uncertainty in prediction of the wide range of 
variables in this method is such that precision in the forecast may be relatively low.  
As Stopford states: “the model is simple in principle but complex in practise” (ibid., p. 
637).  To demonstrate the difficulties inherent in this process, two forecasts from 
credible representative industry bodies from the 1990s, using this forecasting 
method, have been examined to see how well they predicted the development of 
peak demand between 1995 and 2006: AWES15 (The Association of West European 
Shipbuilders, 1993) and the SAJ (The Shipbuilders Association of Japan, 1993).  
The forecast period corresponded roughly to the period of the time series used for 
linear regression analysis in this dissertation.  AWES undertook a forecast in CGT 
for all ship types and sizes, including fishing vessels, whilst SAJ forecasted only the 
main ocean-going cargo carrying fleet sectors in dwt.  Both forecasts correctly 
predicted the development of significantly increased output that was experienced 
over this period but AWES underestimated total demand for this ten years by 31%   
and SAJ by 94%.  This is not to say that these were poor quality or un-credible 
forecasts but that the extent of uncertainty in the variables used to estimate 
newbuilding output is such that precision of forecast magnitude may be low.  Even 
the short term predictions of these forecasts had low precision in terms of volume 
ordered.  AWES’ prediction for the period 1991 to 1995 (bearing in mind that these 
forecasts were published in 1993) over-estimated output by 43% and for the period 
1993 to 1995 SAJ’s forecast under-estimated demand by 86%.  Whilst these 
forecasts could be regarded as ‘historical’ in nature they are cited because they 
correctly forecasted the most significant upturn in demand in thirty years, but without 
precision as to the magnitude and timing of this upturn.  The difficulty lies not in the 
technicalities of the statistical techniques used but in the problem of accurately 
forecasting the wide range of inputs needed, including economic growth, trade 
                                            
15 The forerunner of the Community of European Shipyards’ Associations (CESA). 
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growth, scrapping age, fleet productivity and other factors.  An example of the 
difficulties is seen in an echo from the work of Einarsen in 1938, discussed in 
Section 2.1.2, where he refers to elasticities in ultimate age leading to complexities in 
the working of the phenomenon of reinvestment, which in practical terms leads to 
uncertainty in decisions relating to key model inputs.   
Notwithstanding the difficulties an attempt was made to look at short term forecasts 
of demand using the following economic relationship alone: 
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓{𝐸𝑖,𝑡, 𝐵𝑖,𝑡, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡, 𝑃𝑘,𝑡} + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Where: 
 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the demand (contracting) for vessel type i at time t; 
 𝐸𝑖,𝑦 is the proxy for earnings (normally 3-year time charter rate) for vessel type 
i at time t; 
 𝐵𝑖,𝑡 is the proxy for backlog in years for vessel type i at time t; 
 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the price for vessel type i at time t; 
 𝑃𝑘,𝑡 is the price for substitutable vessel types k at time t, for 𝑘 = 1 … … 𝑛 . 
 𝜀𝑖 is the residual error for the prediction of price for vessel i at time t. 
The specific proxies are discussed in more detail below.  The variables were found 
to be significantly poor predictors of demand and could not be used for linear 
regression analysis in the context of this relationship.  This does not mean to say 
that the mechanism for cross price elasticity listed above does not exist in 
commercial shipbuilding, but that it cannot be demonstrated over the time period 
chosen, with the data used and using linear regression.  Attempts to narrow the time 
period to look more narrowly for this were not successful. 
Cross price elasticity in this form has therefore not been established.  It should be 
noted, however, that this mechanism does not represent the causation of ‘serious 
prejudice’ as argued by EU.  EU did not argue that demand for products for which 
they were competing was affected by the action of South Korea but that prices were 
suppressed – the “subsidy kink” as discussed above in the context of the supply and 
demand functions.  The panel in its ruling said that the requirement for EU was 
specifically to: “Demonstrate such a causal relationship between the subsidy or 
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subsidies in question, on the one hand, and movement in the prices of the product of 
concern to the complaining Member in the relevant market, on the other hand” 
(World Trade Organization, 2005, p. 127 para. 7.557).  The requirement is to show 
that price suppression may exist because the products cited in a dispute are part of 
“the same market” (ibid., p. 128 para. 7.5.6.1).  Arguments in the panel ruling 
consider the geographic boundaries of market sectors (ibid., para. 7.5.6.4), with 
South Korea arguing that a single “world market” does not exist and different 
commercial shipbuilding products do not exist within the same market.  It is 
necessary to consider the same market in its economic context, however, rather than 
geographically or by considering the end use of the product.  The same market 
would therefore be demonstrated to exist by a relationship between price and 
demand for different products.  This does not require that cross price elasticity of 
demand is shown in the form discussed above, but does require that cross 
elasticities between price and demand for different products be identified, taking the 
wider view of cross price elasticity in the context of the supply and demand system. 
An alternative approach, which is consistent with the arguments put to the panel, 
was therefore adopted to look at cross price and demand relationships between 
products.  The relationship examined is as follows: 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓{𝐸𝑖,𝑦, 𝐶𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑘,𝑡}  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where: 
 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the price for vessel type i at time t; 
 𝐸𝑖,𝑦 is the proxy for earnings (normally 3-year time charter rate)  for vessel 
type i at time t; 
 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the proxy for build cost (steel price being used) for vessel type i at time 
t; 
 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the Demand (total orderbook in CGT) for vessel type i at time t; 
 𝐷𝑘,𝑡 is the Demand (total orderbook in CGT) for substitutable vessel types k, 
for 𝑘 = 1 … … 𝑛 . 
 𝜀𝑖 is the residual error for the prediction of price for vessel i at time t. 
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In this case the determinants were found to be strong predictors of price and using 
this expression it is possible to identify whether the price of one product was affected 
by demand for other products, in support of the EU’s price suppression claim.  Both 
contracting and total orderbook were tried as proxies for demand and orderbook was 
found to be the significantly stronger predictor.  This may be expected as the total 
orderbook represents a measure of occupation of capacity, although without 
including a term for capacity itself.   
Natural logarithms of the variables were used in the regressions (i.e. log-log 
regression is used) because “parameters in linear structural models with variables in 
logarithms can be interpreted as elasticities” (Haralambides et al., 2005, p. 83; 
Benoit K., 2011), and it is the identification of elasticities between demand for one 
product and price of another that identifies the existence of the cross price 
relationship.  This methodology has been used in published work to evaluate cross 
price elasticities in a wide range of situations (Cotterill and Samson, 2002; Alves and 
De Losso da Silveira Bueno, 2003; West and Williams Iii, 2007; Sanders et al., 
2008). 
An iterative approach was used to identify elasticities between demand for one 
product and price of another as follows: 
1. An initial regression is run including demand for the ship type itself only, that is to 
say modelling the above expression but excluding variable 𝐷𝑘,𝑡:  
2. Demand for potential substitutes (𝐷𝑘,𝑡) are then introduced individually into the 
model and the effects on the regression and assumptions noted.  
3. Substitutes are accepted on the following basis: 
 The RSquare value is improved by the addition of the substitute product’s 
demand: 
 The distribution of the residuals does not deteriorate (i.e. away from normality) 
by the addition of the substitute product’s demand: 
 The introduced determinant has a significant role in the improvement, judged 
by the coefficients and their significance; 
 Regression assumptions are not violated.  In particular that un-acceptable 
multicollinearity is not introduced, the distribution of residuals is improved and 
ultimately not significantly different from the normal distribution (judged using 
194 
 
a histogram, normal probability plot and plot of residuals against predicted 
values and for all accepted substitutes confirmed by a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 
test), t values for coefficients remain strong (preferably significant at the 1% 
level) and the Durbin-Watson Statistic is increased or remains the same . 
4. Each potentially substitutable product is introduced in the model first and the 
strongest candidate for substitute is then accepted.  The process is then repeated 
with each further potential substitute to identify whether more than one significant 
cross price elasticity can be identified. 
The results identify substitutable products that can be demonstrated to be 
statistically significant in the determination of price for the products examined and for 
the data and time period adopted.  These products demonstrate, in principle that 
elasticities between demand for one product and the price of another exist.  It is 
important to understand, however, that the substitutes identified are not absolutes 
and may vary over time, depending on the products that are competing for the same 
units of capacity.  The products identified are likely to be strong substitutes, because 
the analysis identifies the most significant substitutes over the full time period of over 
twelve years.  Other time periods may identify different substitutes.  The 
methodology can also only identify the strongest substitutes but others may exist.  In 
particular, multicollinearity in demand data is likely to have precluded the 
identification of all substitutes using linear regression.     
Multicollinearity was a specific problem encountered with the data but by keeping the 
VIF factor low, below 5 (Field, 2009, p. 224), the effects are minimised.  A problem 
was also encountered with a persistently low Durbin-Watson statistic in all 
regressions analysed.  This suggests a structural weakness in the model leading to 
auto-regression in the residuals, which would need to be analysed and corrected in 
any attempt to generalise the expression used.  Analysis suggests that the 
expression consistently under-estimates at some times and over-estimates at others 
and it is possible that analysis restricted to specific market periods, for example 
splitting growth and decline, would reduce the problem.  The sample size (n = 147), 
however, in relation to the number of variables, meant that it was not possible to do 
this in the context of linear regression analysis, even though very specific periods 
relating to different stages of the cycle (growth, decline and trough) can be easily 
identified in the data.  The result is that the substitutes identified can only be viewed 
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as existing for this data and in this time period and cannot be extrapolated outside 
that framework.  Such extrapolation is not necessary for this methodology, however, 
and the low Durbin-Watson statistic has therefore been accepted at face value.  The 
intent here is to demonstrate that cross price elasticity exists, not to develop a 
generalised model to predict price. 
7.2.2.4 Data and proxies 
Data is taken from Clarksons Shipping Information Network for the period January 
2003 to March 2015.  The reasons for choosing this time period are: 
1. This period represents an approximation of a cycle, as demonstrated by the 
following graphs showing Clarkson’s newbuilding price index and total 
orderbook: 
 



















Figure 7.3 – Total Orderbook (CGT) 
Four specific coherent periods can be seen in the price figure:  
 Very strong growth (Jan 2003 to May 2005: n = 29) 
 Growth (June 2005 to September 2008: n = 40) 
 Collapse (October 2008 to February 2010: n = 16) 
 Trough (March 2016 onwards: n = 62) 
2. Data is monthly and the total number of data points in each data sample is 
therefore 147.  This gives sufficient sample size for the number of variables 
examined in the regression, typically being 4 or 5.   
3. For the period prior to January 2003 there is at least a strong suspicion (this 
was the period corresponding to the EU’s WTO action) of subsidy affecting 
market prices.  By choosing the period after that time the economic 
relationship is less likely to be clouded by that factor, for which a proxy is 
difficult to identify.  Similarly, once the trough has become well established the 
presence of subsidy, or at least less rational pricing on the part of the 
shipbuilders, is more likely to appear and this period is, again, avoided.   
Proxies used are as follows: 
 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the price for vessel type i at time t; the proxy used is Clarkson’s 
indication of expected price in a particular month.  There is possibly some 
controversy in this value in that it is not based on actual contract values but on 

























negotiations.  Another way of expressing this would be to say that it is a ‘guide 
price’.  The value has the advantage that an indication of price is available for 
all products in all months and this parameter is widely used in research.  Any 
question relates to the meaning and significance of the value, given that it is 
ultimately an opinion.  Future work may review the regressions based on 
actual contract prices, although these are difficult to obtain and often it is not 
possible to define precisely the basis of published prices.  The availability and 
use of proxies of this type is discussed in Glen and Marlow (Glen and Marlow, 
2009).  Price data is summarised for the three fleet sectors in Section 2 of the 
data annex. 
 𝐸𝑖,𝑦 is the proxy for earnings for vessel type i at time t; where 3-year time 
charter rates are available they are used.  In a small number of cases where a 
specific rate for the product concerned is not available, the closest specific 
index for the rate is used.  Lagging of this proxy was considered, specifically a 
6 month lag to represent the period of negotiation of the order, but this was 
not found to improve the regression results and straightforward current 
earnings is used in the analysis. 
 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the proxy for build cost for vessel type i at time t, with steel price being 
used.  Steel price has been used by a number of researchers due to the 
difficulty of identifying any general proxy for this value.  More recent research 
has developed indices of cost, but this again is specific to place and time and 
not general (Jiang and Strandenes, 2012; Jiang et al., 2013).  Information on 
cost breakdowns developed for EU, presented earlier in this dissertation, has 
a similar problem in terms of generality – the percentage breakdowns of cost 
refer specifically to South Korea and were correct in 2003.  It has been 
possible, however, to construct a set of indices with the aim of validating, or 
otherwise, the use of steel price alone as the proxy.  An index was developed, 
based on January 2003 = 100 and by varying the component proportions of 






Cost component Average16 
proportion at 
January 2003 








2/3 varied by Clarksons Newbuild 
Price Index, one third by South Korean 
Producer Price Index (source: 
www.oecd.com)17.   
Other direct costs 3% 
South Korean Producer Price Index 
(source: www.oecd.com).   
Labour 18% 
Overhead 10% 
Table 7.3 – Variation regime for South Korean newbuilding cost index 
The resulting indices for each product are provided in Figure 7.4.   
                                            
16 Identified by weighting each specific model by proportion of output in the period 2003 to 2015 
17 These proportions are based on experience and reflect a broad assumption for typical proportions 
of materials for which the price is dependent on demand specifically in shipbuilding, for example main 
engines, deck equipment and bridge equipment, and non-ship-specific materials for which price varies 





Figure 7.4 – South Korean Shipbuilding Cost Indices (LH Scale) and World 
Steel Price (RH Scale) 
It can be seen that cost changes are heavily influenced by steel price, with the 
greatest movements seen in the more steel-dependent vessels, i.e. with 
capesize and VLCC showing the greatest change and LNG the least.   
The aim of presenting this chart is not to review the details, however, but to 
show that cost increases are strongly correlated with steel price, as 
summarised in the following correlations between the individual product 
changes and the steel price change.  This is presented to confirm that using 
steel price alone in modelling, at least in the context of this dissertation, is a 
valid proxy for shipbuilding costs and is used in the regression.  Specifically 






































































































VLCC Capesize bulk carrier Panamax bulk carrier
Post-panamax container Panamax container Handy tanker






VLCC Correlation Coefficient .987** 
 




Capesize Dry Bulk Correlation Coefficient .992** 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 147  
Panamax Dry Bulk Correlation Coefficient .979** 
 




Post-panamax Container Correlation Coefficient .977** 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 147  
Panamax Container Correlation Coefficient .976** 
 




Handymax Tanker Correlation Coefficient .980** 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 147  
LNG Tanker Correlation Coefficient .968** 
 




Passenger / Vehicle Ferry Correlation Coefficient .925** 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 147 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 7.4 – Correlation between steel price and estimated South Korean 
product-specific price indices 
 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the Demand (total orderbook in CGT) for vessel type i at time t and 𝐷𝑘,𝑡 
is the Demand (total orderbook in CGT) for substitutable vessel types k, for 
𝑘 = 1 … … 𝑛 : data for these variables is straightforward with no proxy needed.  
Demand data is summarised in Section 3 of the data annex and a description 
is given below. 
7.2.2.5 Summary of the characteristics of price and demand data 
The price data time series’ show the characteristics of the cycle over the data period, 
with the peak around 2008.  Variability of price has been measured by coefficient of 
standard deviation, which is shown in Figure 7.5.  It is noticeable that LNG price was 
significantly less variable than others over the period and that the greatest variability 




Figure 7.5 – Variability of price data 
Demand data is also peaked over the cycle, with, again, the exception of LNG ships, 
which shows a significant recovery in demand at the end of the period that is not 
experienced by other sectors.  Demand shows greater variability than price, as 
measured by coefficient of standard deviation and presented in Figure 7.6.  
Capesize dry bulk showed particularly high variability of demand, as did smaller 
container ships (sub-panamax and below). 
 






























































As would be anticipated from previous comments on newbuilding price behaviour a 
high degree of positive correlation was found between prices.  A lower but 
nonetheless significant correlation was also found between demands.  Price 
correlations are summarised in Section 4 of the data annex and demand in Section 
5. 
For price, all correlations were found to be significant at the 1% level using the 
Spearman-Rho non-parametric statistic.  Average correlations with all other sectors 
are summarised in Figure 7.7, showing that in all cases the correlation was between 
about 80% and 90%, except for Roro vessels for which the price correlation with 
other products was significantly lower.  Apart from this exception, correlations were 
found to be consistently high across the three fleet sectors and between all products. 
 
Figure 7.7 – Average Spearman-Rho price / price correlation (correlation with 
all other prices in all fleet sectors) 
Correlations between demand data were mostly positive apart from the following 
cases, where negative correlations were found:  
 between the orderbooks for LNG tankers and panamax and handymax dry 
bulk carriers;  
 between sub-panamax container ships and capesize, handymax and 































LNG and Panamax and Handymax dry bulk carriers were also the sectors that 
registered the fewest significant correlations with other sectors.  These negative 
correlations provide some tentative evidence for the demand suppression 
mechanism discussed above: it is postulated that the demand for low value bulk 
carriers may be suppressed by demand for higher value vessels and this is 
recommended for further study.  100 out of 120 possible cross correlations (83.3%) 
were found to be significant.  94 of these were found to be significant at the 1% level 
and 6, all in the small ship sector, were found to be significant at the 5% level. 
Correlations were mostly above 50% but with significantly lower seen for LNG 
tankers, panamax dry bulk carriers and sub-panamax container ships, as illustrated 
in Figure 7.8.  Particularly strong correlations (around 70%) can be seen for VLCC 
demand and post-panamax container ship demand. 
 
Figure 7.8 – Average Spearman-Rho demand / demand correlation (correlation 
with all other demand in all fleet sectors) 
The relevance of these demand / demand correlations is that they may be expected 






























7.2.3 Correlation results 
7.2.3.1 Correlations of large sector ship prices with demand  
A summary of correlations between prices of large ships and demand for products in 















































































































































































VLCC .753 .558 .800 .523 .432 .743 .405 .855 .262 .805 .739 .600 .636 .754 .489 .875 .754 
Capesize .644 .476 .879 .423 .454 .674 .282 .925  .819 .793 .722 .502 .823 .378 .926 .823 
Suezmax .682 .461 .809 .446 .531 .700 .329 .885  .763 .754 .686 .528 .805 .405 .899 .805 
Aframax .651 .462 .760 .440 .519 .682 .345 .841 .180 .736 .717 .645 .510 .754 .406 .853 .754 
LNG .730 .485 .751 .506 .526 .745 .376 .836 .249 .736 .676 .565 .642 .727 .470 .852 .727 
PP 
Container 
.516 .438 .840 .203 .436 .493  .800  .857 .884 .798 .313 .875  .801 .875 






It is possible to get some gauge of relative strength of influence from this table.  For 
example, the influence of demand for Post-Panamax container ships on price for 
VLCCs is stronger than the influence of VLCC demand on Post-Panamax container 
ship prices.  These relative influences can only be considered in the context of the 
data set analysed, however: general trends cannot be extrapolated for other market 
periods.  It is postulated also that the relative strengths of influence reflect the 
demographic of demand by ship type at any point in time, rather than technical 
differences between products – in other words, in different market conditions the 
relative influences may be found to be different.    
The number and proportion of significant correlations in each sector are shown in the 
following table, along with mean correlations in each sector.   
 

























Large 36 36 100% .59 
Panamax 38 42 90% .63 
Small 23 24 96% .73  
Total 97 102 95% .64 
Table 7.6 – Number of significant correlations for large ship prices with 
demand in all sectors 
The mean correlations are strong within the large ship sector and also between 





Figure 7.9 – Mean correlations of price in the large ship sector with demand for 
all ship types 





























Correlation of large vessel price with demand for: 






Small Feeder Container 
Strong (>.6 and < .7) VLCC 
Post-panamax Container  
Sub-panamax Container 








Table 7.7 – Strength of mean correlations of large vessel price with demand in 
all sectors 
The data is difficult to summarise in general terms but the following can be 
concluded: 
 There is a significant correlation between demand and price that extends 
generally in the market (i.e. the relationship between demand and price is not 
restricted by ship type or size). 
 The correlations extend across the boundaries between the three market 
sectors: for example, in the period examined the price of VLCCs showed a 
correlation coefficient of .875 with demand for handysize tankers. 
 It is noticeable that the strongest correlations are with demand for tankers and 
container ships whilst the weakest correlations are for smaller dry bulk 
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carriers, with panamax dry bulk demand having a particularly weak effect on 
prices of larger vessels.     
 The small number of pairs of products not showing a positive correlation are 
restricted to the demands for the three smaller dry bulk carriers (panamax and 
smaller).  This suggests that these ship types have the weakest effect on 
market price. 
The correlations cannot be adequately explained by simple coincidence of 
demand for different products in the market period examined.  For example, no 
correlation was identified between demand for LNG tankers and demand for 
Post-Panamax container ships over this period  but the correlation between  price 
for LNG tankers and demand for Post-Panamax container ships was found to be 
strongly positive (.745).  Other examples identify pairs of products that were 
found to have a negative correlation for demand/demand relationships but a 
positive correlation for demand price relationships.  There are 20 such instances 
of no correlation or negative correlation between product demands but positive 
correlation between demand and price for the same pairs of products, 
summarised in the following table.  It is concluded from these anomalies that 
correlations show strong evidence for cross price elasticity in the large ship 














































































































































































VLCC     .432       .600      
Capesize     .454      .793 .722  .823   .823 
Suezmax     .531       .686      
Aframax       .345  .180         
LNG .730 .485  .506  .745 .376  .249    .642     
PP 
Container 
    .436       .798      
Table 7.8 – Correlations between price and demand for pairs of products that do not have correlated demands or show 





7.2.3.2 Correlations of panamax sector ship prices with demand  
A summary of correlations between prices of panamax ships and demand for 























































































































































































.763 .633 .834 .559 .305 .772 .445 .859 .292 .797 .746 .568 .617 .726 .518 .886 .726 
Handy-max 
Tank 
.562 .335 .769 .332 .640 .610 .217 .883  .731 .730 .751 .402 .821 .289 .876 .821 
Panamax 
Dry 
.673 .563 .860 .413 .361 .657 .287 .860  .847 .830 .686 .507 .811 .371 .873 .811 
Panamax 
Cont 
.505 .447 .740 .234 .465 .493  .712  .823 .828 .719 .300 .801 .192 .726 .801 
Panamax 
Tanker 
.695 .446 .801 .485 .565 .736 .355 .902  .750 .715 .668 .552 .790 .439 .914 .790 
Sub-pan 
Container 
.407 .358 .700  .470 .395  .678  .797 .799 .741 .211 .786  .672 .786 
Roro .773 .631 .412 .880  .897 .813 .583 .695 .351 .165  .793  .853 .618  




The number and proportion of significant correlations in each sector are shown in the 
following table, along with mean correlations in each sector.   
 

























Large 40 42 95% .58 
Panamax 41 49 84% .63 
Small 25 28 89% .71  
Total 106 119 89% .63 
Table 7.10 – Number of significant correlations for panamax ship prices with 
demand in all sectors 
The proportion of pairs of products showing a significant correlation is slightly lower 
than was found for large ship prices (95%) but the mean correlations are consistent 
between the two sectors, as may be expected given the high price/price correlation for 
all sectors, suggesting that demand influences on price are consistent between the 
two sectors and are not varied by size class.  This consistency extends to the analysis 
of mean correlation by product, as shown in Figure 7.10, which shows the mean for 
both the panamax and large ship sectors together.   




Figure 7.10 – Mean correlations of price in the panamax and large ship sectors 
with demand for all ship types 
The similarity of the mean correlations between sectors means that the conclusions 
for the panamax sector are broadly the same as expressed earlier for the large ship 
sector.  The most significant difference is in the level of influence of demand for 
panamax dry bulk carriers which is significantly stronger within the panamax sector. 
It is also possible to show that for 24 of the product pairs a significant correlation was 
found that cannot be attributed to coincidence of demand between the two products: 
demand/demand correlations for the pairs showed no significant correlation or 
negative correlation whilst demand/price correlation were significant and positive.  As 
for the large ship sector, therefore, cross correlations between demand and price 
cannot be explained by coincidence of demand, providing evidence for the existence 














































































































































































































  .834  .305     .797 .746 .568  .726   .726 
Handy-max 
Tank 
                 
Panamax 
Dry 
  .860  .361   .860  .847 .830 .686  .811  .873 .811 
Panamax 
Cont 
              .192   
Panamax 
Tanker 
   .485   .355        .439   
Sub-pan 
Container 
.407 .358    .395       .211     
Roro                  
Table 7.11 – Correlations between price and demand for pairs of products that do not have correlated demands or show 
negative correlations between demands 
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7.2.3.3 Correlations of small ship sector prices with demand  
A summary of correlations between prices of panamax ships and demand for 



























































































































































































.380 .390 .695  .390 .324  .615  .807 .844 .712 .192 .774  .615 .774 
Handy Dry .774 .579 .813 .567 .385 .787 .450 .872 .306 .779 .718 .565 .658 .730 .533 .897 .730 
Handy 
Tanker 




.422 .325 .691 .169 .449 .425  .718  .720 .765 .736 .269 .781  .717 .781 







The number and proportion of significant correlations in each sector are shown in the 




























Large 23 24 96% .51 
Panamax 23 28 82% .63 
Small 14 16 88% .72 
Total 60 68 88% .61 
Table 7.13 – Number of significant correlations for small ship prices with 
demand in all sectors 
The results are again consistent with both the large and panamax sectors and a very 
similar profile of influence by ship type demand is obtained, as shown in Figure 7.11, 
showing the large ship sector in addition for comparison. 
 
Figure 7.11 – Mean correlations of price in the small and large ship sectors 























Correlation with price in small ship sector Correlation with price in large ship sector
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The similarity of the mean correlations between sectors means that the conclusions 
for the small sector are broadly the same as expressed earlier for the large and 
panamax ship sectors. 
It has also been similarly found that 11 significant positive correlations between 
demand and price can be identified where demand between the products is either 
not correlated or negatively correlated, again showing that correlations cannot be the 
result of coincident demand.  Having said that, the cross price correlations identified 
in this context are relatively weaker than seen in the other two sectors, with the 
exception of influences on handysize dry bulk carriers from demand for panamax 

























































































































































































 .390           .192     
Handy Dry     .385     .779 .718 .565  .730   .730 
Handy 
Tanker 




 .325  .169         .269     
Table 7.14 – Correlations between price and demand for pairs of products that do not have correlated demands or show 




7.2.3.4   Correlation of prices with backlog. 
The previous sections have shown correlations between demand and price for 
different products.  It is demonstrated that significant influence of demand for one 
product can be seen in price for another, that the pattern of influence is consistent 
across all three market sectors and that the results cannot be adequately explained 
by coincidence of demand over the period examined.  Inferences that can be drawn 
in relation to cross price behaviour are investigated further by examining the relative 
strengths of prices with demand for the products themselves and with demand in the 
whole market, represented by backlog.   
The strong significance of backlog for both buyer and seller was discussed earlier, 
taking into account capacity utilisation as well as demand.  Backlog alone, for the 
period of data analysed, was found to be a very strong predictor of price for almost 
all products.  Backlog is calculated by dividing the prevailing orderbook in CGT by 
output in the preceding twelve months and is measured in years.  The value of 
backlog over the period examined is presented in Figure 7.12 
 
Figure 7.12 – Backlog time series 








































































Figure 7.13 – Correlation between price and backlog 
Spearman-rho non-parametric factors are reported and all are significant at the 1% 
level.  It can be seen that correlations are generally above .8, with the exception of 
the Roro sector, which shows a significantly weaker correlation than any other 
sector, and the feeder container sector which is slightly lower but nonetheless still 
very strong.  Correlation is not constant over the time period examined.  In the 
strongly growing market up to the peak in 2008 the average correlation was 95%, 
falling to an average of 70% in the weak market following the peak.  Further 
evaluation is therefore undertaken separately for the two market periods:   
 period 1 up to the peak in September 2008 (n = 69) and  
 period 2 following the peak (n = 78). 
The difference between correlation of price with demand for the product itself and 
with backlog is examined to identify outlying cases where the difference is greater 
than may be expected based on the distribution of the differences for all products.  
The correlations and differences are presented in Table 7.14.  Spearman-rho non-
parametric factors are reported and all are significant at the 1% level, with the 
exception of feeder container ships following period 2 where no correlation was 







































Correlations of price with: 
Difference  Backlog Own demand 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 
VLCC  0.98   0.72   0.96   0.90   0.02  -0.18  
Capesize  0.94   0.91   0.96   0.83  -0.02   0.09  
Suezmax  0.98   0.81   0.74   0.54   0.25   0.27  
Aframax  0.98   0.65   0.94   0.72   0.03  -0.07  
LNG  0.93   0.73   0.89  -0.39   0.05   1.12  
Post-pan container  0.97   0.64   0.96   0.80   0.01  -0.17  
Handymax dry  0.97   0.78   0.96   0.95   0.01  -0.17  
Handymax tanker  0.98   0.76   0.97   0.72   0.01   0.04  
Panamax dry  0.95   0.78   0.90   0.57   0.05   0.21  
Panamax container  0.89   0.45   0.90   0.54  -0.01  -0.09  
Panamax tanker  0.98   0.90   0.85   0.63   0.13   0.27  
Sub-pan container  0.92   0.35   0.43   0.33   0.49   0.03  
Roro  0.99   0.68   0.89   0.58   0.10   0.10  
Feeder container  0.94    0.56   0.28   0.38   
Handysize dry  0.98   0.77   0.97   0.93   0.01  -0.16  
Handysize tanker  0.98   0.76   0.98   0.74  -0.00   0.02  
Small feeder 
container 
 0.83   0.45   0.48   0.47   0.35  -0.02  
Table 7.15 – Correlations between price and backlog and own demand and 
differences between the two.  Outliers identified in bold italic script. 
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The distributions of differences, mean values and box plots are presented in Figure 
7.14 
In most cases the differences are small, with some exceptions and with four 
statistical outliers.  Excluding the outliers the average difference in period 1 is 3.8% 
and in period 2 is 1.0%, showing only a very small advantage in backlog as a 
predictor over demand for the product itself in most cases.  For the outliers the 
conclusions are as follows: 
 Small container ships (sub-panamax and smaller) in period 1: prices were 
significantly higher than would be anticipated based on the demand for the 
products themselves. 
 LNG tankers in period 2: prices were significantly depressed compared to 
what would be expected based on the demand for the product itself. 
These outliers provide examples of cases where market conditions in general have 
caused either increased prices or suppressed prices, providing evidence for the 





 Distribution of differences Identification of outliers 
Period 1: 
Mean difference: 10.9% 





Mean difference 8.0% 
Mean difference excl. 
outliers: 1.0% 
  
Figure 7.14 – Distribution of differences in correlations between price and backlog and own demand  
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7.2.3.5 Conclusions from correlation analysis 
The following conclusions are drawn from the analysis of correlations: 
1. As well as the expected strong correlations between prices, significant 
positive correlations between demand and prices have been shown. 
2. Correlations are found between demand and price for differing products, with 
few exceptions. 
3. Correlations are not limited to specific market sectors but act across the 
market as a whole. 
4. The level of influence of demand on price varies by product and the pattern is 
consistent across the three market sectors.  Demand for container ships and 
tankers are identified as having the strongest influence on price and dry bulk 
carriers the weakest. 
5. The extent of influence suggests that the definition of the same market, from 
the point of view of the shipbuilder, is wide in terms of coverage of products. 
6. Cross correlations between products cannot be explained by coincidence of 
demand and provides circumstantial evidence of cross price elasticity in the 
market for the period examined. 
7. Generally strong correlations between price and backlog for almost all 
products provides circumstantial evidence for the mechanism by which cross 
pricing occurs, through the valuation of units of capacity.  It also provides 
support for the contention that a single market in commercial shipbuilding may 
exist. 
8. Specific evidence for price enhancement and price suppression is provided by 
statistical outliers identified in comparing correlation of prices with demand for 
the products themselves and with backlog, representing demand in the 
market in general.  Prices of small container ships were found to be 
significantly higher in the strong market up to the peak in 2008 than would be 
expected based on the demand for the products themselves and prices of 
LNG tankers in the weak market following the peak were significantly lower 
than would be expected based on the product demand.  These outliers 




7.2.4 Regression results 
7.2.4.1 Overview 
Reports of the iterative results to identify statistically significant cross price 
relationships are contained in Section 6 of the data annex to this dissertation along 
with detailed statistical outputs from accepted regression models in Section 7.  
Significant results are summarised in the following sections for each ship type where 
cross relationships between demand and price were identified.    
Theoretically, as this is Ln/Ln regression, the coefficients in the derived regression 
expressions can be regarded as elasticities.  Elasticities of price with demand in this 
case can be compared directly within an expression because no scale effects result 
from the original data (all prices are in $millions and all demands in CGT).  It is 
therefore possible to compare the relative strengths of elasticity of price with demand 
for the product itself and with demand for identified substitutes.    
7.2.4.2 Regression results for the large ship sector 
Statistically significant relationships between demand and price identified in the large 













Aframax Suezmax Capesize VLCC LNG 
Post-pan 
container 
Aframax       
Suezmax *    *  
Capesize * *   *  
VLCC     *  
LNG      * 
Post-pan 
container  *   *  
Table 7.16 – Identification of statistically significant cross price relationships with demand in the large ship sector 
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The following may be noted from this table: 
 LNG tankers were found to be the most influential product having a significant 
effect on price for all other large ship types apart from aframax.  This suggests 
that Korea was not correct in arguing that barriers to entry meant that LNG 
tankers cannot be considered as part of the same market as other ships (see 
Section 2.2.1).  All coefficients were found to be positive suggesting that 
demand for LNG ships had a positive influence on the value of capacity over 
the period examined.  When viewed against the conclusion from the previous 
section that LNG price was suppressed by low demand following the peak of 
2008, the results suggest that prices for other ships in the large sector may 
have been supported by demand for LNG carriers in the same period.  
Sample size restrictions mean that it has not been possible to split the data to 
confirm this. 
 Post-panamax container and LNG were the only sectors that exhibited mutual 
cross effects, suggesting a strong competitive relationship over the period 
examined.   
 Prices for capesize bulk carriers were the most strongly influenced by demand 
in other sectors (measured by the number of influencing products: 3), whilst at 
the same time capesize demand was not found to have been a significant 
influence the price of any other product in the sector.   This echoes the 
influences found in correlation results.  Demand for the lowest value and most 
widely competed product, therefore, was found to have had the least influence 
on the value of capacity over the period examined.   
 The lack of influence of demand for VLCCs on the price in any other sector 
comes as a surprise, particularly when suezmax and aframax demands are 
shown to have been influential.  This is not explained and is recommended for 
further study. 
 No influencing cross product demands were found in the aframax tanker 
sector.  Further regression to examine the influence of smaller panamax 
tankers, a relationship between the two products being identified as significant 
in the panamax sector analysis below, also did not yield significant results. 
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Further comments on the relative strengths of elasticities are made in the 
following tables, in which increases in RSquare values are classed as weak 
below 5%, moderate between 5% and 10% and strong over 10%.  The strength 





Cross price relationships identified 
 LNG 
 Aframax Tankers 
RSquare increased from .907 to .968 (+.061): moderate 
influence from other products identified. 
Technical substitutability 
 Aframax, the stronger of the two influences identified, is 
technically well compatible. 
 The LNG has low technical substitutability. 
 
 
Elasticities for the substitute products are both greater than 
for the product itself with demand for aframax being the 





B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -3.821 0.181 -21.071 0.000
LnSuezmax 3 yr time charter rate 0.193 0.021 0.275 9.110 0.000
Ln World Steel Price 0.329 0.014 0.494 23.454 0.000
LnSuezmax Orderbook 0.030 0.013 0.065 2.372 0.019
Ln LNG Orderbook 0.080 0.008 0.225 10.049 0.000
Ln Aframax Orderbook 0.143 0.012 0.360 11.560 0.000
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Capesize dry bulk carrier 




RSquare increased from .832 to .948 (+.116): strong 
influence from other products identified. 
Technical substitutability 
 Compatibility with the tankers is high. 
 The LNG has low technical substitutability. 
 
Elasticities for the substitute products are all greater than for 
the product itself with demand for Aframax being the 
strongest determinant.  Demand for LNG also shows a 
relatively strong influence and suezmax the weakest.  
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -5.465 0.320 -17.096 0.000
LnCapesize 3 yrTime Charter rate 0.109 0.015 0.268 7.445 0.000
Ln World Steel Price 0.216 0.030 0.253 7.235 0.000
LnCapesize Orderbook 0.053 0.012 0.161 4.220 0.000
Ln LNG Orderbook 0.130 0.013 0.284 10.036 0.000
Ln Aframax Ordbook 0.206 0.020 0.404 10.500 0.000







































Cross price relationships identified 
 LNG 
RSquare increased from .872 to .923 (+.086): moderate 
influence from other products identified. 
Technical substitutability 
 The LNG has low technical substitutability for the VLCC. 
 
Demand for the product itself is a relatively strong 
determinant of Ln Price.  Demand for LNG is also a strong 








B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -4.936 0.259 -19.062 0.000
Ln VLCC 3yr time charter rate 0.262 0.024 0.341 10.857 0.000
LnWorld Steel Price 0.231 0.024 0.301 9.590 0.000
Ln VLCC Orderbook 0.194 0.018 0.407 10.736 0.000
Ln LNG Orderbook 0.148 0.012 0.360 12.510 0.000




































Cross price relationships identified 
 Post-panamax container 
RSquare increased from .710 to .837 (+.127): strong 
influence from other products identified. 
Technical substitutability 
Both products are complex in terms of building but technical 
substitutability is not close, in particular in relation to differing 
steelwork density and taking into account the element of barrier 
to entry for the LNG tanker. 
 
Elasticity for the substitute products is stronger than for the 






B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 0.364 0.206 1.761 0.080
Ln Clarksea earnings index 0.039 0.008 0.175 4.907 0.000
Ln World Steel Price 0.098 0.020 0.250 4.958 0.000
Ln LNG Orderbook 0.081 0.008 0.388 10.722 0.000




































Cross price relationships identified 
 LNG 
 Suezmax 
RSquare increased from .907 to .925 (+.018): weak influence 
from other products identified. 
Technical substitutability 
 The container ship and tanker are strongly technically 
compatible. 
 For the LNG ship, both products are complex in terms of 
building but technical substitutability is not close. 
Demand for the product itself was a strong determinant with 





B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -4.739 0.287 -16.493 0.000
Ln Container 3Yr Time Charter 
Index
0.329 0.011 0.793 29.551 0.000
Ln World Steel Price -0.107 0.024 -0.148 -4.446 0.000
Ln Post-pan container Orderbook 0.343 0.027 0.642 12.944 0.000
Ln LNG Orderbook 0.087 0.013 0.223 6.748 0.000
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 The elasticities of demand for substitutes were generally found to have been 
stronger over the period examined than elasticities of demand for the product 
itself, with the exception of the post-panamax container sector.  This was the 
largest market sector in the period examined and it is concluded that this 
sector may have dominated in setting the value of capacity.   
 In determining price in the LNG sector, demand for competing large container 
ships was strongly significant.  In this case the data suggests that price for 
one product was significantly influenced by competition for the alternative and 
LNG tankers and post-panamax container ships provide the strongest 
evidence for cross price elasticity in the data analysed:  the two products can 
be seen to have competed as substitutes from the viewpoint of the builder. 
 Demand for LNG tankers was also seen to have a strong influence on price 
for the two largest classes of tanker (suezmax and VLCC) and for large bulk 
carriers.    
 Where strong influences are identified the substitute products tended to show 
relatively strong technical substitutability with the product.  The exception to 
this is the influence of demand for LNG tankers, which played a significant 
role in determining the value of capacity over the period, but which are not 
easily technically substitutable with any other product.  This suggests that the 
influence of cross price elasticity is not confined to technically substitutable 
products but acts through the market as a whole, acting to increase the value 
of capacity in general. 
7.2.4.3 Regression results for the panamax sector 
Statistically significant relationships between demand and price identified in the 






























    *  
Handymax tanker         
Panamax dry    *  *  
Panamax container      *  
Panamax tanker         
Sub-panamax 
Container 
        
Roro  *   *   
Table 7.17 - Identification of statistically significant cross price relationships with demand in the panamax sector 
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The following may be noted from this table: 
 Demand for sub-panamax container ships was found to be the most influential 
within the sector, forming a significant determinant of prices for the two dry 
bulk carrier types and the larger panamax container sector.  No influences 
were observed on the price of the sub-panamax container ship.  This result 
comes as a surprise as the panamax container sector had greater order 
volume over the period compared to the sub-panamax.   
 Panamax dry bulk carrier prices were the most strongly influenced bulk ship 
type, showing a significant relationship with demand for container ships.  
Conversely, demand for both the two dry bulk types (panamax and 
handymax) showed no influence on price of any other sector, suggesting that 
the two technically most simple ship types were weakest in terms of price 
determination, again echoing the results of the correlation analysis. 
 Outside the bulk sector demand for the roro type was not found to influence 
other prices but price for the ship type itself was influenced by demand for 
tankers (handymax and panamax).  
 Neither of the two tanker types showed any significant cross relationship with 
demand for other products in the sector.  For the handymax tanker the 
demand for the ship type itself was a very strong determinant of price, yielding 
an RSquare value of .965 without substitutes included in the regression.  This 
very high fit may have made the identification of any cross influences difficult.  
This was not the case for the panamax tanker, however, demand for which 
was not found to be a significant predictor of price in the regression analysis, 
whilst demand for all other products were found to have a moderate to strong 
influence on RSquare, although none could be accepted as none passed all 
the statistical assumptions tests.  This sector was therefore regarded as 
anomaly and further tests were therefore undertaken to examine potential 
substitutable product in the large ship sector, which revealed demand for both 
aframax tankers and LNG tankers as being significant in determining price.   
Further comments on the relative strengths of elasticities are made in the 
following tables, in which increases in RSquare values are classed as weak 
below 5%, moderate between 5% and 10% and strong over 10%.  The strength 
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Handymax dry bulk carrier 
Cross price relationships identified 
 Sub-pan container 
RSquare increased from .833 to .938 (+.105): strong 
influence from other products identified. 
Technical substitutability 
 The two products are closely technically compatible. 
 
Elasticity for the substitute product is slightly larger than for 







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -4.611 0.209 -22.103 0.000
Ln Handymax Dry 3yr Time 
Charter Rate
0.233 0.016 0.438 14.864 0.000
Ln World steel price 0.185 0.028 0.232 6.651 0.000
Ln Handymax Dry Orderbook 0.136 0.013 0.384 10.804 0.000
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Panamax dry bulk carrier 
Cross price relationships identified 
 Panamax container 
 Sub-panamax container 
RSquare increased from .855 to .962 (+.107): strong influence 
from other products identified. 
Technical substitutability 
 Compatibility with the larger container ship is high. 
 The smaller container ship is less compatible in terms of 
ship size. 
Elasticity with demand for panamax container ships is greater 
than for the product itself with a weaker influence also from the 





B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -5.203 0.233 -22.302 0.000
Ln Panamax Dry 3yr Time 
Charter Rate
0.175 0.012 0.367 14.191 0.000
Ln World steel price 0.209 0.023 0.253 9.001 0.000
Ln Panamax Dry Orderbook 0.127 0.014 0.303 8.882 0.000
Ln Sub-Pan Container Orderbook 0.181 0.012 0.488 15.589 0.000

































Cross price relationships identified 
 Sub-panamax container 
RSquare increased from .819 to .909 (+.09): moderate to 
strong influence from other products identified. 
Technical substitutability 
 The two ship types are compatible in terms of steelwork 
balance but show a considerable difference in vessel 
size. 
 
Elasticity for the substitute product is stronger than for the 
product itself in this case, despite panamax container being 






B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -1.174 0.150 -7.812 0.000
Ln Panamax Dry 3yr Time 
Charter Rate
0.050 0.008 0.211 6.019 0.000
Ln World steel price 0.336 0.016 0.584 21.638 0.000
Ln Panamax Container Orderbook 0.066 0.011 0.210 5.849 0.000

































Cross price relationships identified 
 Aframax 
 LNG 
RSquare increased from .865 to .933 (+.068): moderate 
influence from other products identified. 
Technical substitutability 
 The two tankers are compatible in terms of steelwork 
balance but not ship size.  Compatibility with LNG (not 
shown in the diagram) is low. 
 
Demand for the product itself was not a significant determinant 
but demand for aframax was found to be a strong predictor, 
suggesting that panamax tankers are a substitute product for 
aframax in the large ship sector.  Demand for LNG also had a 





B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -3.403 0.173 -19.662 0.000
Ln Panamax tanker 3yr Time 
Charter Rate
0.099 0.036 0.133 2.754 0.007
Ln World steel price 0.337 0.014 0.531 23.779 0.000
Ln Aframax Ordbook 0.183 0.016 0.484 11.425 0.000
Ln LNG Orderbook 0.082 0.010 0.243 8.627 0.000



































Cross price relationships identified 
 Handymax tanker 
 Panamax tanker 
RSquare increased from .878 to .937 (+.059): moderate 
influence from other products identified. 
Technical substitutability 
 Compatibility with the handymax tanker is good.  
 Compatibility with the panamax tanker is poor. 
 
Demand for handymax tankers was very slightly more 
significant as a determinant of price compared to the product 
itself, both being strong determinants of price.  Demand for 
panamax tankers showed a negative correlation (the only one 





B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -3.398 0.228 -14.909 0.000
Ln World steel price 0.362 0.021 0.476 17.510 0.000
Ln Roro Orderbook 0.212 0.015 0.413 13.717 0.000
Ln Handymax Tanker Orderbook 0.217 0.021 0.341 10.146 0.000

































 As with the large ship sector the coefficients for substitute products tended to 
show stronger elasticity of price with demand than was found with the 
products themselves and sub-panamax container ships were found to have 
the strongest influence on price in this sector. 
 The cross relationship between panamax and aframax tankers reflects the 
close technical positioning of these two products in terms of technical 
substitutability. 
7.2.4.4 Regression results for the small ship sector 
No significant cross price relationships were identified for the small ship sector using 
linear regression.   Three of the four products analysed showed high RSquare values 
in regression without the inclusion of substitutes: 
 Feeder container: .921 
 Handy tanker: .967 
 Small feeder container: .899 
For the two small container ship sectors this is unexpected, being apparently 
contradictory to correlation results that suggest that prices for small container ships 
had been elevated in the market growth period, compared to what might be expected 
values based on the demand for the products themselves.  The regression looks at 
the full period, however, whereas the correlation split the market into growth and 
decline, with the conclusion relating to the growth phase only.  Sample size 
restrictions mean that it is not possible to split the regression to confirm the 
correlation results for separate periods. 
Regressions for the handy dry vessel alone showed significant potential for 
improvement in fit by the inclusion of substitutes, but none from within the small ship 
sector were able to satisfy statistical assumptions.  Further regression was therefore 
tried to examine whether this ship type was influenced by demand for the most 
influential ship type in the larger panamax sector: sub-panamax container ships, 
which yielded strong evidence for cross price elasticity for this ship type.  This model 
provides statistically valid evidence for cross price behaviour between market 




Handy dry bulk carrier 
Cross price relationships identified 
 Sub-pan container 
RSquare increased from .827 to .957 (+.13): strong influence 
from other products identified. 
Technical substitutability 
 The two products are strongly technically compatible. 
 






B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -4.161 0.137 -30.298 0.000
Ln Handy Dry 3yr Time Charter Rate 0.205 0.016 0.337 13.158 0.000
Ln World steel price 0.200 0.022 0.266 9.213 0.000
Ln Handy Dry Orderbook 0.117 0.008 0.411 14.390 0.000
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7.2.4.5 Conclusions from regression analysis 
1. The existence of cross price elasticity in the data examined is confirmed by 
linear regression, demonstrating statistically significant effects of demand for 
one product on the price of another.  It is concluded therefore that the ‘same 
market’ may be constituted by more than one product. 
2. It must be stressed that these may not be the only cross price relationships 
existing in the market but represent the most important relationships that can 
be demonstrated using linear regression and that were persistent over the 
data period examined.  Other relationships may have been more important in 
specific market periods.  Multicollinearity of demand in the market over the 
period examined may have obscured other relationships that may exist but 
which cannot be identified using linear regression.  It should also be noted 
that models were restricted to pairs of products competing directly within the 
same market sector, with two exceptions.  Correlation analysis suggests that 
other significant relationships could be found between sectors, as was found 
with panamax tankers and substitute products identified in the large ship 
sector and handysize dry bulk carriers and sub-panamax container ships.  It is 
possible that linear regression could reveal other significant relationships as 
substitutes for those identified across the three sectors and this would be 
expected based on the evidence from the correlation analysis. 
3. Cross price relationships were less evident in the small ship sector, compared 
to the panamax and large ship sectors.  The demand for the products 
themselves were found to be highly significant in three of the four ship types 
examined and this may have made cross price effects difficult to identify using 
linear regression.  The fourth ship was found to be influenced by demand from 
a vessel a larger size category.  No such lower significance of the effect of 
demand from substitutes on price was identified in the correlation analysis 
and the significance of this finding is therefore questioned and recommended 
for further study. 
4. In general, demand for container ships were found to be significantly 
influential in all sectors, along with demand form LNG tankers that had a 
strong influence on price setting.  Demand for tankers was also found to be 
significant in the determination of price.  This may be expected, with builders 
competing strongly for higher added value products.  These influences are 
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consistent with those identified in the correlation analysis.  Demand for dry 
bulk carriers, on the other hand, at the other end of the complexity spectrum, 
was found to have no identifiable influence on price for the period examined.   
5. Technical substitutability was found to be present in the results but wider 
influences from less technically substitutable products was also found, most 
notably the influence of demand for LNG tankers on prices of other products 
in the large ship sector and for the panamax tanker.  This suggests that 
technical substitutability may be of low significance in the determination of 
price, compared to other factors such as capacity utilisation and the perceived 
value of products to the shipbuilder, confirming the conclusions reached in the 





The following sections summarise the conclusions reached in examining market-
related problems encountered in Korea-Commercial Vessels.  Specifically the 
problems relate to demonstrating that a commercial shipbuilding market exists, that 
‘like’ products can be identified in that market and that cross price elasticity exists in 
that market between products.  Conclusions below are summarised according to the 
three hypotheses used to structure the research work, following general conclusions 
on the nature of the industry.  
8.1 General 
1. The modern commercial shipbuilding industry in terms of construction 
methods, shipyard design and products commenced after the end of WWII 
and is a product of globalisation.  Key changes defining the industry since 
WWII, in addition to technical aspects of production, have included increasing 
size of vessels produced, standardisation of the products and the pursuit of 
volume and economies of scale in market leading shipyards. 
2. Commercial shipbuilding has, through its history, been subject to cycles that 
lead to economic difficulties for shipbuilders.  In particular these difficulties are 
caused by the persistence of capacity in the decline and trough phases of the 
cycles.  The nature of the cycles changed in the second half of the 20th 
Century, with output becoming less volatile and the pitch of the cycle 
increasing, including longer periods of sustained growth and recession. 
3. Market leadership in the post-WWII period has passed from Japan to South 
Korea and then to China. The length of period for which market leaders have 
retained dominance has declined with each successive leader and the level of 
dominance has reduced.  It is questionable as to whether a true hegemony 
has existed since the British domination of the industry in the late 19th Century 
but it is true to say that market leadership has become increasingly 
concentrated in a small number of shipyards and shipyard groups. 
4. Subsidy has been a persistent feature of commercial shipbuilding throughout 
its history, with many forms of subsidy and many reasons for granting 
subsidy.  Two significant reasons are the economic difficulties that beset 
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shipbuilders in cyclical downturns and the very high cost of developing a 
modern high volume competitive shipyard.  It is unlikely that such a shipyard 
can be developed in the modern era without government assistance. 
5. The form of very large, high-throughput shipyard that has developed in 
particular since the 1990s is questioned in terms of viability, given the cyclical 
nature of demand.  Such shipyards are undoubtedly highly efficient in strong 
market conditions but are very difficult to manage in weak market conditions.  
The level of throughput required to maintain market share is likely to be 
unattainable in trough periods and low throughput will seriously impair the 
efficiency of the shipyard.  Inefficiency in trough periods, therefore, is likely to 
counteract high efficiency in boom periods and over the full cycle the benefits 
of scale are questionable.  The risk inherent in investment in these ultra-large 
shipyards may in the long run be regarded as too great.    
8.2 The legal definition of ‘like product’ in the context of WTO 
1. There is no simple definition of ‘likeness’, with the concept being interpreted 
according to case law in WTO instruments.  In the context of this work 
likeness is essentially about competitiveness and like products are those that 
compete for the same opportunities and thereby compete in the same market. 
2. The concept of likeness has to be seen from the viewpoint of the producer, 
the shipyard.  The end use of the product, which might determine likeness for 
the buyer, the ship owner, is not relevant to the discussion in this context.  
Thus, that a container ship cannot be regarded as a substitute for an LNG 
tanker from the point of view of ship operations is of no relevance to the 
discussion of like product in the commercial shipbuilding industry. 
3. Likeness in commercial shipbuilding is therefore about which products 
compete for the same units of shipbuilding capacity.  Like products have to 
exist in commercial shipbuilding because shifts in demand mean that it is 
rarely possible for a shipbuilder, with few exceptions, to concentrate on a 
single product.  For this reason capacity has to be flexible to build a range of 
products, normally referred to as the product mix, to enable a business to 
react to market shifts.  The need for a product mix is particularly important as 
a consequence of the increase in output volume experienced in the past fifty 
years.   
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4. Likeness refers to any aspect of the product that may confer a competitive 
advantage.  This includes not only the technical features of the product and 
how these relate to the factors of competitiveness inherent in a shipyard 
competing to gain orders for that product but also factors such as customers’ 
tastes and habits.   
8.3 Hypothesis 1 – the commercial shipbuilding market exists 
1. There is strong empirical evidence for the de facto acceptance of the 
existence of a commercial shipbuilding market and numerous references to 
the market in common usage.  This is justified by benchmarking the industry 
against the features that constitute the concept of a market as an economic 
construct, in particular that it relates to economic transactions (the buying and 
selling of ships) and that there is sufficiently close contact between buyers 
and sellers for a market price to exist. 
2. The market is constituted partially by products but also by a factor of 
production: shipbuilding capacity.  When an order is placed the transaction 
normally involves the sale of a commitment to provide future capacity (a slot) 
to build a product, rather than a direct and immediate sale of that product.  If a 
contract were to be cancelled before construction starts the slot would be re-
sold wherever possible but the substitute trade would not necessarily be for 
the same product as the original transaction.  The substitute would be from a 
range of products that key into the factors of competitiveness for the capacity 
being sold. 
3. The market in its totality includes any ship structure over 100 GT, below which 
the market could more readily be defined as boat building rather than 
commercial shipbuilding.   
4. For the market above 100 GT, three distinct sectors are identified, 
characterised by the products, the nature of competition and the nature of 
demand.  These are the workboat market (up to about 500 GT), the large 
workboat / small ship market (between about 500 and 5,000 GT) and the 
international commercial shipbuilding market (over about 5,000 GT).  For the 
two smaller sectors, local and regional purchasing are more common and 
demand is less volatile than in the large sector.  The two very large peaks of 
demand seen over the past fifty years were experienced only in the large 
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sector, which accounts for around 90% of all shipbuilding work content.  The 
international commercial sector, over 5,000 GT, was taken as the basis for 
further analysis in this dissertation. 
8.4 Hypothesis 2 - like products exist in the commercial shipbuilding 
market 
1. Like products are determined in part by identifying those products that are 
compatible with the factors of competitiveness that define a unit of 
shipbuilding capacity, or in other words the mix of products for which that 
capacity can compete for orders.  Determinants of competitive advantage 
include labour cost, productivity and the characteristics of the supply chain.  
Economies of scale and location in a country with strong steel and marine 
equipment supply industries have been important determinants for market 
leaders in recent years.  Other factors of competitiveness may include state 
aid, access to finance and advantages from the strength of being part of a 
diversified group.   
2. Few barriers to entry are found in international commercial shipbuilding.  Such 
as have existed recently include protected markets that are not open to 
international competition, notably the Jones Act market in the United States, 
the LNG market, for which only qualified and appropriately invested shipyards 
can compete, and the cruise ship market, for which the unique characteristics 
of the supply chain and technical innovation present barriers for new entrants. 
3. Consumers’ tastes and habits are also important in assessing likeness in 
commercial shipbuilding.  Relevant examples identified that could be argued 
to determine likeness include the tendency for domestic orders in Japan, the 
KG finance system in Germany and established relationships between buyers 
and sellers, for example the relationship between Maersk and Odense Lindo 
(prior to its closure) or the relationship between Carnival and Fincantieri. 
4. Technical substitutability is examined in relation to aspects of the product that 
key into the nature of investment in the shipyard and aspects that key into 
factors of competitiveness that may be inherent in a unit of capacity.  The 
nature of the investment includes consideration of the size of the ship, the 
relative steelwork content in the product and the size of the market in relation 
to market share.  Factors of competitiveness include relationship with the 
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supply chain and the balance of steelwork in relation to the skills and 
experience of the workforce.   
5. Technical substitutability was examined in three sectors:  large products that 
relate to shipyards that typically have VLCC launching facilities (products 
above 80,000 GT and 20,000 net steel tonnes), panamax products that relate 
to shipyards that typically have panamax launching facilities (typically 
between 20,000 and 80,000 GT and 7,500 and 15,000 net steel tonnes) and 
small shipyards, below about 20,000 GT and 7,500 net steel tonnes. 
6. Within each sector technical substitutability was found to be wide with few 
exceptions.  Exceptions include cruise ships and LNG tankers in the large 
ship sector and ferries and roro cargo in the panamax sector.   
7. Whilst opportunities were found to be primarily taken from within the size 
sector, shipyards were also seen to ‘trade down’ to take orders where 
possible from a smaller sector where advantage can be obtained from this.  
Technical substitutability therefore acts across the size boundaries.  For 
example, panamax tankers were found to be more compatible with aframax 
tankers than with other products in the panamax sector. 
8. It was not found that likeness could be restricted by construction material, the 
difference between niche and volume products or the nature of the shipyard, 
for example depending on whether a shipyard used slipways or drydock for 
launching.   
8.5 Hypothesis 3 – cross price elasticity exists between like products 
in the commercial shipbuilding market 
1. The existence of different products within the ‘same market’ has been 
examined by an empirical examination of market data for the period January 
2003 and March 2015.  Products within the ‘same market’ would be expected 
to show a cross relationship between demand for one and price for the other. 
2. Correlation analysis reveals a strong link between prices for all products and 
across all sectors of the market.  That this is not a feature only of the market 
period investigated in this dissertation can be demonstrated by concurrence 
with two previous studies, one in 1921 and one in 1996 that reached the same 
conclusion (Ballard, 1921; Wijnolst and Wergeland, 2009) . 
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3. The correlation between prices cannot be adequately explained by 
coincidence of demand: the positive correlation persists in the cases where no 
correlation between demands was found or where negative correlations 
between demands was identified. 
4. Correlations between demand and price are also in general significantly 
positive between products, with few exceptions.  The strength of correlations 
suggests that the strongest influence on price in the period examined was 
generated by demand for container ships and tankers and the weakest 
influence derived from demand for dry bulk carriers.  These influences were 
confirmed by subsequent linear regression analysis. 
5. Strong positive correlations between prices for all products in all sectors and 
backlog measured in the market as a whole suggest that the mechanism for 
determining the value of units of capacity affects all sectors of the market.  
Backlog is highly significant for both buyer (for whom it is a measure of 
scarcity of capacity) and seller (for whom it is a measure of scarcity of orders) 
and takes into account both demand and shipyard capacity.  Backlog was 
found to be a very strong determinant of price. 
6. Correlation analysis therefore supports the EUs contention in Korea – 
Commercial Vessels  that price suppression in one sector of the market may 
result from pricing in different sectors of the market. 
7. Two specific cases of cross price effects were identified in the data using 
correlation.  Firstly the price of small container ships was shown to have been 
significantly higher than would have been expected based on demand for the 
products themselves in the strong market period up to 2008.  Secondly, the 
price of LNG tankers was found to be suppressed, compared to what would 
be expected on the basis of demand for the product itself, in the weak market 
following 2008.   
8. Statistically significant relationships between demand for one product and 
price of another were identified using linear regression, confirming the 
presence of cross price elasticity in the commercial shipbuilding market, 
confirming that different products can be shown to be economically part of the 
‘same market’.  Price for one product may be partially determined by demand 
for a different product, due to cross-elasticity between the two.  In many cases 
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the elasticity of demand for the substitute was found to be stronger than 
elasticity of demand for the product itself. 
9. Having said this, problems were encountered in the use of linear regression to 
identify cross price relationships because of multicollinearity resulting from 
correlations between demands for different products.  Because of this it was 
only possible to identify the strongest cross price relationships as being 
statistically significant in the period examined.  Additional influences may exist 
that could not be identified using this technique and the full extent of the 
‘same market’ in commercial shipbuilding has not been established.  
10. Cross price effects were strongest in the two larger sectors of the market 
(panamax and above) but significantly weaker in the small sector of the 
market.  Only one of the four small products tested showed cross price effects 
and that was with demand for a product in the larger panamax sector. 
11. Evidence for the need for strong technical substitutability in determining cross 
price relationships was weak.  Whilst many of the relationships revealed did 
include a high degree of technical substitutability, others did not.  The 
strongest example is the effect of demand for LNG tankers on the price of all 
other ship types in the large ship sector, with the exception of aframax 
tankers, but for which technical substitutability is low.  This suggests that 
technical substitutability is a weak determinant of likeness in the commercial 
shipbuilding market. 
12. In summary the statistical analyses provide evidence for cross price 
relationships in commercial shipbuilding and that influences act across all 
market sectors and all products, with few exceptions.  In applying this 
conclusion, however, specific proof can only be provided in specific 
circumstances and each case would have to be assessed on merit pertaining 
to the market conditions and competitive relationships at the time of a 
complaint.  It is not possible to generalise the findings of this dissertation. 
8.6 Final conclusion 
1. The thesis is found to be supported, that the international commercial 
shipbuilding industry is not fundamentally different to other industry sectors in 
that it can be defined and analysed to make it governable by WTO 
instruments that aim to regulate competition.  This was achieved by 
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addressing the underlying issues relating to the nature of the market, which 
caused difficulty in Korea – commercial vessels. 
2. It is hoped that these conclusions may assist in opening the way for future 
disputes that may arise but that might otherwise have been discouraged by 
the difficulties identified in 2003. 
9. Recommendations for further work 
A number of areas of further work are suggested by this research: 
1. Investigation of the possible oligopoly effects on the shipbuilding market, 
generated through increasing concentration in the industry. 
2. Consideration of the optimum form of shipyard investment, given the 
vulnerability of the high volume approach in relation to market volatility.  
Consideration of the viability of the strategies of the industries in Japan and 
South Korea and lessons that could be learned for the sustainability of the 
development of the industry in China are particularly important.   
3. Consideration of the technical potential for flexibility of capacity to gain 
advantage from strong market conditions but also to minimise the dis-benefits 
that accrue in weak market conditions. 
4. Further theoretical investigation of the empirical analysis of cross price 
elasticity presented herein and the limits of the ‘same market’ in commercial 
shipbuilding.  Investigation of the relationship between backlog and price and 









11. Appendix 2 – Development of research in maritime economics 
Maritime economics is relatively young as a specific research discipline, the origins 
dating, according to Heaver, to 1973: “the first year of publication of the journal 
Maritime Studies and Management, changed in 1976 to Maritime Policy and 
Management” (Heaver, 2012, p. 18), although there were, of course, earlier 
researchers in the field, notably Isserlis and Tinbergen working in the 1930s and 
Metaxas and Zannetos working in the 1960s and 1970s.  Zannetos was particularly 
influential in developing modern economic theories of shipping markets in his work 
on the tanker markets published in 1966 (Zannetos, 1966).   
Early researchers faced a significant barrier in that data was scarce.  They were also 
faced with a bewildering complexity of routes and commodities, in the era prior to the 
consolidation of dedicated bulk trades and before consolidation of liner and tramp 
cargoes into containers.  Isserlis’s paper “Tramp Shipping, Cargoes and Freights” 
from 1938 includes 38 pages of tables that define the cargoes and routes of the day, 
including rates for cargoes such as: “deals; rice and or paddy; hemp; cottonseed; 
jute; teas; wool; jaggery; esparto…”  (Isserlis, 1938). This apparently disparate array 
of goods was consolidated into a series of freight rates and indices, although Isserlis 
points out that he was not the first to achieve this, noting the first use of such indices 
being in 1904.  Isserlis’s contribution was to develop the indices into a coherent and 
extensive set of time series’.   
In the discussion of Isserlis’s paper, the President of the ‘Royal Statistical Society’, to 
which the paper was presented, notes: “Dr Isserlis has performed an enormous task 
in giving us chain-indices for freights on all important commodities and routes for 68 
years, a task which justifies the epithet ‘monumental’”.  These statistics enabled 
cycles in freight volumes and freight rates and their primary causes to be clearly 
identified, a subject much extended in recent times by Stopford (Stopford, 2009), and 
showed volatility that would be recognisable in modern statistics, although 
forecasting of future market states was found to be intractable: “The fact remains 
that it is comparatively easy to find explanations for the various stages of a trade 
cycle that is past, and that it is impossible to predict correctly the occurrence of the 
successive phases of a cycle which is in progress, and still more so in the case of a 
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cycle that has yet to commence” (Isserlis, 1938).  This statement strikes a chord with 
modern maritime economics, with forecasting remaining elusive, and Isserlis’s paper 
presents a wide range of statistics that, whilst not without critics both at the time of 
publication and in more recent times (Klovland, 2002), can be seen as seminal in the 
context of future industry reports such as the annual UNCTAD Review of Maritime 
Transport.  The paper also considers the link between “futures” in the cotton and 
grain markets and forward freight rates, demonstrating further prescience relating to 
subjects that exercise the minds of maritime economists in the modern era.   
A further issue to face the early researchers is also identifiable in the discussion 
section of Isserlis’s paper, where a representative of the “Tramp Shipping 
Administrative Committee”, that is a representative of the ship owners, demonstrated 
scepticism bordering on hostility in relation to the use of statistics to describe the 
fortunes of the shipping industry, stating: “If statistics were published, they should 
have some relative value to the conditions of an industry”.  The reluctance of ship 
owners to be measured by statistics would be a recurring theme up to the 1980s.  
For example, Zannetos notes in his preface: “Oil companies collect some data for 
their internal purposes but often consider what they have as proprietary.  Moreover, 
the information that is available in any one place is usually segmented or 
specialized, and cannot be readily put together into meaningful time series” 
(Zannetos, 1966, p. vii).  The importance of Isserlis’s contribution would be 
confirmed by the widespread use of freight indices in future eras.  The usefulness of 
indices was summarised succinctly by a commentator on Isserlis’s paper as: “he 
need not believe that the statistics were absolutely true, but that they might be taken 
to have a general aggregate truth”. 
In the discussion of Isserlis’s paper at the Royal Statistical Society meeting at which 
it was presented, a contributor noted that “Dr Isserlis was forced by present 
circumstances to forage for information” and another that: “The statistics were 
extremely important, but extremely difficult to produce, and the information could not 
be supplied every year or so.  To his mind it was astonishing that shipowners should 
have been willing to reveal so much of the particulars of their business as they had 
done”.  Scarcity of data would remain a problem for researchers for many decades.  
In a controversial (at the time) book that sought to answer the question: “why has the 
tonnage of ships registered in the United Kingdom declined from over 45% of the 
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world total in 1900 to about 16% of the total in 1960?” (Sturmey, 1962), British 
economist S.G. Sturmey wrote of the difficulties he faced in answering this question: 
“shipping is not an industry which enjoys scrutiny and, having its own answers to the 
disparity between the growth rates of British and world shipping, has been loath to 
lift, to an outsider,  the traditional veil of secrecy which shrouds so many of its 
operations…and facilities do not exist to enable an outside research worker to collect 
such data” (ibid., p.3).  Writing thirteen years later in a book titled ‘Shipping 
Economics’, the same author indicated that since his initial research was published 
the situation had at least started to change: “there has been a recognition of the 
need for more research into all aspects of ship operating, including that necessary to 
determine trade trends and predict changes” (Sturmey, 1975, p. 7).  Improvements 
were slow, however.  In this latter book Sturmey notes that the President of the 
Chamber of Shipping had, in his presidential address in 1974, stated: “This is an age 
when professors and economists seated in their studies surrounded by statistics and 
other data but, I am afraid, insulated from the hard facts of life, can reach some 
astonishing conclusions” (ibid., p.2).  This has direct echoes of Isserlis’s efforts forty 
years earlier and the reluctance of the ‘old guard’ of the shipping industry to open up 
data to analysis is only very thinly veiled in this statement.  It is interesting to note 
that Sturmey’s 1975 book contains very little data or analysis in 255 pages of 
collected papers and articles.  It is not a book on shipping economics that would be 
recognised as such today.   
Notwithstanding some residual reluctance in the shipping industry, relating to the 
availability of data, the situation had definitely begun to change by the mid-1970s.  
Writing in 1977, R.O. Goss pointed out that a decade earlier: “it was possible to 
complain that, although Britain had been a major maritime power for a very long 
time, it had produced no school of writers on the economics of sea transport.  Today, 
the situation is changing rapidly” (Goss, 1977, p. 1).  Goss goes on to quote from 
Fairplay Magazine of 22nd August 1973 where an editorial remarked: “twenty years 
ago the number of academics interested in shipping could have been counted in a 
telephone kiosk” but notes then that “today the volume of research in progress is so 
great that a periodic index is needed” (ibid).  Goss then went on to note the difficulty 
of “quantification” in the research at the time because of reluctance of the industry to 
make data public.  In discussing the development of modern shipping Goss notes 
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that “the failure to collect and present primary data, to analyse them and to publish 
the results led, however, to many mistakes being made, and an entirely unnecessary 
level of risk for shipping companies” (Goss, 1977, p. 27).  At the time Goss reported 
that the industry was sceptical of data analysis because the data appeared to be too 
variable to yield generally applicable results but also noted that “it is the variations 
themselves which are important, and which need comparison in economic, and not 
only in physical, terms” (Goss, 1977, p. 31).  This comment turned out to be 
prescient indeed. 
Heaver points out in relation to research prior to 1939 that: “The focus..was on 
technology.  It was not until after World War II that the application of formal economic 
analysis to the selection of ships was encouraged” (Heaver, 2012, p. 17).  The 
exceptions to this were Tinbergen, who applied mathematical analysis to the cycles 
seen in tanker markets in 1933/34 and Koopmans who developed the ‘transport 
algorithm’ as a special case in linear programming, in looking at the problem of 
shipping in the North Atlantic in WWII (Ibid, pp 19,20).   
The important topics discussed by Goss in 1977 were predominantly about the 
economics of ship design and operation.  Much of the discussion was based on the 
experience of the researchers, with some data and analysis to support the 
conclusions.  The methodologies remained largely similar in a summary of “Current 
issues in maritime economics” published in 1993 (Gwilliam and Molenaar, 1993) but 
research had firmly moved from ship operation to the economics of shipping, shifting 
from the economics of ships and their operation to the economics of seaborne trade 
and supporting industries.  By this time data analysis techniques had also improved.  
Globalisation had increasingly become the driver of the industry and was therefore 
the subject of research and the economics of competition had also become of 
significant interest.  Focus was also coming to bear on the microeconomics 
“concerning the decision processes of firms in this changing shipping world” 
(Gwilliam and Molenaar, 1993, p. 5).  Forecasting of supply and demand by sector 
was of interest to assist ship operators in every day decisions and more 
sophisticated econometric modelling was being introduced (Strandenes, 1984; 
Strandenes, 1986).  The pricing process in the volatile bulk markets (the 
determination of freight rates and asset values) had also become of interest.  
Gwilliam and Molenaar describe the “developing techniques” that were consequent 
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on the availability of more capable computer software, and also the improving 
availability of shipping data to analyse in those models (although this latter point is 
not mentioned specifically by the authors) and “the extension of forecasting models 
to the dynamics of the market, notably joint responses of investors to initial market 
outlooks.  The weak element thereof remains the behavioural equations”(Gwilliam 
and Molenaar, 1993, p. 6).  The methodologies adopted in the papers published in 
that book remained similar to those used by Goss 16 years previously, that is to say 
drawing conclusions based on a thorough analysis of the systems and causative 
relations, supported by data analysis.   
The subject was enhanced in 1993 by the publication of Beenstock and Vergottis’s 
influential book Economic modelling of world shipping (Beenstock and Vergottis, 
1993), building on work that the authors had started to publish in the 1980s.   
Beenstock and Vergottis themselves noted that little up to that time had changed 
since publications by Tinbergen in 1931 and 1934, and Koopmans in 1939, which 
defined “what might be called the classical econometric approach to modelling 
shipping markets”  (Cullinane, 2005, p. 20), although this is perhaps less than 
objective given the work published by Strandenes and others since the 1970s.  A 
good example can be seen in the work published by the Norwegian School of 
Economics and Business Administration (Strandenes, 1984), modelling the bulk 
markets.  In this publication Strandenes notes that the model is “an updated version 
of the original analysis published by Eriksen and Norman (1976)” (ibid.).   
As predicted by Goss in 1977 and as mathematical and computer capability 
developed, coupled to the increasing availability of data, after this time it became 
variability itself that was of greatest interest to many maritime economists.  In 
particular the evaluation of volatility and the assessment of financial risk for ship 
operators became central to the discussion.  In commenting on Beenstock and 
Vergottis’s work, Glen and Martin note that: “The key feature of this work..is not in 
the econometrics rather it is in the seminal development of a coherent explanation of 
ship price behaviour” (Cullinane, 2005, p. 26), referring to second hand value in 
particular.  The development of data, computers and modelling techniques were 
therefore being brought to bear on the problem identified by Isserlis in 1938, 
although the uncertainties remain despite improved methodologies, data and 
equipment for analysis. 
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In a more recent update of the main issues relating to maritime economics published 
in 2005, Cullinane  discusses that in the previous 20 years the analysis of shipping 
markets has progressed from a “hypothesized causality and structural modelling 
[approach]” to “methodologies revolved around data-driven approaches that focus on 
the statistical properties of market data and determining reduced form dynamic 
relations therein” (Cullinane, 2005, p. 3).   Whilst this approach tends to be widely 
used, there is some question about its ability to provide real insight and the resulting 
work sometimes tends to be long on statistical detail and short on causality and 
pragmatic conclusions that relate to the real world, in particular taking into account 
that markets are constituted above all by human beings and are not simply statistical 
constructs.  In discussing the history of modelling in maritime economics, Cullinane 
goes on to summarise Glen and Martin, who contribute a chapter to the book, as 
follows: “One of the…conclusions that Glen and Martin draw from their survey of the 
literature and ensuing empirical analysis is that the contemporary reliance on data-
driven methodologies does not yield the same insight or depth of understanding that 
may be derived from approaches based on structural modelling [and]… it may be 
time to revert again to a more traditional approach” (Cullinane, 2005, p. 4).  This 
appears to be advocating a shift back from an over-reliance on inductive analysis of 
statistics to a more deductive approach where theories are derived from a broader 
range of research methodologies, with statistical analysis providing a supporting role, 
rather than leading.   Without considering causation the reductive reporting of 
statistics is limited as to what it can add to the understanding of the subject and it is 
not possible to be sure of the significance of the statistics reported.     
The empirical approach to shipping market analysis questioned by Cullinane is in 
some cases neither deductive (no theory is proposed to be tested by the statistical 
analysis) nor inductive (very little theory of causation is developed based on the data 
collected) and the move back to “a more traditional approach” suggested by 
Cullinane appears to be suggesting a return to the more broadly based research 
philosophy and approach of the eras of Goss, and Gwilliam and Molenaar discussed 




12. Appendix 3 – The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
The WTO is a surprisingly young organisation, established by the “Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization”, 15th April 1994, which 
concluded the “Uruguay Round” of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) which lasted from 1986 to 1994.  It is located in Geneva and counted 154 
member states as members at 2nd March 2013 (World Trade Organization, 2013b).  
The WTO was established in response to a widely perceived need for a legal 
framework to regulate trade in the context of increasing globalisation.   The aim of 
this framework is to protect the interests of weaker countries seeking to develop their 
economies and to assure access to global trade that is as free as possible from 
restrictive practises.  The need for the WTO’s foundation is summarised by Bossche 
as follows: 
“One of the defining features of today’s world is the process of economic 
globalisation, with high levels of international trade and foreign direct investment.  
There is a broad consensus among economists and policy-makers that economic 
globalisation in general and international trade in particular offer an unprecedented 
opportunity to reduce poverty significantly worldwide.   
However, to ensure that this opportunity is realised, economic globalisation and 
international trade have to be ‘accompanied’ by good governance in developing 
countries and more development assistance from developed countries and have to 
be managed and regulated at the international level.  If not, economic globalisation 
and international trade are likely to be a curse, rather than a blessing to humankind, 
aggravating economic inequality, social injustice, environmental degradation and 
cultural dispossession.  Managing and regulating economic globalisation and 
international trade so that they benefit all is one of the prime challenges of the 
international community in the twenty first century” (Bossche, 2008, p. 2). 
The WTO’s own summary of the function of the organization includes the following: 
“At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the 
world’s trading nations. These documents provide the legal ground rules for 
international commerce. They are essentially contracts, binding governments to keep 
their trade policies within agreed limits. Although negotiated and signed by 
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governments, the goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and 
importers conduct their business, while allowing governments to meet social and 
environmental objectives. 
The system’s overriding purpose is to help trade flow as freely as possible — so long 
as there are no undesirable side effects — because this is important for economic 
development and well-being. That partly means removing obstacles. It also means 
ensuring that individuals, companies and governments know what the trade rules are 
around the world, and giving them the confidence that there will be no sudden 
changes of policy. In other words, the rules have to be ‘transparent’ and predictable” 
(World Trade Organization, 2013b). 
The law of the WTO is made up of a complex set of rules, at the heart of which “five 
groups of basic rules can be distinguished: (1) rules of non-discrimination; (2) rules 
on market access; (3) rules on unfair trade; (4) rules on the conflict between trade 
liberalisation and other societal values and interests; and (5) institutional and 
procedural rules, including those relating to WTO decision making, trade policy 
review and dispute settlement” (Bossche, 2013, p. 35).  
The group of regulations appertaining to this dissertation are the third in the above 
list, regarding unfair trading practices.  Bossche goes on to summarise this sector as 
follows: 
“WTO law, at present, does not provide for general rules on unfair trade practices, 
but it does have a number of detailed rules that relate to specific forms of ‘unfair’ 
trade.  These rules deal with dumping and subsidised trade. 
Dumping, i.e. bringing a product on to the market of another country at a price less 
than the normal value of that product, is condemned but not prohibited in WTO law.  
However, when the dumping causes or threatens to cause material injury to the 
domestic industry of a Member producing a ‘like’ product, WTO law allows that 
Member to impose anti-dumping duties on the dumped products in order to offset the 
dumping… 
Subsidies, i.e. financial contributions by governments or public bodies that confer a 
benefit, are subject to an intricate set of rules.  Some subsidies, such as export and 
import substitution subsidies, are, as a rule, prohibited.  Other subsidies are not 
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prohibited but, when they cause adverse effects to the interests of other Members, 
the subsidising Member should withdraw the subsidy or take appropriate steps to 
remove the adverse effects…If a prohibited or other subsidy causes or threatens to 
cause material injury to the domestic industry of a Member producing a ‘like’ product, 
that Member is authorised to impose countervailing duties on the subsidised 
products to offset the subsidisation” (Bossche, 2013, p. 38). 
It was within the ambit of this section of the WTO rules that the European Union in 
2003 raised a case of unfair trade practices against South Korea relating to the 
uneconomic pricing of commercial ships in the international market, which it was 
alleged was supported by the South Korean government and caused harm to the 
EU’s shipbuilding industry.   There were a number of problems in the prosecution of 
a shipbuilding case that can be seen as inherent in a careful reading of the 
quotations above.  Firstly, how does one define the term ‘like product’ in 
shipbuilding?  This is a significantly more complex concept than it at first appears 
and the meaning of the term is continuously being defined through case law (panels 
place emphasis on the application of previous judgements in making their decisions).  
Put simply, how can an oil tanker be shown to be ‘like’ a container ship?  Secondly 
how can one demonstrate harm to a competing national industry when the 
international nature of the commercial shipbuilding industry means that the products 
are sold into a global market and not specifically imported into the complaining 
Member’s country (or region in the case of EC)?  Finally the very existence of a 




13. Appendix 4 – EC and WTO legislative definitions of the 
commercial shipbuilding market 
Definition 1: European Commission in the Framework on State Aid to 
Shipbuilding (European Commission, 2011) 
“(a) ‘shipbuilding’ means the building, in the Union, of self- propelled 
commercial vessels; 
 (d)18 ‘self-propelled commercial vessel’ means a vessel that, by means of its 
permanent propulsion and steering, has all the characteristics of self-
navigability on the high seas or on inland waterways and belongs to one of 
the following categories: 
(i) seagoing vessels of not less than 100 gt and inland waterway vessels of 
equivalent size used for the transportation of passengers and/or goods; 
(ii) seagoing vessels of not less than 100 gt and inland waterway vessels of 
equivalent size used for the performance of a specialised service (for 
example, dredgers and ice breakers); 
(iii) tugs of not less than 365 kW; 
(iv) unfinished shells of the vessels referred to in points (i), (ii) and (iii) that are 
afloat and mobile; 
(e) ‘floating and moving offshore structures’ means structures for the 
exploration, exploitation or generation of oil, gas or renewable energy that 
have the characteristics of a commercial vessel except that they are not self-
propelled and are intended to be moved several times during their operation”. 
This definition is virtually identical to that in the previous (2003) version of this 
framework except that sub-paragraph (e) has been added to cover the trend for 
shipyards to diversify activity into the offshore sector.  It is also important to note that 
                                            
18 Sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) refer to definitions for shipbuilding and conversion and are not included 
in this quotation. 
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a useful part of the definition that was included in the 2003 and previous versions of 
the framework has been removed, the paragraph being as follows: 
“For the purposes of the above, ‘self-propelled seagoing vessel’ shall mean a vessel 
that, by means of its permanent propulsion and steering, has all the characteristics of 
self-navigability on the high seas. Military vessels (i.e. vessels which according to 
their basic structural characteristics and capability are specifically intended to be 
used exclusively for military purposes, such as warships and other vessels for 
offensive or defensive action) and modifications made or features added to other 
vessels exclusively for military purposes shall be excluded, provided that any 
measures or practices applied in respect of such vessels, modifications or features 
are not disguised actions taken in favour of commercial shipbuilding inconsistent with 
State aid rules;” 
This makes the important distinction that prior to 2011 naval vessels were excluded 
from the EC definition of the commercial market.  It is proposed to retain this 
exclusion in the definition used in this dissertation, because military and commercial 
vessels rarely compete for the same units of capacity.  It can also be seen in this 
definition that inland waterway vessels are included.  This is appropriate because 
they may compete for capacity with sea-going vessels. 
Definition 2: OECD in the “OECD Agreement” (OECD, 1994)  
“1. This Agreement covers the construction and repair of any self-propelled 
seagoing vessels of 100 gross tons and above used for transportation of 
goods or persons or for performance of a specialised service (for example, ice 
breakers and dredgers) and tugs of 365 kW and over. 
2. This Agreement excludes: 
a. military vessels and modifications made or features added to other vessels 
exclusively for military purposes. This exclusion is subject to the requirement 
that any measures or practices taken in respect of such vessels, modifications 
or features are not disguised actions taken in favour of commercial 
shipbuilding and repair inconsistent with this Agreement. If a Party considers 
that this requirement has not been met, it may, without prejudice to its rights 
to initiate the other procedures foreseen in this Agreement, request further 
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information, which the other Party shall co-operate to provide as fully and 
quickly as possible. 
b. fishing vessels destined for the building or repairing Party’s fishing fleet. 
This exclusion is subject to the requirement that the Party provides full 
transparency in accordance with Article 4. 
3. For purposes of this Agreement: 
a. a vessel is considered "self-propelled seagoing" if its permanent propulsion 
and steering provide it all the characteristics of self-navigability in the high 
seas; 
b. "repair" includes, inter alia, conversion and reconditioning of self-propelled 
seagoing vessels as defined in subparagraph (a) above; and 
c. "military vessels" are vessels which according to their basic structural 
characteristics and ability are intended to be used exclusively for military 
purposes.” 
It can be seen that the basic definition coincides with the EC definition, including 
vessels above 100GT or 365 kW in the case of tugs, and excludes military vessels 
(although with the proviso noted above that this has been excluded from the latest 
EC definition and with the caveats that this exclusion may be waived in the OECD 
case under certain circumstances).   Beyond this the OECD definition excludes 
fishing vessels and inland waterway vessels, although on the factor market argument 
this is inappropriate for a definition of a shipbuilding market as these ships will 
compete for capacity alongside cargo carrying and seagoing vessels.  It can also be 
seen that the OECD definition does not cover the offshore products envisaged by the 
EC in the latest draft of the framework, for the reason that the OECD agreement was 





14. Appendix 5 – Industry definitions of the commercial 
shipbuilding market 
For commercial data providers the market is primarily constituted by larger vessels 
(typically over about 5,000 GT) involved in transporting cargo, plus sometimes other 
sectors such as cruise and ferry, offshore supply and other specialist vessels.  Some 
recent examples include: 
 Clarkson Research in its publication “World Shipyard Monitor” includes 
detailed information on bulk vessels (wet and dry) over 10,000 dwt only.  For 
the other ship types included, no lower size limit is given but the coverage is 
predominantly of larger ships: gas carriers, cruise, roro ferry, container ships.  
OSV are included in addition and a category described as “others”, which 
includes multi-purpose, reefer, pure car carrier and ro-ro cargo (Clarkson 
Research, 2014).  Whilst no lower limits are given in some sectors, it is clear 
that the data provided in this source addresses the large steel payload-
carrying sector, plus offshore supply.   
 Astrup Fearnley’s weekly report on newbuilding activity tracks only vessels of 
handysize and above (Fearnleys, 2014). 
 The annual ‘Platou Report’ in the section on newbuilding includes only 
tankers, bulk carriers, container, gas, car carriers, chemical tankers and 
cruise ships.  
 A report produced by the consultancy ‘Worldyards’ commissioned in 2012 by 
OECD to support discussion of ‘market distorting practices’ at a special 
session of WP6 (OECD Working Party 6, 2012b) includes “commercial 
vessels above 1500 dwt trading internationally” and specifically excludes 
offshore tonnage.    This deadweight limit will exclude workboats such as tugs 
and fishing vessels and other small vessels such as inland waterway craft. 
The building of workboats and small ship types, with the exception of OSV in some 
sources, is generally ignored in the routine reporting and analysis of the industry.  
There are some exceptions to this.  For example, SeaEurope (incorporating The 
Committee of European Shipyards’ Associations and European Marine Equipment 
Council) include a category ‘NCCV’ (non-cargo-carrying-vessels) in their annual 
statistical review, because this sector is of significant importance in the modern 
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European industry, although no size limits or scope are indicated by the 
organisation.  This is the exception, however, and the question arises as to whether 
the general industry view of the commercial shipbuilding market is correct in only 
taking into account a limited number of ship types and sizes in the context of what 
could be constituted as a coherent market? 
Industry sources provide an important lead in the definition of products, in that 
products are classified in terms that the shipping industry uses them (derived from 
the characteristics of ‘parcels’ of cargo, in terms of the form of the cargo and the 
quantity, that are typically shipped (Stopford, 2009, p. 58 to 60)).  For example a dry 
bulk carrier of 80,000 dwt with 32.2 m beam is effectively the same product as one of 
83,000 dwt with 32.2m beam: both are panamax bulk carriers in shipping industry 
nomenclature and are directly substitutable.  Examples of the products and 
definitions commonly included in published data sources are included in Appendix 1, 
compiled by the author from numerous sources.  The definition of products in terms 
of industry usage provides an important framework for use in analysis.  This is not 
only because it helps greatly in the analysis and definition of ‘like product’ but also 
because it reduces the variety of potential products in analysis and greatly clarifies 
the picture derived.  The size limitation and the exclusion of certain ship types that is 
common in commercial data have to be questioned in the total context of the 
commercial market, however.  Yachts and fishing vessels, for example, do compete 
with cargo-carrying ships for capacity and thereby have to be considered in a market 
definition. 
At the most detailed level, Lloyd’s Register (LR) uses a taxonomy (adopted by Sea-
Web, the fleet data source used in this analysis) that at the most detailed (fifth) level 
includes 110 classifications of ship, not counting two instances of the word “etc.” in 






Figure A5.14.1 – Summarised Lloyd’s Register ship type taxonomy to the fourth level (source: analysis of information 



















































In the strictest definition of the market for commercial vessels it would not be 
possible to eliminate any of these classifications.  None of the ‘cargo carrying’ sector 
could be excluded from a generalised model of the “commercial vessel” market, and 
virtually all the miscellaneous side of the diagram in Figure A5.1 would also have to 
be included.   The classification “Other ship structures”, for example, includes yachts, 
which have already been discussed as being at least in part relevant to the market.  
Similarly, “non-propelled ships” may compete with the cargo carrying ships for 
capacity and cannot be excluded.  Only two categories at the fifth level appear to be 
unsuited to the analysis of a market for “commercial vessels”, being patrol vessels 
under the ‘other activities’ classification and ‘naval auxiliary ship’ under ‘other ship 
structures’, both being naval type vessels and therefore generally subject to political 
decisions in terms of build location and acceptability of price19. 
In general, therefore, it is proposed to use the vessels included within LR’s taxonomy 
to define the products within a “commercial market”, with the limited exclusions noted 
above.  Ships included in LR’s database will be grouped by common industry usage 







                                            
19 The UK Government’s ordering of four replenishment tankers from DSME of South Korea on 2012 
may appear as an exception to this conclusion.  It should be kept in mind, however, that DSME is a 
warship builder as well as a commercial shipbuilder and the vessels will only partially be using 
commercial shipbuilding capacity.  This order may also be seen as a test for the UK Government, 
rather than a permanent future commitment to the building of naval auxiliaries outside of the UK. 
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15. Appendix 6 – The development of economy of scale 
A: The pursuit of volume 
To demonstrate the progress of the pursuit of volume in commercial shipbuilding 
Figure A6.1 presents the output from the world’s largest shipyards at the start of 
each decade from 1960, with output measured by both Gross Tons and number of 
ships delivered. 
 
Figure A6.15.1 – Largest commercial shipbuilders by decade (output in the 
year indicated – data sourced from Sea-Web) 
The movement of the market lead from Europe in 1960, through Japan in the 1970s 
to South Korea following 1980 can be seen in this Figure.  What can also be seen is 
that the largest shipyard in 2010 produced 28 times the gross tonnage of the largest 
yard in 1960 and almost five times as many ships.  It can also be seen that the pace 
of investment in volume picked up significantly after 1990, facilitated by the 
continuous growth in demand that developed between then and the market crash in 
2008.    
The output statistics in Figure A6.1 are, of course, affected both by the investment in 
shipbuilding capacity and the state of the market.  The output at the start of each 
decade is, apart from the notable exception of the peak around 2011, at relatively 
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development of volume would compare the situation at the two peaks, comparing 
1975 with 2011.  This is done in figure A6.2. 
 
Figure A6.15.2 – Largest commercial shipbuilders comparing peak outputs in 
1975 and 2011 (data sourced from Sea-Web) 
The comparison of the peaks shows that the largest shipyard in the most recent 
peak produced four times as much tonnage and six times as many ships as the 
largest tanker factory20 at the height of the previous peak.  It may be argued that 
Mitsubishi Nagasaki’s output of 14 VLCCs in 1975 was the furthest extent of the 
single product mass production factory in the modern era (ignoring wartime 
production in the United States).   
Whilst a mass production single-product facility, such as Mitsubishi Nagasaki in the 
1970s, is a seductive concept, given the potential productivity gains available from 
absolute standardisation of the product and development of production facilities to 
suit, it is not possible in reality that such a shipyard can be sustainable due to market 
shifts between products over time.  Gains in productivity will be offset by under-
utilisation in poor market conditions and flexibility to build a range of compatible ship 
types is therefore vital to achieve sustainable volume.  To illustrate the dangers of 
over-specialisation, Figure A6.3 shows the total output of VLCCs from 1968 up to the 
                                            
20 Mitsubishi Nagasaki was series building only VLCCs in 1975 and could be said to be the inventor of 
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present day, in terms of number of ships, with a reference line showing Mitsubishi 
Nagasaki’s peak output in 1975. 
 
Figure A6.15.3 – Global output of VLCCs (data sourced from Sea-Web) 
The production of VLCCs peaked during the initial phase of development in the 
1970s, with 91 ships delivered in 1974 and Mitsubishi Nagasaki having about a 15% 
market share.  The peak was short lived, however, with around six years of high 
demand between 1969 and 1976.  Thereafter the market disappeared for around 15 
years, providing very little and sometimes no demand for products from a dedicated 
VLCC factory.  Following the crash in demand for tankers in 1978, Mitsubishi 
switched to being a more flexible shipyard, building a range of tankers, LNG carriers, 
bulk carriers and container ships.  There is therefore illustrative of an economic 
imperative, due to the nature of the market, that a unit of shipbuilding capacity has to 
be flexible between products to adapt to market shifts and that comparison of 
likeness on the basis of ship type is not representative of the nature of the industry.  
Like products, each of which is compatible with a shipyard’s capacity and 
determinants of competitiveness, have to exist for a shipyard to survive. 
It would be wrong, however, to give the impression that the pursuit of volume implies 
that all shipbuilders have tried to achieve the highest levels of throughput as 
achieved in these largest shipyards.  Very large shipyards are the exception rather 
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modern market-leading yards may not be optimum, given the high cost of supporting 
such capacity in cyclical downturns.  This is recommended for further study.  In the 
five years of the peak of output from 2008 to 2012 the largest shipyard produced an 
output of over 82 ships per year whilst the average yard only 3.2 ships per year and 
the average value in the upper quartile of yards was 10.25 ships per year.   Perhaps 
most startlingly, 56% of shipyards delivered one ship or fewer per year over the peak 
period.  It is of significance, however, that only 25% of these small yards (by output) 
have managed to win any orders in the post-crash period since 2008, compared to 
68% of shipyards producing more than one ship per year.  The average throughput 
of these more successful shipyards over the peak five years was just under 6 ships 
per year and they produced around ten times as much shipbuilding work (CGT), 
indicating a focus on more sophisticated ship types.  This is illustrated in Figure 
A6.4, showing the average output in terms of CGT and number of ships over the 
peak period, along with average ship size represented by bubble diameter. 
 
 
Figure A6.15.4 – Average annual output per shipyard over the period 2008 to 
2012 (bubble size represents average ship size in GT – data sourced from Sea-
Web) 
83,023 GT



















































Whilst very large shipyards remain the exception, the pursuit of volume (for most on 
a smaller scale) has been a general feature of the development of shipbuilding over 
the past fifty years.  This is shown in Table A6.1, comparing the average output per 
year in the five years from 1960 to 1964 with the five years around the peak in the 
mid-1970s (1973 to 1977) and the five years discussed above. 
Period 
All yards (number of 
ships per year) 
Yards taking orders 
post-crash only 
(number of ships 
per year) 
1960 to 1964 2.0 NA 
1973 to 1977 2.4 3.0 
2008 to 2012 3.2 5.9 
Table A6.15.1 – Average annual output for average shipyards producing 
vessels over 5,000 GT 
It can be seen from this table that the average output for yards surviving the crash 
has doubled from the post-peak period in the 1970s. 
The effect of economy of scale on competitiveness is two-fold.  Firstly it enables 
investment, overhead and other general costs to be spread more economically over 
a larger workload.  Secondly, it generates buying power for the shipyard particularly 
if the makers list, that is the list of equipment suppliers, is controlled.  This allows the 
shipyard to develop a strong supply chain and enables the material cost to be 
reduced.  . 
It would follow that the larger the shipyard the greater the competitive advantage that 
could be gained from these sources, provided that sufficient work can be maintained 
to utilise the expensive capacity developed.  This caveat identifies what might be 
regarded as a ‘double-edged sword’ characteristic of the strategy, given the variable 
nature of demand in the largest sector of the market.  The vulnerability of such 
strategies relates to the imperative to keep capacity occupied in a market downturn 
or to fill newly developed capacity and this mechanism was at the core of the EC’s 
arguments in the WTO case.  The conflict between investment to reduce costs and 
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the need to minimise costs in a downturn, in other words to minimise the overhead 
and financing burden that remains once output has turned down, has been well 
known for a long time.  Pollard and Robertson in their book on British shipbuilding 
between 1870 and 1914 state about shipbuilding at that time: “British yard owners 
were able to take advantage of their more highly skilled workforces by investing only 
in equipment that was absolutely necessary to manipulate the large, heavy, and hard 
components of modern ships, and by refusing to purchase as many labour-saving 
machines as German and American builders did.  Thus the conservatism of the 
British was motivated not by a shorter time horizon or an irrational distrust of 
innovation, but by an awareness (which the less experienced German and American 
builders did not share) of the [cyclical] hazards of the industry” (Pollard and 
Robertson, 1979, p. 29).  Whether this was a wise strategy in the long run is highly 
debatable, given the long slow demise of the British industry after this time and given 
that skilled labour costs tended to rise significantly as the market rose, diminishing 
the advantage of the strategy in the long term.  As pollard and Robertson state of 
this problem: “The difficulties were never satisfactorily resolved” (ibid.).  The most 
successful strategy has possibly been the strength between diversified sectors of 
industrial conglomerates, as for example seen in the ‘Chaebol’ of South Korea  (Joon 
Soo Jon, 2002, p. 558).  When shipbuilding is in need of support it is possible that 
other sectors of the group may be able to provide this because they may be at a 
stronger position in their own business cycle.  Professor Joon Soo Jon says in this 
book: “The flexibility inherent in the within-group transfer of resources to the benefit 
of shipbuilding operations has been important to the success of Japanese and South 
Korean Shipbuilders” (ibid.).  Even this strategy has its problems, however, for 
example in the role that the bankruptcy of Daewoo Motors played in the weakening 
of the entire group in the late 1990s, the shipyard DSME also subsequently 
becoming insolvent. 
B: Standardisation of the product 
Despite the progress of the past fifty years there persists an element of 
misunderstanding of the nature of the product of the commercial shipbuilding 
industry, particularly amongst those not directly involved in the industry.  Specifically 
this relates to a belief that ships are in some sense ‘unique’ in terms of product, 
differentiating shipbuilding, for example, from automobile construction where mass 
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production leads to production runs of thousands of quasi-identical products.  As 
Glen puts it: “many ships, although built to a basic design, will be tailored to a 
shipowner’s specific need.  In a world of mass manufacturing, this creates a distinct 
limitation to the opportunity of cost reduction through the repeated assembly of 
identical designs, thus limiting a potential source of production economies” (Glen, 
2006).   
The benefits of standardisation have long been known.  Sturmey noted in his 1962 
book on the decline of the British shipping industry, that one of the contributory 
factors was that British shipowners insisted on buying unique ships from British 
shipyards, ignoring the fact that standard ships could be purchased more cheaply 
from abroad: “Standardization of tramps, bulk carriers and tankers has been largely 
neglected by British shipowners and shipbuilders, despite the knowledge that such 
standardization could cut costs” (Sturmey, 1962, p. 401).  Despite this the contrary 
view, that ships are largely one-off project-builds, is still widely held.  In an article in 
the Naval Architect Magazine in October 2010, the ‘Head of Business Capture, 
AVEVA NET Solutions’ (the market leading supplier of computer design software for 
commercial shipbuilding) stated: “Shipbuilding is distinct from most other 
manufacturing industries.  Firstly, vessels are almost always unique, enormously 
complex and hugely expensive to create.  Secondly, these one-off products are 
designed and constructed to breathtakingly short timescales, involving vast material 
supply chains, production facilities and manpower logistics” (Gwyther, 2010).  
Certainly there are sections of the industry where vessels are predominantly unique, 
for example in the construction of some warships or dredgers, but this view of 
commercial shipbuilding in the modern era is far from giving an accurate 
representation of the global commercial shipbuilding industry. 
In making this very general claim for the ‘one-off’ nature of the product in 
shipbuilding, Gwyther is echoing a long-held view of the industry.  The ‘Geddes 
Report’ by the UK Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee published in 1966 describes in a 
section titled ‘The kind of industry’ the conflict between craft and industry in 
shipbuilding and states that ‘ships, like buildings, are mostly ‘one off’ jobs’(Geddes, 
1966).  The standard industry textbook from fifty years ago quoted previously, Hardy 
and Tyrell, echoed this view, notwithstanding ‘liberty ships” and ‘T2’ tankers that are 
noted as an exception: “It must be remembered that seldom – except in the case of 
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oil tankers – are more than six exact sister ships needed.  Therefore the highly 
specialized assembly-line establishment may find difficulty in operating at maximum 
efficiency”(Hardy and Tyrrell, 1964, p. 4).  Things started to change during the 1970s 
and in the ‘Booz-Allen’ report commissioned by the UK government into “British 
Shipbuilding 1972”, an update to the previously mentioned ‘Geddes Report’, it was 
stated that “Standard designs, particularly for large ships in the oil and bulk trades, 
are becoming increasingly acceptable to shipowners”(Booz-Allen and Hamilton 
International BV, 1973).  It is true to say that up to the 1980s standard products were 
the exception, rather than the rule, and were sufficiently unusual as to be branded 
with generic names to identify the series.  Examples include IHI’s ‘Fortune’ bulk 
carrier (61 built in total) and ‘Freedom’ general cargo ship (178 built in total), and the 
highly successful ‘SD14’ general cargo liner from Austin and Pickersgill, UK (208 
built in total).  Analysis of fleet data from Sea-Web reveals that of 943 ships over 
5,000 GT built in 1975, only 10% (95 ships in total) were of a recognised standard 
design of this type, with the longest series over the year being 10 ‘Santa Fe’ general 
cargo liners from AESA of Spain and 9 ‘SD14’s from Austin and Pickersgill.  Such 
charismatic names are rarely used in the modern era but the use of standard 
designs has become more common.  Analysis of Sea-Web data reveals that 28% of 
the 2,557 commercial vessels delivered in 2012 (1,848 ships in total) were of a 
branded and named standard design.  Even where there is no named standard, 
however, standardisation is now the norm in much of commercial shipbuilding, 
particularly for larger ships.  For example, between 2007 and 2014 Daewoo 
Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering of South Korea delivered 59 VLCCs, all of 
which have length and beam of 333m x 60m and deadweight about 320,000 tonnes.  
Hyundai Heavy Ulsan delivered 46 VLCCs also with these dimensions and Hyundai 
Samho a further 37.  Other Korean yards have delivered smaller numbers of VLCCs 
with almost identical dimensions.  Whilst these vessels are not specifically named as 
standards and there may be minor variations between ships, they constitute 
effectively quasi-standard ships that conform to size classes required by the shipping 
industry and conforming to the parcel sizes that shippers require for their trades. 
The development of strong size classes has been a significant feature of the 
shipbuilding boom of 2000 to 2008, differentiating it from the previous boom that 
peaked in the mid-1970s.  This is demonstrated in Figure 6.5, which shows the 
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spread of designs of crude oil tankers from shipyards in market leader Japan in 
1975, at the peak of the previous cycle, with those of shipyards from market leader 
South Korea at the peak of the recent cycle in 2010. 
 
Figure A6.15.5 – Comparison of the spread of crude oil tanker designs from 
market leaders at market peaks (data sourced from Sea-Web) 
The almost limitless spread of designs from Japanese yards in 1975 is contrasted 
with the tight clustering of types delivered by Korean yards in 2010, showing 
coherence in design between yards as well as within yards. 
How this quasi-standardisation of products relates to the concept of ‘like product’ 
within the context of the SCM agreement is addressed specifically in this 
dissertation.  It is worth touching further on one important aspect at this stage.  
Whilst the function of a ship built within a shipyard will vary according to its type, for 
example oil tanker compared to container ship, the interim products from which 
those two types are made, in particular the steel interim products, need not vary 
significantly.  As Bruce and Garrard term it: “One of the key features of design for 
production is the use of standards, for example for steel”(Bruce and Garrard, 1999).  





















     
        
        
        








described in SNAME’s standard work on ship production as follows: “The vast 
majority of shipbuilding involves the simultaneous production of multiple products of 
different types with some significant variation within product types.  A key to this type 
of production is to recognise that even given product variety and variation, there is a 
high degree of similarity between most ships’ intermediate products.  Intermediate 
products are the sub-products that are produced and then concatenated through 
multiple production stages to create a final product”(Lamb and Society of Naval 
Architects and Marine Engineers (U.S.), 2003, p.25-5).   
A good example of this principle can be found in the production of a stiffened flat 
panel, the fundamental unit of production in the construction of all ships.  Fabrication 
of a panel essentially involves the welding of a number of flat plates together, 
followed by the welding of stiffening structure to the resulting panel.  Such a panel 
will vary in scantlings (i.e. material thicknesses), overall shape and dimensions, the 
number of cut-outs and their shape and position and the size and arrangement of 
stiffening members.  From the point of view of operatives on the panel production 
line: 
 The overall shape and dimensions, providing that they are within the capacity 
of the production line, are of no consequence as the plates are cut 
automatically and provided they are laid in the correct orientation the panel 
dimensions will be correct.   
 The cut-outs are of no consequence as they also are cut automatically when 
the plates are cut. 
 The arrangement of stiffening members is of no consequence as the 
positioning of members is marked automatically by the cutting machine and, 
providing that the correct stiffeners are provided to the panel line cut-to-shape 
and are aligned to the correct lines, the panel arrangement will be correct. 
The final use of the panel is also of no consequence to its production, whether it is 
for use in a tanker or a bulk carrier, for example.  The stability of this part of the 
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